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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Anna Cook 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Department of Philosophy 
September 2018 
Title: Unable to Hear: Settler Ignorance and the Canadian Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission 
 
My dissertation provides an epistemic evaluation of settler colonialism in terms of 
settlers’ disavowal of past and ongoing settler colonial violence. I seek to explain how 
settlers can fail to hear Indigenous testimonies in ways that disrupt structural inequality 
and challenge settler colonial legitimacy. This theoretical consideration of settler 
ignorance reveals how the elimination of Indigenous peoples requires the 
delegitimatization of Indigenous peoples as knowers. This insight is crucial in evaluating 
contemporary governmental apologies and truth commissions aimed at reconciliation. In 
particular, I focus on the epistemic assumptions that do not challenge what I call ‘settler 
ignorance’ and so do not transform settler nation-myths that disavow past and present 
settler colonialism. My epistemic evaluation of settler colonialism demonstrates how the 
exclusion of Indigenous peoples from the realm of reason, what I call their ‘epistemic 
elimination,’ is not accidental, but integral to the settler colonial project of eliminating 
Indigenous presence.  
Using this characterization of settler ignorance, I evaluate the Canadian Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in terms of its ability to accomplish its mandate of 
“establishing and maintaining respectful relationships” between Indigenous peoples and 
settler Canadians. I conclude that the TRC fails on its own terms because it does not 
 v 
challenge epistemic assumptions that prevent testimonies of residential school survivors 
to be heard as expressions of Indigenous refusal of settler authority. Without challenging 
these epistemic assumptions, testimonies cannot disrupt structural settler ignorance and 
so, cannot lead to meaningful reconciliation.  
Meaningful reconciliation requires of settlers a reparative transformation of 
epistemic assumptions that work to maintain a structural ignorance of past and ongoing 
settler colonial violence. The goal of what I call ‘reparative knowing’ is both a personal 
one and a critical intervention into how settlers can become epistemically responsible 
agents. In the context of ongoing settler colonial violence, reparative knowing involves a 
troubling of settler common sense, and so, a disruption of structural settler ignorance. 
Without such an understanding of settler ignorance and reparative knowing, an 
investigation into the aims and transformations of settler colonialism would remain 
incomplete. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF SETTLER IGNORANCE IN THE 
CANADIAN TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 
 
I hate you residential school. I hate you.  
You’re a monster 
A huge hungry monster. 
Built with steel bones. Built with cement flesh. 
You’re a monster.  
Built to devour innocent Native children.  
— Excerpt of “Monster” by Dennis Saddleman1 
A Note on Terminology 
 Practices of naming and self-naming are important. As a white settler Canadian 
working in the field of Indigenous philosophy, deliberate practices of naming are all the 
more important.2 For the purposes of this project, I use ‘Indigenous peoples’ to refer to 
the Onkwehonwe (original people) of what is now called Canada and what is now called 
United States (Alfred 2009b, 181).3 I use ‘Indian’ to refer to the legal term in Canada, for 
example when referring to the Indian Act or as Vine Deloria Jr. and Daniel Wildcat use 
the term to name American Indians. The term ‘Aboriginal’ has become the most common 
                                                        
1 Poet Dennis Saddleman spoke at the Commission about his experience at Kamloops Residential School in 
Edmonton.  
 
2 I am second-generation Canadian (with parents from England and Scotland) growing up in Kahnawà:ke 
Mohawk land (Montréal) and currently living in Kalapuya land (Eugene, OR).  
 
3 While my analysis emerges from an investigation of Canadian policies, my account of settler colonial 
epistemology is not limited to policies to Canada (but United States, Australia, Hawaii). 
 
 2 
official term used in Canada to refer to First Nations, Inuit, and Métis people once 
adopted in the 1982 Constitution Act. As such, I use the term as it is used in 
governmental documents and use ‘Native’ or ‘Indigenous’ as a modifier when naming 
communities and nations.4  
I use ‘non-Indigenous’ or ‘non-Native’ to name persons or communities who are 
not Indigenous to the place called Canada. More specifically, I draw on Jodi Byrd 
(Chickasaw Nation), Chelsea Vowel (Métis) and Sherene Razack’s respective writings to 
more narrowly define who counts as a settler to Canada. Vowel specifies ‘settler’ as a 
term to refer to “the non-Indigenous peoples living in Canada who form the European-
descended sociopolitical majority” (Vowel 2016, 16).5 Razack’s definition of white 
settler society similarly emphasizes the role of racial hierarchy in the establishment, and 
continued shaping, of settler colonialism (Razack 2002). Byrd, moreover, provides a new 
category, the arrivant, to complicate the usual binary of colonial settler and native. 
‘Arrivants,’ which she borrows from poet Kamau Brathwaite names “people forced into 
the Americas through the violence of European and Anglo-American colonialism and 
imperialism around the globe” (Byrd 2011, xix).6 For the purposes of this project, I 
narrow my focus to the relationship between settler and Indigenous peoples. Unless 
specified, I use the term ‘settler,’ as Vowel does, to refer to non-Indigenous peoples 
                                                        
4 Audra Simpson highlights the importance of self-definition of Indigenous identity given the history of 
settler colonial violence through the management of membership rules through blood quantum rules 
(Simpson 2014).  
 
5 As Vowel points out, ‘settler’ is a relational term, rather than a racial category (Vowel 2016, 16).  
 
6 Similar to Byrd’s term ‘arrivant’, Vowel uses to term ‘non-Black people of color’ to distinguish non-
European-descended peoples who come to live in Canada from European-descended peoples who are able 
to access the social advantages of whiteness (Vowel 2016, 17). 
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living in Canada or the United States who form the sociopolitical majority. For this 
reason, ‘white settler’ and ‘settler’ are meant to be synonymous.7 When I use Razack’s 
term ‘white settler,’ I do so to explicitly draw attention to the intersection of settler 
colonialism and white supremacy, especially when this intersection has been 
undertheorized. 
 
History of the Canadian Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
The Indian Residential Schools system has been referred to as “Canada’s greatest 
national shame” (Stanton 2011, 1). Beginning in the 1880s, the Canadian government 
sought to assimilate Indigenous children by requiring, under the Indian Act of 1876, their 
attendance at church-run schools. The result was that 132 federally supported schools 
were set up in almost every province and territory and functioned for well over a 
century.8 Most schools were operated as joint ventures with Anglican, Catholic, 
Presbyterian, or United Churches.9 Over 150,000 children were separated from their 
families and communities to be sent far away to schools where they were forbidden to 
speak their languages, practice their spirituality or express their cultures. Physical and 
sexual abuse were rampant and at least 6,000 children died while in the residential school 
system.10  
                                                        
7 Since ‘settler’ is not a racial term, it should not be understood as following a dualistic logic. Identities are 
much more intricate than our terms can sometimes allow.  
 
8 The last federally run facility, the Gordon Residential School in Saskatchewan closed in 1997. 
 
9 67 percent of schools run by the Roman Catholic Church, 20 percent by the Anglicans, 10 percent run by 
the United Church, 3 percent by the Presbyterian Church.  
 
10 Vowel 2016, 117.  
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Starting in 1990, the violence of residential schools entered the public 
consciousness when Phil Fontaine, then Grand Chief of the Manitoba Assembly of 
Chiefs, spoke about his experience of abuse suffered in residential school on national 
television.11 The same year Fontaine publicly spoke out about his experience, the Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (hereafter RCAP) was formed in response to the Oka 
Crisis.12 The RCAP held public hearings across Canada, speaking to over 2,000 people 
and commissioning over 350 research commissions. Its mandate was to develop a 
research plan on four theme areas—governance; land and economy; social and cultural 
issues; and the North. RCAP’s final five-volume report was released in November 1996. 
Its findings, in short, were that past and current governmental policies towards Aboriginal 
peoples were “unethical,” and that there is a need for a complete restructuring of the 
relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples in Canada.13 The RCAP’s 
final report People to People, Nation to Nation sought to establish the foundations of a 
fair and honorable relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples of 
Canada. The report called for a new Royal Proclamation to require the government to 
commit to a “new set of ethical principles that would acknowledge and respect 
Aboriginal cultures and values, the historical origins of Aboriginal nationhood and the 
inherent right to Aboriginal self-determination.”14  
                                                        
11 Nagy 2014, 204.  
 
12 The Oka Crisis was a land dispute between Kahnawà:ke Mohawk nation and the Canadian town of Oka, 
Québec, which lasted 78 days in 1990.   
 
13 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples 1996. 
 
14 The Royal Proclamation of 1763 was a defining document in the relationship between Aboriginal and 
non-Aboriginal people in North America. Issued in the name of the king, the proclamation summarized the 
rules that were to govern British dealings with Aboriginal people—especially in relation to the question of 
land. The central messages of the proclamation are clear in its preamble: “Aboriginal people were not to be 
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The RCAP final report changes would have required constitutional change. The 
federal government’s response to the RCAP report, Gathering Strength: Canada’s 
Aboriginal Action Plan, emphasized non-constitutional approaches to strengthening 
Aboriginal governance and established the Aboriginal Healing Foundation (AHF) to 
manage a healing fund of $350 million with particular attention to the legacy of abuse in 
the residential schools system.15 This led to the creation of the federal Office of Indian 
Residential Schools Resolution Canada tasked with managing and resolving the large 
number of abuse claims filed by survivors of residential schools.  
These class-action lawsuits resulted in the Indian Residential Schools Settlement 
Agreement (IRSSA).16 The IRSSA is an agreement between the government of Canada 
and the approximately 86,000 Native Canadians who were enrolled in residential schools. 
The Settlement Agreement came into effect September 19, 2007 and provided 
approximately $5 billion in compensation, commemoration, and the establishment of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (hereafter TRC).17 
                                                        
‘molested or disturbed’ on their lands. Transactions involving Aboriginal land were to be negotiated 
properly between the Crown and ‘assemblies of Indians.’ Aboriginal lands were to be acquired only by fair 
dealing: treaty, or purchase by the Crown” (Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples 1996).  
15 The RCMP set up a Native Residential School Task Force to investigate allegations of criminal abuse 
(Regan 2010, 8). By 2000, it had received 3,400 complaints. 
 
16 At the time of the Settlement Agreement, 14,903 survivors had filed claims against the government, 
making it the largest out-of-court settlement agreement in Canadian history. The IRSSA came in the 
shadow of the dissolution of the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in 2005 that unsuccessfully settled 
thousands of residential school survivor lawsuits (Nagy 2012, 354).  
 
17 The five main components of the IRSSA are the Common Experience Payment (CEP), Independent 
Assessment Process (IAP), the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), Commemoration, and Health 
and Healing Services. The monetary repayment ($10,000 for the first school year the survivor attended, and 
an additional $3,000 for each subsequent school year) has been met with mixed reaction. The repayment 
process has been criticized by some students whose compensation claims were denied, while others report 
that the payment was important to them as tangible recognition of the systemic harms they suffered at the 
schools. 
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The TRC has had the stated purpose of promoting public awareness about the 
residential school system and educating Canadians about the 150-year history of 
residential schools, rather than bringing about legal reparations.18 As part of the truth-
telling and reconciliation process, there have been seven national events across Canada 
(Winnipeg in 2010, Inuvik in 2011, Halifax in 2011, Saskatoon in 2012, Montréal and 
Vancouver in 2013, and Edmonton in 2014) that aimed to engage and educate the 
Canadian public about the history of the residential school system through personal 
testimony from survivors, governmental officials, and church officials. Crucially, the 
TRC does not have powers of subpoena and “shall not name names unless the person has 
been already convicted” (Nagy 2014, 215).  
The TRC’s final report Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future: 
Summary of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada was 
published in June 2015 at the National Closing Event held in Ottawa. The report affirms 
that for over a century “the central goals of Canada’s Aboriginal policy were to eliminate 
Aboriginal governments; ignore Aboriginal rights; terminate the Treaties; and, through a 
process of assimilation, cause Aboriginal peoples to cease to exist as distinct legal, social, 
cultural, religious, and racial entities in Canada” (Honouring the Truth 2015, 1). The 
report names the establishment and operation of Indian Residential Schools system as 
“cultural genocide,” under Article 2(e) of the UN’s Convention on Genocide defined as 
“the destruction of those structures and practices that allow the group to continue as a 
                                                        
18 John Milloy, the former Research Director of the Canadian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, has 
been openly critical of the process—“The design of the Commission, even before Commissioners were 
selected, was naively careless—its mandate too large, its time frame too short (and there is really no 
advantage in being an unset organization) and its budget, which I hazard was “picked out of the air,” has 
proven wholly inadequate” (Milloy 2013, 13). After the initial TRC chair quit, the Commission was chaired 
by Justice Murray Sinclair, chief Wilson Littlechild and Marie Wilson (Regan 2010, 8). 
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group” (2015, 3). The report is accompanied by Calls to Action to “redress the legacy of 
residential schools and advance the process of reconciliation” (Calls to Action 2012). 
These ninety-four calls for action include concrete steps that can be taken by the 
governments of Canada, Indigenous peoples, churches, educators, the business sector, 
civil society organizations and others. The calls include subsections pertaining to child 
welfare, education, language and culture, health, and justice. 
The Canadian TRC was particular in many ways. Truth commissions have most 
often been established in countries making the transition to more democratic politics such 
as in South Africa, Chile, El Salvador, and Argentina. For this reason, the establishment 
of a truth commission in a stable Western democracy such as Canada was an unusual 
occurrence.19 Furthermore, the Canadian TRC was the first truth commission to be 
established as part of a judicially supervised negotiated agreement, rather than by 
executive order.20  
The creation of the TRC has been met with a fair amount of criticism from both 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous scholars. Paulette Regan and John Milloy have focused 
on the implications of a model of reconciliation that is grounded in a public confession 
that performs a form of voyeurism for a mostly settler audience (Milloy 2013, Regan 
2010); Taiaiake Alfred (Kahnawà:ke Mohawk) has argued that the absence of significant 
material changes and the restitution of tribal lands means that talk of reconciliation is 
empty rhetoric (Alfred 2009a); and Rosemary Nagy and Glen Sean Coulthard 
                                                        
19 Paulette Regan also notes that the Canadian TRC is the only commission that focuses on Indigenous 
peoples and on the historical experience of children (Regan 2010, 8). 
 
20 Rosemary Nagy traces the origin of the TRC as a hybrid model between a judicially-based public inquiry 
and a truth commission (Nagy 2014). 
 
 8 
(Yellowknives Dene) have respectively pointed out how the TRC positions the ills of 
colonialism strictly in the past and thus denies the realities of an ongoing settler colonial 
present (Nagy 2013; Coulthard 2014).  
While truth commissions provide a public platform to share survivors’ 
experiences, the reconciliatory potential of truth commissions rests, however, on how 
these personal testimonies are heard. In other words, if truth commissions are about 
giving voice to survivors, they should be evaluated in terms of how these testimonies are 
heard. At issue here is that the way settlers hear the voices of residential school survivors 
can either maintain a historical amnesia about past and ongoing colonial violence, or 
effectively disturb what Alfred calls, “the benevolent peacemaker myth that forms the 
basis of settler identity” (Alfred in Regan 2010, ix). In this vein, Paulette Regan, the 
Research Director of the Canadian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, notes that the 
Canadian TRC “provides a rare opportunity for non-Native Canadians to undertake a 
deeply critical reflective re-examination of history and themselves” (Regan 2010, 8). I 
contend, in turn, that the TRC provides a rare opportunity to consider what structures and 
discourses prevent testimonies from Indigenous peoples from being heard in a way that 
would transform settler history and settler identity.  
In my dissertation, I argue that settler colonialism produces a form of structural 
ignorance. I draw from settler colonial studies, Native feminisms and social epistemology 
in order to articulate a novel theoretical framework of settler ignorance, which maintains 
a denial of past and ongoing settler colonialism by depicting Indigenous peoples as 
irrational and stuck in a fixed past. This project weaves together Native and Western 
 9 
traditions of knowledge in order to expose a settler colonial epistemology that 
undermines claims to Indigenous self-determination. 
Using this characterization of settler ignorance, I evaluate the Canadian TRC to 
show its limitations in addressing settler ignorance and affirm that, without challenging 
its epistemic assumptions, the Commission merely performs the settler colonial myth of 
the “benevolent settler.” The Canadian TRC offers a particularly fruitful occasion to 
consider how settlers hear the testimonies of Indigenous peoples and exemplifies how 
settler ignorance is maintained in the face of testimonies of past and ongoing settler 
colonial violence.  
My dissertation provides an epistemic evaluation of settler colonialism in terms of 
settlers’ disavowal of past and ongoing settler colonial violence. I seek to explain how 
settlers can fail to hear Indigenous testimonies in ways that disrupt structural inequality 
and challenge settler colonial legitimacy. This theoretical consideration of settler 
ignorance reveals how the elimination of Indigenous peoples requires the 
delegitimatization of Indigenous peoples as knowers. This insight is crucial in evaluating 
contemporary governmental apologies and truth commissions aimed at reconciliation. As 
such, my dissertation provides a critical examination of the TRC in terms of how it 
frames testimonies of residential school survivors. In particular, I focus on the epistemic 
assumptions that do not challenge what I call ‘settler ignorance,’ and so do not transform 
settler nation-myths that disavow past and present settler colonialism.  
My epistemic evaluation of settler colonialism demonstrates how the exclusion of 
Indigenous peoples from the realm of reason, what I call their ‘epistemic elimination,’ is 
not accidental, but integral to the settler colonial project of eliminating Indigenous 
 10 
presence. This epistemic evaluation informs my evaluation of TRC in terms of its ability 
to accomplish its mandate  of “establishing new relationships embedded in mutual 
recognition and respect that will forge a brighter future” between Indigenous peoples and 
settler Canadians (Honouring our Truth 2015, 339). I conclude that the TRC fails on its 
own terms because it does not challenge epistemic assumptions that prevent testimonies 
of residential school survivors to be heard as expressions of Indigenous refusal of settler 
authority. Without challenging these epistemic assumptions, testimonies cannot disrupt 
structural settler ignorance and so, cannot lead to meaningful reconciliation.  
Meaningful reconciliation requires of settlers a reparative transformation of 
epistemic assumptions that work to maintain a structural ignorance of past and ongoing 
settler colonial violence. The goal of what I call ‘reparative knowing’ is both a personal 
one and a critical intervention into how settlers can become epistemically responsible 
agents. In the context of ongoing settler colonial violence, reparative knowing involves a 
troubling of settler common sense and a disruption of structural settler ignorance. While 
my theoretical framework emerges from an engagement with the Canadian TRC, I claim 
that settler ignorance is fundamental to the aims of settler colonialism whose scope 
exceeds a Canadian context. Settler colonialism produces structural ignorance as one of 
its effects. Without such an understanding of settler ignorance and reparative knowing, an 
investigation into the aims and transformations of settler colonialism would remain 
incomplete.21  
 
                                                        
21 This diagnostic explanation of settler ignorance speaks to settlers’ lack of acknowledgement and respect 
in different settler colonial contexts. This thus applies to questions of land repatriation, sovereignty, 
pipelines, welfare abuses and disproportionate incarceration rates.  
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Chapter Overview 
My second chapter, “Truth, Reconciliation, and Recognition” demonstrates how a 
politics of recognition fails to transform relationships between Indigenous and settler 
Canadians not only because it enacts an internalization of colonial recognition, but 
because it fails to account for structural ignorance. The TRC both shows how politics of 
recognition concretely manifests, and fails, in a settler colonial context. I first show the 
role of recognition in Canadian governmental policies whereby the state recognizes the 
cultural distinctness of Indigenous peoples as a group in Canada and consider its 
limitations. The model of recognition fails to appropriately characterize the harm of 
settler colonialism in terms of the seizure of land and a loss of self-determination. The 
TRC provides a concrete example of how a politics of recognition in settler colonial 
context functions, showing its limitations in addressing the structural violence of settler 
colonialism. This chapter presents the limitations of a recognition-model of reconciliation 
in three ways: (i) recognition’s inability to speak to structural inequality; (ii) its narrow 
definition of recognition in terms of culture; (iii) and its internalization of colonial 
recognition.  
While I agree that a politics of recognition is inadequate in transforming settler 
colonial relations, I extend Glen Sean Coulthard’s critical intervention by framing these 
limitations in terms of settler ignorance. A politics of recognition fails to transform 
relationships between Indigenous and settler Canadians not only because it enacts an 
internalization of colonial recognition, but because it fails to account for the denial of 
settler colonialism. I argue, with Kevin Bruyneel, that this disavowal does not emerge 
from a lack of information, but rather emerges from a particular kind of knowing that 
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undermines the testimony of Indigenous peoples. The TRC assumes that the testimonies 
will be heard in a politically meaningful way. I am critical of this assumption, and in 
response, this chapter argues that a liberal politics of recognition cannot challenge this 
disavowal since its characterization of social oppression is predicated upon a denial of 
settler colonialism. 
My third chapter, “Settler Colonial Epistemology,” contends that the devaluation 
of Indigenous peoples as knowers is integral to the settler colonial project. I draw on 
Patrick Wolfe and Lorenzo Veracini’s characterization of the underlying aims of settler 
colonialism as a logic of elimination (as opposed to colonialism’s logic of exploitation) 
that both seeks to eliminate Indigenous peoples and desires its very own extinction. The 
aim of eliminating Indigenous presence takes the form of statistical elimination, 
elimination through settler nation-building myths, as well as what I call an “epistemic 
elimination.” The latter eliminates Indigenous peoples as a group from the realm of 
reason. 
An epistemic evaluation of settler colonialism explains the assumptions that 
justify the settler colonial project of eliminating Indigenous peoples in order to seize land. 
This comes to form what I call a settler colonial epistemology. Crucially, settler colonial 
epistemology has a specific understanding of land as property. John Locke’s political 
theory epitomizes the dominant model of Western rationality in which rational 
relationships to land are relationships of ownership and cultivation. According to a settler 
colonial epistemology, the rational understanding of land is as inert matter to be owned 
and cultivated. According to a settler colonial epistemology, Indigenous relations to the 
land are seen as irrational and primitive. As such, settler colonial epistemology justifies 
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land dispossession by eliminating Indigenous peoples from the realm of reason. The 
epistemic elimination of Indigenous peoples explains the justification for both the 
characterization of a populated North American continent as belonging to no one (terra 
nullius) and the governmental policies of US boarding schools and Canada’s residential 
school policy. 
My fourth chapter, “Settler Ignorance,” expands upon my third chapter to provide 
an original description of settler colonialism as an epistemology of ignorance. Settler 
colonial epistemology justifies ongoing ignorance and denial of a settler colonial past and 
present. Settler ignorance is not a lack of knowing, but a particular kind of knowing and 
remembering. This chapter engages with recent developments in social epistemology that 
aim to identify different forms of ignorance and examine how ignorance is produced and 
sustained. In particular, I draw on Charles Mills’ work on white ignorance, which he tells 
us, cultivates collective amnesia about the past that undermines the testimony and 
credibility of nonwhite people. 
I argue, however, that Mills’ account of white ignorance should be expanded to a 
consideration of white settler ignorance. I broaden an account of racial ignorance to 
include the particular epistemic structures of settler colonialism. This characterization of 
settler ignorance shows that the denial of past and ongoing violence against Indigenous 
peoples, through the reconstruction of the past to assert the primacy of settlers, is not 
explainable in terms of a lack of access to resources for knowledge and information but is 
rather a structural ignorance. This structural ignorance functions to discredit Indigenous 
speakers by hearing emotional testimonies as (i) an expression of past wrongs and (ii) 
evidence of individual pathology. This structural ignorance is invisible to itself and 
 14 
exempts itself from critique. It is for this reason that Indigenous voices are necessary in 
order to expose these epistemic structures.  
My fifth chapter, “Settler Hearing and the TRC,” provides an ethical evaluation of 
the Canadian TRC in light of structural settler ignorance. This evaluation shows how 
settler colonial epistemic assumptions limit the possibility for meaningful reconciliation. 
The confessional-model of the TRC comes to form what I call ‘settler hearing,’ a kind of 
paranoid hearing that confirms settler authority in which the hearer is not open to 
surprising or unsettling communication. Settler hearing is a concrete manifestation of 
structural settler ignorance. I characterize settler hearing in TRC in terms of three 
features: (i) its mandate’s presumption that the sharing of testimony can and will 
reconcile relationships; (ii) the creation of a template for acceptable testimonies; and (iii) 
its isolation from structural settler colonial violence.  
Insofar as the TRC performs a settler hearing, it fails in terms of both its own 
mandate of “establishing and maintaining respectful relationships” between settler 
Canadians and Indigenous communities, as well as its ability to assuage the ethical 
loneliness of residential school survivors. In order to address the ethical loneliness of 
residential school survivors, settlers must develop a kind of ‘reparative hearing’ whereby 
the voices of residential school survivors are heard as an expression of ongoing 
Indigenous self-determination and agency such that these voices testify to the ongoing 
failure of the settler colonial project of elimination.  
My final chapter, “Unsettling Settler Ignorance,” proposes practices to challenge 
structural settler ignorance. These are practices of reparative knowing that show what 
meaningful reconciliation requires on the part of settlers. Against the TRC’s framing of 
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reconciliation as something that has a single fixed meaning, I contend that reconciliation 
comes to require different practices for Indigenous communities than for settlers. With 
this in mind, I present two possible definitions of reconciliation that go beyond the 
TRC—reconciliation as refusal and resurgence, and reconciliation as reparation. The 
account of reconciliation as refusal and resurgence showcases practices of cultivating 
Indigenous self-determination within Indigenous communities and outside the confine of 
recognition from the settler Canadian government. The account of reconciliation as 
reparation proposes practices aimed at settlers to recognize their very own settler identity 
and its implications in order to bear ethical witness to past and ongoing settler colonial 
violence. This form of reconciliation requires that settlers take up practices of reparative 
knowing whereby they cultivate an epistemic responsibility characterized by humility, 
curiosity and open-mindedness.  
In the context of ongoing settler colonial violence, reparative knowing involves a 
critical transformation of settler ignorance. This transformation must be predicated upon 
a rejection of the “placelessness” of Western epistemology, which justifies land 
dispossession through the epistemic elimination of Indigenous peoples as credible 
knowers. For this reason, I conclude with a proposal for unsettling settler ignorance that 
is rooted in Indigenous land-based education.  
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CHAPTER II 
TRUTH, RECONCILIATION, AND RECOGNITION 
 
I think all Canadians need to stop and take a look and not look away.  
Yeah, it’s embarrassing, yeah, it’s an ugly part of our history.  
We don’t want to know about it. What I want to see from the Commission is to rewrite the 
history books so that other generations will understand and not go through the same 
thing that we’re going through now, like it never happened. 
Daniel Elliot, descendant of survivors22  
 
Introduction 
The language of recognition has become a dominant framework to discuss 
political struggles. In particular, Glen Sean Coulthard notes that Indigenous self-
determination efforts in Canada have been couched in terms of recognition.23 The TRC, 
in particular, is immersed in this recognition-talk insofar as it seeks to provide an 
opportunity for survivors to have their experiences recognized. Recognition of shared 
experience fulfills the state’s legal responsibility of the IRSSA. The TRC invites 
survivors of residential schools to share their personal narratives under the assumption 
that this will inform the Canadian public of the residential school legacy and will 
motivate a transformation of settler identity. In this respect, the TRC proposes a model of 
                                                        
22 Honouring the Truth 2015, 13. 
 
23 Coulthard cites the 2005 policy position issued by Canada’s largest Aboriginal organization, the 
Assembly of First Nations (AFN), in which self-determination is defined “around a vision of the 
relationship between First Nations and Canada which would lead to strengthening recognition and 
implementation of First Nations’ governments” (Coulthard 2007, 438). 
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reconciliation based on the sharing of personal testimony. According to this view, in 
order for there to be reconciliation, there must be recognition of the experiences of 
survivors of residential schools. The problem is a lack of information, a lack of 
recognition, and so the remedy is more information, more recognition.  
As such, the TRC’s underlying epistemic claim is that a collection of facts and 
testimonies can and will reconcile relationships between Indigenous peoples and settler 
Canadians. It assumes that settler Canadians simply need to hear testimonies of 
residential school survivors in order to challenge our historical amnesia about the role 
residential schools have played in the creation of the settler colonial nation-state now 
called Canada. 
The TRC implies that truth-telling, through the recognition of survivors’ 
experiences, can lead to reconciliation. The name of the commission, at the very least, 
suggests that truth-telling is first required in order to achieve reconciliation. What 
reconciliation means, however, remains murky and tenuous.24 The final report notes the 
amorphous definition of reconciliation throughout the truth-telling events, yet officially 
defines reconciliation as “an ongoing process of establishing and maintaining respectful 
relationships” (Honouring the Truth 2015, 13). The TRC implicitly affirms that truth-
telling is intimately related to reconciliation and that reconciliation must occur through 
state recognition.25  
                                                        
 
24 Dale Turner sees the definition of reconciliation in the TRC as follows: The action of restoring estranged 
people or parties to friendship; the result of this; the fact of being reconciled (Turner 2011). Reconciliation 
will emerge as a central concept in chapter 6.   
 
25 “There is an emerging and compelling desire to put the events of the past behind us so that we can work 
towards a stronger and healthier future. The truth telling and reconciliation process as part of an overall 
holistic and comprehensive response to the Indian Residential School legacy is a sincere indication and 
acknowledgement of the injustices and harms experienced by Aboriginal people and the need for continued 
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This chapter considers the relationship between recognition and reconciliation and 
uses the TRC as a concrete example of a liberal politics of recognition that seeks 
reconciliation through the recognition of Indigenous peoples as a distinct cultural group 
in Canada. I conclude that the liberal model of recognition fails to address structural 
settler colonial violence and, as such, cannot provide the conditions for voices of 
residential school survivors to be heard in a meaningful way. I begin by contextualizing 
the politics of recognition as a guiding political theory in addressing political struggles in 
multicultural liberal democracies. I then examine the limitations of this model in terms of 
(i) the narrowing of recognition to cultural recognition and (ii) the overshadowing of 
structural and economic features of social oppression. I go on to show how these 
limitations of liberal model of recognition are all the more visible and damaging in a 
settler colonial context. In particular, I extend Coulthard’s critique that recognition leads 
to internalized colonial identification by framing these limitations in terms of 
recognition’s misdiagnosis of settler colonial violence. The model of recognition fails to 
appropriately characterize the harm of settler colonialism in terms of the seizure of land 
and a loss of self-determination, defined as “the right of a people to govern themselves by 
their own laws and exercise jurisdiction over their territories” (Tully 2000a, 57).26  
The limitations of a liberal model of recognition play out in the TRC in the 
particular way that it assumes that the cause of settlers’ historical amnesia is a lack of 
                                                        
healing. This is a profound commitment to establishing new relationships embedded in mutual recognition 
and respect that will forge a brighter future. The truth of our common experiences will help set our spirits 
free and pave the way to reconciliation” (Honouring the Truth 2015, 339).  
26 I will return to the question of Indigenous self-determination in chapter 6. James Tully writes, “the right 
of self-determination is, on any plausible account of its contested criteria, the right of a people to govern 
themselves by their own laws and exercise jurisdiction over their territories” (Tully 2000a, 57).  
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information that can be rectified by testimony. The mischaracterization of the harms of 
settler colonialism leads to a fundamental misunderstanding of settler Canadians’ 
obliviousness about residential schools as a case of an innocent lack of knowledge. 
Drawing on Kevin Bruyneel’s account of settler memory, I show how settlers’ historical 
amnesia about residential schools is not a lack of memory but a particular kind of 
remembering that upholds settler colonial power. Given recognition’s misdiagnosis of 
both the source of settler colonial violence and settlers’ historical amnesia, I affirm that 
the model of recognition cannot identify a continued disavowal of settler colonialism. For 
this reason, I conclude that a liberal politics of recognition cannot challenge this 
disavowal since its characterization of social oppression is predicated upon a denial of 
settler colonialism. 
 
Politics of Recognition 
The motif of recognition as a normative goal of political struggle is situated 
within a variety of philosophical traditions and debates. It is not clear what exactly 
recognition means or looks like. As Nancy Fraser puts it, “is recognition really a matter 
of justice, or is it a matter of self-realization?” (Fraser and Honneth 2003, 27). In other 
words, are political struggles in a liberal multicultural context primarily focused on 
identity or on justice? While recognition emerges as a central theme in many 
philosophical contexts and traditions, for the purposes of this project, I primarily frame 
recognition as it pertains to critical interventions to liberal political theory.27 Within 
liberal political thought, the motif of recognition arises in the liberal-communitarian 
                                                        
27 The motif of recognition first emerges in the critical theory tradition in Hobbes and Rousseau.  
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debate that emerges in response to John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (1971). It is a debate 
about the nature of the self and the role of political institutions to promote the flourishing 
of the self. The terms of this debate stem from Kant and Hegel’s respective definitions of 
freedom and self-determination. Kant’s emphasis on the respect for the equal dignity of 
autonomous beings gets articulated in the liberal position, whereas Hegel’s recognition 
model of identity comes to form the basis of the communitarian position.28  
In the modern articulation of this debate, though, the concern for recognition 
emerges from the defense of minority cultural groups in a multicultural context. Rawlsian 
Kantian liberalism affirms that a just society is one that does not promote particular ends 
but enables citizens to pursue their own values and ends. Liberalism expounds a theory of 
justice in relation to the distribution of goods conforming to a concept of justice as 
fairness (Rawls 1971). Justice is limited to the distribution of goods. Liberalism seeks to 
provide the framework for individuals to pursue their own values and ends, and as such, 
it posits a constitutive principle of equality, which requires official neutrality on 
conceptions of the good life (Dworkin 1978).  
Early critics of Rawls, such as Sandel (1981) and MacIntyre (1984), contest the 
Rawlsian description of individuals as solitary, autonomous rational holders of desires 
and beliefs, and propose, in response, a model of the self as socially and culturally 
embedded, and fundamentally “encumbered” (Sandel 1984). Rawls’ theory of justice as 
fairness aims to decontextualize questions of identity through his thought experiment of 
the original position with its veil of ignorance, whereby citizens are abstractly defined as 
                                                        
28 Hegel rejects the atomism of Kant’s position whereby ethical acts arise from the exercise of reason. For 
Hegel, freedom and the self do not arise from introspection, but from intersubjective recognition. As such, 
rights are concretely actualized through the intersubjective recognition of freedom (Honneth 1995, 11-17).   
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equally rationally and mutually disinterested. Sandel characterizes Rawls’ original 
position as a variation of Kant’s transcendental argument in providing the foundation for 
the right that is prior to the good (Sandel 1984, 85). This argument, however, presupposes 
a picture of the self as an “unencumbered self” in which the self is an ideally free rational 
agent whose identity is prior to its aims and interests (1984, 86).29 Sandel and MacIntyre 
contest the very viability of this unencumbered self, turning to Aristotle and Hegel to 
articulate the importance of cultural membership in the comprehension of virtues and the 
creation of identity.  
The critiques of traditional liberalism’s individualism and neutrality of the 
conception of the good life are further developed within debates about multiculturalism. 
Liberal neutrality seems at odds with the aims of multiculturalism, which is explicitly 
aimed at a particular conception of the good life, namely membership in an ethno-cultural 
group.30 The questions of cultural diversity arose within the political context of political 
struggles by Indigenous peoples, national minorities, and immigrants in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s (Laden and Owen 2007). In practice, this involves answering the 
question of what negotiations are necessary to ensure the flourishing of individuals in 
different cultural contexts. As a result of these political struggles, a politics of 
multiculturalism emerges with an emphasis on recognition. Charles Taylor, Will 
Kymlicka and James Tully theorize the question of recognition as it pertains to the 
defense of minority rights within a specifically Canadian context. Their central goal is to 
                                                        
29 Seyla Benhabib argues that Hobbes’ definition of men as “sprung out of the earth, and suddenly, like 
mushrooms, come to full maturity” characterizes the ideal of the autonomous man (Benhabib 1986, 156).    
 
30 Laden and Owen suggest that a Rawlsian framework has led to “a number of idealizing assumptions such 
as the closed character of the polity […] and its cultural homogeneity,” which in turn have led to a relative 
disengagement with issues of cultural diversity within liberal political thought (Laden and Owen 2007, 5). 
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articulate the importance of the recognition of cultural identities in a multicultural liberal 
democracy in a way that extends the communitarian argument for the centrality of 
community membership. At issue in their respective discussions is whether minority 
rights can be defended within a liberal framework of individual rights and state neutrality, 
or whether attention to recognition exceeds the confines of liberalism.   
 Most contemporary work on recognition as a normative framework for political 
movements developed in response to Charles Taylor’s article “Multiculturalism and the 
Politics of Recognition.” In his article, Taylor traces the development of recognition as a 
normative category from the advent of individualized identity and the ideal of 
authenticity that emerged with the collapse of social hierarchy in the beginning of the 18th 
century.31 This collapse led to the idea of individualized identity and authenticity as 
inwardly generated. As a result, recognition became fundamentally linked to self-identity 
and an “understanding of who we are, of our fundamental defining characteristics” 
(Taylor 1994, 25). For Taylor, recognition is fundamentally about identity. 
 The political implications of a recognition model of identity, however, are many. 
Taylor describes how the politics of recognition, which is based on the principle of equal 
respect, has come to mean two different things in the public sphere: the politics of equal 
dignity, “which emphasizes the dignity of all citizens and thus argues for the equalization 
of rights and entitlements” (1994, 37); and the politics of difference, “which emphasizes 
the unique identity of an individual or a group in terms of their distinctness from 
everyone else” (1994, 39). These two modes of politics, both based on the notion of equal 
                                                        
31 This collapse saw the rejection the notion of honor, which was intrinsically linked to inequality and 
preferences, in favor of the modern notion of dignity, which is defined “in a universalist and egalitarian 
sense” (Taylor 1994, 27). 
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respect, come into conflict—the principle of equal respect requires that we treat people in 
a difference-blind fashion by focusing on what is the same in individuals, while the 
principle of equal respect requires that we recognize, and even foster, particularity (1994, 
43). On each other’s terms, they violate the principle of equal respect: the politics of 
difference violates the principle of non-discrimination and the politics of equal dignity 
negates identity by forcing people into a homogenous mold that is untrue to their 
particular authentic identity.  
 Taylor’s politics of recognition distinguishes itself from the liberal principle of 
equality and the principle of dignity. Drawing on Rousseau, Herder and Hegel, Taylor’s 
politics of recognition rests on a holist ontology in which the self arises dialogically 
through reciprocal recognition of oneself as separate and equal. As a result, the social 
relation of recognition is prior to the individual and intersubjectivity is prior to 
subjectivity. In other words, you cannot be yourself unless you are recognized by another 
self. For this reason, Taylor characterizes recognition as a “vital human need,” such that 
nonrecognition or misrecognition is “a form of oppression by inflicting crippling self-
hatred” (1994, 26). Since recognition is vital to subjectivity, the absence of recognition, is 
profoundly damaging. For Taylor, recognition is required on both the intimate plane for 
acknowledgement of an original identity and on the social plane for a healthy democratic 
society.32  
 Taylor, ultimately, upholds a version of a politics of difference by arguing that a 
                                                        
32 This recalls Hegel’s description of the master-slave dialectic specifies the need for mutual intersubjective 
recognition in Phenomenology of Spirit and the need for contractual recognition within civil society and 
solidarity within the state in Philosophy of Right. Axel Honneth’s model of recognition similarly extorts the 
sociality of Spirit (Honneth 2014).  
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politics of recognition must accommodate value pluralism and support the survival of 
minority cultural groups. Individual identity does not occur in isolation, but is formed 
through “dialogue with others, in agreement or struggle with their recognition of us” 
(1991, 45-46). Cultural communication is the horizon for individuals to develop their 
identities. One of his examples is the recognition of Québécois culture as distinct within 
Canadian culture. The preservation of Québécois culture violates state neutrality insofar 
as it posits its survival and flourishing as a social good. For example, Taylor’s defense of 
language policies (Bill 101, for example)33 that promote the survival of French language 
that is crucial to Québécois culture violates liberalism’s principle of equal respect insofar 
as it posits a vision of the good life.34 His other example is the accommodation of claims 
by First Nations to “preserve their cultural integrity” in order to realize their status as 
“distinct and self-determining actors” (1994, 40). As such, Taylor characterizes the ills of 
settler colonialism in terms of the preservation of cultural integrity. The lack of 
recognition (or misrecognition) of Indigenous culture is the form of violence that a 
politics of recognition seeks to redress. As I show in the final section, this 
characterization of settler colonial violence is both too narrow and leaves out questions of 
political self-determination and land dispossession in such a way that signals 
recognition’s failure to bring about meaningful reconciliation.   
                                                        
33 The Charter of the French Language, known as Bill 101, is a 1977 law in Québec (with subsequent 
amendments) that makes “French the language of Government and the Law, as well as the normal and 
everyday language of work, instruction, communication, commerce and business” (Éditeur officiel du 
Québec 2018).  
 
34 For this reason, he has been characterized as a communitarian along with Michael Walzer (Tully 1995, 
44). Walzer also critiques the abstraction of Rawlsian liberalism and argues that political theory must arise 
from the context of people’s lived realities (Walzer 1983). Michael Sandel outlines the communitarian 
position in “The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self” (Sandel 1984). 
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 The concern with cultural recognition within Canada’s liberal policy of 
multiculturalism gets articulated differently in Will Kymlicka’s work. Kymlicka, on the 
other hand, develops a defense of “group-differentiated rights” within a liberal model of 
autonomy (Kymlicka 1995). Although Kymlicka characterizes group membership as a 
requirement for the development of autonomy, he does not characterize cultural identity 
as an intrinsic good, as Taylor does, but as an instrumental good in attaining individual 
autonomy. In this respect, Kymlicka is neither a communitarian who views a person’s 
cultural community as determining the conception of the good, nor a cosmopolitan who 
affirms that an individual can flourish without a membership in a single ethno-cultural 
group (see Waldron 1995).35 Alternatively, Kymlicka is committed to defending minority 
rights within a liberal framework that prioritizes individual autonomy and state neutrality. 
His position can be placed between communitarianism and cosmopolitanism—he 
considers cultural membership to be “an unchosen value” like a communitarian and he 
values free individual choice about conceptions of the good like a cosmopolitan. 
Kymlicka insists that the exercise of free choice is possible only within a cultural context 
that fosters autonomy (Kymlicka 1995, 85). He characterizes cultures as the “contexts of 
choice” for individuals that provide meaningful and intelligible options from which 
people can frame their goals (1995, 89).36 In this way, Kymlicka articulates a liberal 
                                                        
35 The cosmopolitan argument is critical that a communitarian defense of culture maintains a crystalized 
version of a dynamic culture that limits its ability to adapt. Jeremy Waldron goes on to make the stronger 
claim that a cosmopolitan lifestyle is the only authentic response to a modern world. He describes the 
cosmopolitan as someone who “refuses to think of himself as defined by his location or his ancestry or his 
citizenship or his language” (Waldron 1995, 95). 
 
36 Kymlicka’s liberal multiculturalism resonates with Joseph Raz’s claim that the development of personal 
autonomy and freedom depends on cultural membership. He defines personal freedom as the freedom to 
choose from culturally defined options (Raz 1994, 161). Liberal multiculturalism emphasizes value 
pluralism as well as the belief that individual freedom relies on “full and unimpeded membership in a 
respected and flourishing cultural group” (1994, 159). Kymlicka expands on Raz’s theory of liberal 
 26 
multiculturalist position for the preservation of societal culture37 that remains loyal to the 
liberal value of individual freedom.38 For this reason, he affirms that national minorities 
and Indigenous peoples should have control over education as well as other aspects of 
their cultural and political life.39 
 Moving beyond the communitarian-liberal impasse, James Tully articulates an 
account of recognition that engages with Indigenous models of constitutionalism that 
reject the norm of uniformity. In this vein, he proposes a dynamic model of recognition 
whereby recognition is not overdetermined but is the result of negotiation and agreement 
among the group demanding recognition. In other words, recognition is a process of 
compromise and negotiation within the group, as well as between the group and other 
members of society. It is for this reason that Tully characterizes recognition not as a 
‘dialogue’ but as a complex ‘multilogue’ that is inevitably unstable and always 
                                                        
multiculturalism and furthers the connection between identity and cultural membership in Liberalism, 
Community, and Culture (Kymlicka 1989).  
 
37 A “societal culture” is synonymous with ‘a nation’ or ‘a people’ – “that is, an intergenerational 
community, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a 
distinct language and history. A state is multicultural if its members either belong to different nations (a 
multi-nation state) or have migrated from different nations (a polyethnic state), and if this fact is an 
important aspect of personal identity and political life” (Kymlicka 1995, 18). 
 
38 Seyla Benhabib similarly contends that liberalism can provide a framework to work through the 
recognition of culture. She resists, however, both Taylor and Kymlicka’s respective claims for recognition 
on the basis of the preservation of culture and puts forward a claim for recognition on the basis of the 
conception of cultures and identities as “essentially contested and internally riven narratives” rather than as 
static entities (Benhabib 2002, xi). For her, cultural identification is constituted by “a series of interlocking, 
fluid, and often competing strands of signification and argumentation” (2006, 385). For example, “to be a 
Catholic” is “to know and to identify with some strands of collective narrative through which the past is 
accounted for and the future anticipated” (2006, 385). Benhabib argues that cultural diversity is compatible 
with democratic equality only if three normative conditions are met: egalitarian reciprocity, voluntary self-
ascription, and the freedom of exit and association (2002, 19). Under this model, claims for recognition 
must be articulated within the framework of deliberative democracy (by meeting the three conditions), and 
with an understanding that cultural identity is both porous and negotiable. 
 
39 See Moore 2003.  
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incomplete (Tully 2000b, 475). Crucially, he acknowledges that recognition demands 
cannot be made on the ground of a stable and fixed group identity. Group identity is the 
result of dialogue and negotiation, such that “any formal recognition at best will be a 
codification of the state of process of identity negotiation at a particular time, a reification 
of a moment of the more primary activities” (2000b, 477). For this reason, he suggests 
that the struggles for recognition are better understood as struggles for ‘disclosure’ or 
‘acknowledgment’ (2000b, 479). Recognition is a form of democratic participation that 
demands political freedom to negotiate the rules according to which group members 
recognize one another. Recognition is more than simply a matter of a fixed and stable 
identity, but a matter of group identity in flux that arises through negotiation and struggle.  
 Talk of recognition has not been limited, however, to discussions internal to 
liberal political theory, but has also been an important framework in social critical theory. 
Axel Honneth, for one, echoes Taylor’s characterization of recognition as a necessary 
condition for attaining full undistorted subjectivity. In this respect, both Taylor and 
Honneth articulate the harm of misrecognition in ethical terms—misrecognition stunts the 
subject’s capacity for achieving a good life.40 According to this identitarian account of 
recognition, there is a kernel of authentic identity that must be fully developed through 
the process of recognition in order to be an agent. Furthermore, Honneth contends that 
                                                        
40 Honneth provides a twofold understanding of recognition as both the basic intersubjective structure of 
individuation and the normative direction of social development. Drawing on Hegel’s intersubjective model 
of identity and G. H. Mead’s pragmatist social psychology, Honneth identifies the need for recognition 
within three principal spheres of social interaction: love, rights, and esteem (Honneth 1995). Following the 
object relations theory of Donald Winnicott and Jessica Benjamin, Honneth presents the first affective 
recognition of parent-child as the “structural core of all ethical life” which makes autonomous participation 
in public life possible (1995, 107). The legal form of recognition in the form of rights and the status 
recognition of social esteem as a unique person are further generalizations of this primary affective 
recognition. 
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the conceptual framework of recognition is the “appropriate tool for categorically 
unlocking social experiences of injustice as a whole” (Fraser and Honneth 2003, 133). 
For Honneth, social oppression lies in the disrespect and psychic harm of misrecognition. 
As a result, the recognition model of struggle provides a “semantic bridge” between 
personal experience of injustice and impersonal institutionalization of legal and status 
recognition (Honneth 1995, 163). Moreover, Honneth’s account of the struggle of 
recognition implies a telos to modern social development that parallels human 
development following a normatively guided recognition order.41  
 While Taylor, Kymlicka, Tully, and Honneth differ on the relationship between 
recognition and autonomy, they all propose variants of an identitarian model of 
recognition, which frames misrecognition as a harm for one’s identity (and so individual 
autonomy and flourishing). While cultural representation is important, critics of politics 
of recognition worry that an emphasis on cultural recognition might overshadow other 
forms of social oppression, namely ones of material distribution and structural power 
inequality. For this reason, the following section considers critiques that an identitarian 
model of recognition often mischaracterizes the source of social oppression.  
 
Limitations to Recognition 
 Politics of recognition raises questions about the relationship between identity and 
cultural membership. A consideration of how social power complicates this relationship, 
however, reveals some limitations of a politics of recognition. In the following section, I 
                                                        
41 Honneth names social, institutional spheres of care, respect and esteem in Freedom’s Right (Honneth 
2014).  
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raise two interrelated limitations of a liberal politics of recognition: the narrowing of 
recognition to cultural recognition and the overshadowing of structural and economic 
features of social oppression.  
 In her debate with Axel Honneth, Nancy Fraser argues that in recent years, 
identity politics have overshadowed the demand for economic redistribution.42 She 
contends that the move to recognition, and away from redistribution, has focused on the 
cultural realm of social oppression at the expense of a providing a critique of economic 
structures. Understood in the cultural and political domain, misrecognition occurs when 
one belongs to a cultural group that is devalued by the dominant culture. As such, 
misrecognition is repaired by “contesting the dominant culture’s demeaning picture of the 
group” and replaced by “new self-representations of their own making” (Fraser 2000, 
109-110). She names two problems that arise from the move from redistribution to 
recognition—the problem of displacement and the problem of reification. The former 
displaces considerations of redistribution by narrowly characterizing misrecognition “as a 
free-standing cultural harm” at the expense of considering institutionalized economic 
inequality (2000, 110). The latter reifies identity insofar as collective identity claims 
require “an authentic, self-affirming and self-generated” identity (2000, 112). This, in 
turn, imposes “a single, drastically simplified group identity which denies the complexity 
                                                        
42 According to redistribution, classes or class-like collectivities suffer socio-economic injustice when they 
are unjustly differentiated, such that justice requires economic restructuring (Fraser 2003, 12-14). 
According to the identity model of recognition, Weberian status groups, who are differentiated either prior 
to, or as a result of, cultural hierarchical valuation, suffer cultural injustice rooted in social patterns of 
representation, such that justice requires cultural or symbolic change (2003, 12-14). Fraser argues that the 
antithesis of recognition and redistribution is a false one, and she proposes a two-dimensional social 
differentia. Gender injustice, properly understood as both a case of maldistribution and misrecognition, can 
only be remedied by an approach that encompasses both politics of redistribution and politics of 
recognition (2003, 15). This 2-dimensional conception of justice treats distribution and recognition as 
“distinct perspectives on and dimensions of justice” (2003, 35). 
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of people’s lives” (2000, 112).43  
 For Fraser, the ills of misrecognition should not be framed in terms of the 
distortion of identity, but in terms of social subordination.44 Recognition must be a matter 
of justice, rather than one of identity. The normative core of her status model of 
recognition is parity participation, which requires “all adult members of society to 
interact with one another as peers” (Fraser and Honneth 2003, 36). This definition of 
justice has an objective condition—the “distribution of material resources must be such 
as to ensure participants’ independence and ‘voice’”—as well as an intersubjective 
condition—the institutionalization of patterns of cultural value that “express equal respect 
for all participants and ensure equal opportunity for achieving social esteem” (2003, 36). 
The aim of recognition is to overcome subordination by challenging institutionalized 
“patterns of cultural value that impede parity of participation and to replace them with 
patterns that foster it” (2003, 30). In other words, the struggle for recognition as the 
struggle for social status is a “remedy for social injustice, not the satisfaction of a generic 
human need” (2003, 45). The status model of recognition pertains to both socially 
entrenched patterns of cultural value and to the economic structure of society. That is to 
say, the status model of recognition requires a politics of redistribution insofar as “it 
understands that status subordination is often linked to distributive justice” (2003,119).45  
                                                        
43 This echoes Appiah and Heyes’ respective concerns. Heyes argues that the politics of recognition ends 
up affirming a notion of authentic identity that demands recognition (Heyes 2003). In this respect, she 
echoes Appiah’s worry that the identity model of recognition conflates the normative with the descriptive, 
and so risks balkanizing the cultural identity in question (Appiah 1994). 
 
44 In fact, Fraser claims that “maldistribution directly entails misrecognition” (Fraser and Honneth 2003, 
52). 
 
45 Fraser’s status model of recognition is “deontological and nonsectarian,” that is, it appeals to a morally 
binding principle of justice as participatory parity without espousing a single conception of self-realization 
or the good life (Fraser and Honneth 2003, 30-31). In turn, Fraser argues that attempts to redress 
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 Iris Marion Young similarly raises concerns with the narrowing of recognition to 
cultural recognition.46 She worries that current scholarship in politics of difference 
focuses too narrowly on the recognition of cultural difference within a liberal paradigm 
(see Kymlicka 1995) at the expense of concerns of structural inequality. She seeks to 
distinguish politics of positional difference from a politics of cultural difference (Young 
2007). Young contends that her politics of difference is broader than a politics of cultural 
recognition insofar as it provides a structural analysis of social inequality and exposes the 
existence of ruling norms that dictate who the bearer of rights is supposed to be (1999, 
416). Difference is more broadly understood in terms of the dominant institutions that 
support norms that privilege some groups and render others deviant. These might be 
cultural norms, but they can also be “norms of capability, social role, sexual desire, or 
location in the division of labor” (1999, 415).  
 A politics of difference rejects interpretations of formal equality as treating 
everyone equally insofar as it fails to redress such unjust norms and posits that many 
economic and social inequalities can only be remedied by attending to “the specific 
differences of capability, social positioning, spiritual obligation, etc. of persons, and 
                                                        
misrecognition require “changing social institutions—or more specifically, changing the interaction-
regulating values that impede parity of participation at all relevant institutional sites” (2003, 115). Young, 
however, is critical that Fraser’s analytic framework, which opposes cultural and political economy, 
renders working-class and queer politics “more one-dimensional than they actually are” (Young 1997).  
 
46 Not all articulations of recognition deal with cultural recognition, however. Consider, for example, J. M. 
Bernstein’s Torture and Dignity, which provides a more expansive account of intersubjective recognition in 
his characterization of torture as a form of moral devastation in ways that highlight the relationship 
between dignity, and physical embodiment and social trust. The self’s need for external recognition entails 
a permanent vulnerability, and hence, a ubiquitous need for trust. This need for trust is not established 
rationally, but is given in “first love,” and is further developed in and through the expectation of self-
respect, or “lovability” (2015, 19-20). Under Bernstein’s reading, recognition is not limited to the need for 
cultural membership but is described in terms of the fundamental intersubjectivity and vulnerability of the 
self. 
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accommodating to them in order substantively to realize fair equality of opportunity for 
everyone” (1999, 417). She thus affirms that most group-based political claims of justice 
are responses to these structures of privilege and disadvantage.  
The narrowing of recognition to cultural recognition motivates the well-worn 
critique of liberalism’s inability to attend to structural inequality. Both Tully and Young 
are ultimately critical that liberalism can attend to the dynamics of recognition insofar as 
it is theoretically blind to concerns of structural power.47 Young challenges the liberal 
reduction of social justice to distributive justice and narrowing of difference to claims to 
culture.48 She is critical that liberal models of distributive justice overattend to 
individuals and fail to articulate the import of social group membership for autonomy. In 
assuming a homogenous public and arguing for formal equality, liberal theory fails to 
consider the substantive heterogeneity of the public. Young defines the distributive 
paradigm of justice as one in which social justice is deemed as the “allocation of material 
goods such as things, resources, income, and wealth” at the expense of an analysis of “the 
social structure and institutional context that often help determine distributive patterns” 
(1990, 15). To this point, her account of the “five faces of oppression” reveal the subtle 
forms of injustice that cannot be addressed by a distributive model of justice (1990, 39). 
Her model resists the tendency to limit an analysis of oppression to one or two structures. 
Social oppression cannot be reduced to cultural misrecognition nor to economic injustice 
(1997). As such, both Young and Fraser (while using different language) attempt to 
                                                        
47 For Tully, recognition is intimately tied to the redistribution of power relations, and to “recognition 
capital (status, respect, and esteem)” (Tully 2000b, 470).  
 
48 Both of which Young sees still present in Benhabib’s work (see Young 1999). 
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expand recognition beyond a consideration of identity to a consideration of structural 
power inequalities.49 
  Over and above the inability to challenge structural power inequalities, 
identitarian models of recognition rely on troubling ontological assumptions about the 
nature of identity and progressive social change. On this account, Lois McNay is critical 
of Honneth’s normative account of recognition insofar as it depends upon an “ahistorical 
analysis that misrecognizes the role that power relations play in structuring and mediating 
the emotions of social suffering” (McNay 2008, 275). Under Honneth’s account, 
recognition will inevitably result in progressive social change in a way that both 
underestimates “the negativity of social conflict and agency” and provides a limited 
account of the development of law (2008, 276). According to McNay, the ontological 
primacy of recognition, whereby the child-parent dyad forms the development of 
relations of recognition on all aspects of social life, is both psychologically reductive and 
it sentimentalizes social relations.50 Honneth’s account obscures how social relations are 
mediated through latent dynamics of money and power.51  
 Patchen Markell further criticizes the ontological assumptions of the politics of 
recognition. He is critical of the grounds on which Taylor articulates a notion of 
recognition as a necessary condition for self-realization insofar as it denies Taylor’s very 
                                                        
49 Young and Fraser are, however, critical of each other’s projects (See Fraser 1995 and Young 1997).  
 
50 Cynthia Willett is similarly critical of the infant-parent as the paradigmatic dyad of intersubjective 
recognition since this relation is not intersubjective but is one of “subjectless sociality” (Willett 1995, 18). 
 
51 Alternatively, McNay proposes that Bourdieu’s account of habitus (Bourdieu 1979) can better describe a 
phenomenological account of oppression without naturalizing emotions and seeing them as the result of 
power relations that sediment as “physical and psychological dispositions” that define a subject’s embodied 
being in the world (McNay 2008, 279).  
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own understanding of “the self as a creature of ‘web of interlocutions’” (Taylor 1989, 
36). Markell rejects recognition’s underlying ontological claims of “sovereign agency” 
that is both claimed to be a product of intersubjective recognition yet also prior to it 
(Markell 2003, 23). Claims to sovereign agency mischaracterize the ontological 
principles of the human condition, defined as non-sovereign. Markell reframes 
recognition as acknowledgment in terms of the problem of sovereignty. A politics of 
acknowledgment emerges from an appreciation of one’s own condition of finitude.52 In 
this respect, he draws on Arendt’s critique of the “identification of freedom with 
sovereignty” (Arendt 1977, 164) in his assertion that “if recognition makes the social 
world intelligible, it often does so by stratifying it, subordinating some people and 
elevating others to positions of privilege and dominance” (Markell 2003, 1-2). In other 
words, he is critical as to whether a politics of recognition can address the role of state 
institutions in establishing and perpetuating the power and status inequalities that it seeks 
to redress.  
 These critiques of recognition call for a recharacterization of the source of social 
oppression. More pointedly, these critics of recognition contend that a politics of 
recognition can perpetuate, rather than reduce, power inequality. This line of criticism 
gets further articulated when considering how a liberal politics of recognition 
characterizes social oppression in a settler colonial context. The narrowing of social 
oppression to cultural recognition frames the root settler colonial violence in terms of a 
loss of cultural integrity and identity. This characterization misses the particularity of 
                                                        
52 “Acknowledging her finitude enables the subject to dismantle her own privilege rather than patronizing 
others by ‘granting’ them recognition” (Markell 2003, 38).  
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settler colonial violence, namely the seizure of land and the drive to eliminate Indigenous 
populations.  
 
Recognition in a Settler Colonial Context 
This section demonstrates how a liberal politics of recognition concretely 
manifests in the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Canadian state. The two 
critiques of recognition laid out above (the narrowing of recognition to cultural 
recognition and its inattention to structural power relations) become all the more visibly 
nefarious in an explicitly settler colonial context. I define a settler colonial context as one 
in which colonizers invade a territory, exterminate Indigenous nations and seize 
Indigenous land with the aim of complete settlement.53 I outline how Taylor’s politics of 
recognition, within its own settler colonial context, shapes ongoing governmental policies 
towards Indigenous groups in order to show how recognition fails to frame social 
oppression of Indigenous peoples in terms of the loss of sovereignty, seizure of land, and 
denial of political self-determination. 
An identitarian model of recognition characterizes social oppression in terms of 
cultural representation, while Fraser’s status model of recognition broadens recognition 
to address problems of economic redistribution. Both versions of politics of recognition 
fails to capture what is at the root of the social oppression of Indigenous peoples. For this 
reason, Coulthard argues that even Fraser’s model of recognition does not address “the 
most pertinent features of injustices related to mis- or nonrecognition in colonial 
                                                        
53 I explain the aims of settler colonialism in more detail in the following chapter. Leanne Betasamosake 
Simpson names the aim of settler colonialism as such— “It seemed simple. Colonizers wanted the land” 
(Simpson 2017, 15). Patrick Wolfe puts it succinctly—“Settler colonizers come to stay” (Wolfe 2006, 388). 
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contexts” (Coulthard 2014, 36—emphasis added). In particular, the discussion of 
recognition emerges from a consideration of multiculturalism and not multi-nationalism. 
A settler colonial context is a multi-national context in which the settler state and 
Indigenous nations are in some sort of relationship with each other.54 That is to say, the 
question of recognition in a multicultural context emerges from the conflict between the 
liberal ideal of fairness and neutrality and the flourishing of distinct cultural groups and 
evades the question of Indigenous nationhood. This framework of recognition does not, 
however, address conflicts between nations.55 The model of recognition is therefore ill-
equipped to undermine settler colonialism since state recognition cannot attend to nation-
to-nation relationships and, moreover, since mutual recognition is impossible since the 
Canadian state does not require recognition from First Nations, Métis and Inuit peoples in 
order to exist.  
Taylor’s identitarian liberal politics of recognition affirms that relations of 
recognition can have either a positive effect (when recognition is mutual or affirmative), 
or a negative effect (when recognition is unequal or disparaging) on “our status as free 
and self-determining agents” (2014, 17). Accordingly, proponents of a liberal politics of 
recognition seek greater “state recognition” and “accommodation” of Indigenous identity 
claims in order to enable more mutual Indigenous-state relationships.56 It is through state 
recognition that Indigenous culture is affirmed and legitimated. In practice, Coulthard 
                                                        
54 Consider, for example, Canada’s claim to be in a nation-to-nation relationship with Indigenous nations.  
 
55 Fraser’s Scales of Justice, however, revises her theory of participation parity to include a third dimension 
of adequate representation in decision-making processes. This revision explicitly frames question of 
recognition and redistribution to target injustices across borders (Fraser 2010).   
 
56 This is most often accomplished through “land claim settlements, economic development initiatives, and 
self-government agreements” (Coulthard 2014, 3).  
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tells us that this results in “institutional accommodation by the settler state apparatus” 
(2014, 38). Indigenous claims to nationhood are reconciled through the “accommodation 
of Indigenous identities in some form of renewed relationship with the Canadian state” 
(2014, 3). Consider, for example, the White Paper of 1969, the effort to abolish the Indian 
Act, which was framed as an attempt to turn First Nations people into ethnic groups, to 
“be gradually absorbed into the melting pot” (Manuel and Derrickson 2015, 29-30).57 A 
more recent example is President Trump’s effort to remove the classification that 
designates Native tribes as nations, which would classify Native tribes as ethnic groups.58 
This model of the accommodation of Indigenous identity raises some pressing 
concerns. For one, the narrowing of recognition to culture depoliticizes Native 
relationships to land. As Maureen Konkle notes, “Native people’s connection to land is 
not just cultural (as it is usually and sentimentally understood), but it is also a political 
connection about governments, boundaries, authority over people and territory” (Konkle 
2004, 12). The effect of this narrowing of recognition means that culture becomes the 
sole site of Indigenous identity and agency, foreclosing a legitimate politics of 
Indigenous sovereignty and self-determination. Land dispossession is not a problem of 
cultural recognition, but one of loss of sovereignty.59 Cultural recognition here 
mischaracterizes the harm of misrecognition by failing to consider institutionalized 
                                                        
57 The 1969 White Paper, formally known as the Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy, 
1969, was a Canadian government policy that attempted to abolish previous legal documents pertaining to 
Indigenous peoples, including the Indian Act and treaties. Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development Jean Chrétien proposed the policy in order to assimilate all Indian peoples under the 
Canadian State. The proposal’s intense backlash led to its withdrawal in 1970. 
 
58 Letourneau 2018. 
 
59 The loss of land is also an ontological violence. The role of land in Indigenous ontology will be 
developed in the following chapter.  
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economic inequality, settler colonial and heteropatriarchical violence. Simply put, 
cultural recognition without political and economic redistribution will not lead to self-
determination. By failing to frame social oppression of Indigenous peoples in terms of 
loss of sovereignty and political self-determination, recognition misidentifies the source 
of settler colonial violence.  
A second limitation of recognition is its perpetuation of settler colonial 
identification. It is with this concern in mind that Coulthard argues that a liberal politics 
of recognition reproduces, rather than transcends, a colonial structure of dominance 
(Coulthard 2007, 438-9). In Red Skins, White Masks, Coulthard forcefully rejects 
Taylor’s liberal politics of recognition on the grounds that it actually reaffirms the 
configurations of colonial power that demands for recognition aim to transcend. For this, 
he draws on Frantz Fanon’s criticism of the Hegelian master-slave dialectic of 
recognition whereby self-consciousness arises through the process of externalization and 
mutual recognition, that is, through the recognition of another.60  
Fanon contends that the dialectic of recognition breaks down in a colonial 
context, which he describes in terms of both objective (political economy) and subjective 
(affective) levels (Fanon 1967, 11-12 qtd in Coulthard 2007, 444). This account of the 
dual structures of colonialism moves past the Honneth-Fraser impasse and avoids a focus 
on recognition at the expense of redistribution and vice-versa. Given this description of 
colonialism, Fanon argues that reciprocal recognition is impossible since the terms of 
                                                        
60 While Taylor draws on Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth in articulating the role of misrecognition in 
relations of domination, Coulthard relies on Fanon’s earlier Black Skins, White Masks to challenge Taylor’s 
argument that colonial misrecognition can be reconciled within a liberal multicultural framework 
(Coulthard 2007).  
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recognition are determined by and in the interests of the colonizer. Insofar as subjectivity 
is defined in terms of the recognition of the colonizer, the colonized’s sense of self 
develops through the internalization of colonial recognition. In this way, settler colonial 
recognition involves the creation of “colonized subjects” through a process of 
internalization whereby the colonized come to accept and even identify with the limited 
misrecognition granted through state structures. Fanon affirms that this internalization 
often leads to psycho-affective attachments to these “master-sanctioned forms of 
recognition” (Fanon 2005, 148). In practice, this means that the state recognizes 
Indigenous culture through accommodation practices in the same spirit as Canadian 
bureaucrat Dr. Duncan Campbell Scott’s 1920 goal of solving the “Indian problem” by 
ensuring that every Indigenous person be “absorbed into the body politic [so that] there is 
no Indian position, and no Indian Department” (Scott qtd in Manuel and Derrickson 
2015, 29-30).  
In this way, Coulthard contends that contemporary colonial power and hegemony 
work not through a process of exclusion, but rather through the inclusion and shaping of 
Indigenous peoples and perspectives by state discourses. Recognition practices do not 
rectify colonial injustice but reaffirm the settler state’s legitimacy. He argues that self-
determination cannot be bestowed upon by the state but must result from Indigenous 
resurgence that challenges the legitimacy of the Canadian settler state.61 Given Fanon’s 
description of the psychological internalization of colonized subjectification, Coulthard 
notes the importance of the self-affirmative power of righteous anger that leads to direct 
political action (as exemplified in the Oka crisis, the Idle No More movement, and the 
                                                        
61 I develop an account of reconciliation as refusal and resurgence in my final chapter.  
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Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women movement, among others).62 He maintains the 
importance of transformative praxis in purging the “psycho-existential complexes 
battered into [Indigenous populations] over the course of the colonial experience—a 
process of strategic desubjectification” (Coulthard 2007, 450). 
In this respect, Coulthard is suspicious of projects like Dale Turner’s that aim to 
engage with state’s legal and political discourses.63 Turner proposes a model of 
Indigenous self-determination that engages with the confines of liberal recognition. He 
argues in This is Not a Peace Pipe that Indigenous people have to engage the state’s legal 
and political discourses in more effective ways in order to have their relationship with the 
Canadian state informed by their distinct worldview (Turner 2006). Turner argues that 
violence against Indigenous peoples has resulted by excluding the perspectives of 
Indigenous peoples from discursive and institutional sites. He diagnoses the problem as 
one of exclusion from state discourse and so, he calls for Indigenous peoples to find more 
effective ways of participating in state practices that determine the meaning of Aboriginal 
rights. To this end, he affirms that certain members of the community should become 
what he calls “word warriors,” that are fluent in language of rights.   
Coulthard, however, is critical of Turner’s approach insofar as it minimizes the 
discursive power of the state.64 Turner’s account rests on the ability of word warriors to 
                                                        
62 See Idle No More and National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls. 
 
63 The worry of the assimilationist power of state discourses can also be reflected in Scott Lyons’ project 
(Lyons 2010). Lyons’ hope for Native American studies is to produce research programs and pedagogies 
that can integrate traditionalism with the modernity and diversity that exist in the indigenous world. 
Whereas Coulthard, Alfred and Simpson propose visions of self-determination that are grounded in a 
rejection of capitalism and the nation-state, through a rejection of state recognition, Lyons contends that a 
“project of decolonization begins with the apparatuses that we have at our disposal” (Lyons 2010).   
 
64 Coulthard writes, “the efficacy of Turner's intervention rests on a crucial theoretical assumption reflected 
in his text's quasi-Foucauldian use of the term discourse. I say quasi-Foucauldian because when he refers to 
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transform legal and political discourses of the state to be more amenable to Indigenous 
perspectives. Coulthard worries that this approach underestimates the state’s legal and 
political power in maintaining colonial relationships. For Coulthard, colonial power has 
been maintained not through the exclusion of Indigenous peoples but rather through the 
inclusion and shaping of Indigenous identities. Given this, he tells us that self-
determination cannot be found in relationship with the colonial state, but in a rejection of 
colonial authority.65 Coulthard argues that Turner’s proposal risks the assimilation of the 
word warriors. Moreover, Coulthard’s analysis does not limit the state’s power to its 
discursive power but acknowledges how the legal and discursive power of the state are 
also “backed by and hopelessly entwined with the economic, political, and military power 
of the state itself” (Coulthard 2008). In other words, discursive transformation is not 
enough to allow for Indigenous self-determination.  
Coulthard’s criticism that state recognition cannot bring about meaningful change 
because of the material power of the state accurately names a serious limitation of the 
state’s interest in seeing and naming settler colonial violence. In sum, recognition, 
through the guise of recognizing the distinctness of Indigenous cultures undermines 
Indigenous nations’ self-determination. The process of recognition legitimates the 
Canadian state’s authority of defining Indigenous identity. As such, recognition makes 
identity intelligible only by creating “colonized subjects.” Relations between nations 
must be predicated upon mutual recognition of each’s sovereignty. Insofar as recognition 
                                                        
the discursive practices of word warriors he assumes that these pack the ‘power’ necessary to transform the 
‘legal and political discourses of the state’ into something more amenable to indigenous perspectives” 
(Coulthard 2008).  
 
65 Audra Simpson’s politics of refusal articulates this very project. Her account is given in chapter 6.  
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does not emerge from the mutual recognition of sovereignty, recognition by the Canadian 
state cannot challenge settler colonial power imbalance but reasserts it.  
The motif of recognition cannot identify land dispossession as a source of 
oppression. The narrowing of social oppression to cultural misrecognition has the 
consequence of erasing most forms of settler colonial violence, which, in turn, reinforces 
colonial recognition. For this reason, I argue that state recognition cannot hear voices as 
expressions of political self-determination, but rather will hear them in terms of colonial 
recognition. As Michi Saagiig Nishnaabeg scholar Leanne Betasamosake Simpson writes 
—“Right now to a great degree in Indigenous life, we are looking into the colonizer’s 
mirror, and that mirror is reflecting back that we are shameful, that we are not good 
enough, that we are not smart, or successful, or rich enough, or white enough, or 
Canadian enough, or together enough to organize. But why is the colonizer our mirror? 
Because the colonizer will always reflect back to us what the state wants to see” 
(Simpson 2017, 188—emphasis added).  
A liberal politics of recognition emerges from a consideration of the flourishing of 
individuals within a multicultural liberal democracy. Talk of multiculturalism, however, 
erases the settler colonial reality that distinct nations lie within the boundaries of the 
country now called Canada. Recognition diagnoses the problem of social oppression as a 
lack of appropriate cultural representation, but this characterization fails to identify settler 
colonial violence in terms of the loss of sovereignty through seizure of land. In this way, 
recognition fails to see its own assumption of settler colonialism. For this reason, I 
conclude that state recognition rests on a denial of settler colonial reality. 
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Recognition and the TRC  
The TRC’s framework of a liberal politics of recognition is evident in the TRC’s 
final report characterizing the residential school system as a policy of cultural genocide. 
The TRC’s final report names the establishment and operation of Indian Residential 
Schools system as a policy of cultural genocide (under Article 2(e) of the UN’s 
Convention on Genocide) in that it sought to destroy structures and practices that allow 
the group to continue as a group. The focus on the residential schools’ impact of cultural 
destruction harkens back to Taylor’s account of the harm of cultural misrecognition. 
While the description of the residential school policy as cultural genocide is important 
and astounding, it belies an emphasis on cultural misrepresentation instead of land 
dispossession, loss of political self-determination, and the physical extinction of 
Indigenous communities. The description of social oppression in terms of cultural 
misrepresentation ignores questions of land dispossession and political self-
determination.  
The liberal politics of recognition’s mischaracterization of the source of settler 
colonial violence, and thus its disavowal of a settler colonial reality, plays out in the 
TRC’s epistemic assumptions. The TRC, insofar as it is framed by a politics of 
recognition, provides an opportunity to examine the limitations of recognition in terms of 
a denial of settler colonialism. In addition to Coulthard’s critiques of recognition, I argue 
that a politics of recognition fails to transform settler colonial relationships not only 
because it enacts the internalization of colonial recognition, but because it rests on a 
denial of settler colonialism and so cannot identify, let alone challenge, this denial. These 
limitations play out in the TRC in the particular way that settlers fail to hear testimonies 
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of residential school survivors. The TRC illustrates how recognition attempts to include 
diverse voices in the political sphere while, at the same time, failing to challenge 
prevailing power relations that silence these voices.  
 
Recognition and Historical Amnesia 
How did you not know this?!  
Chelsea Vowel (Métis)66  
 
How is it that we know nothing about this history?  
Paulette Regan, the Research Director of the Canadian TRC67 
 
It would be hard to overemphasize the cultural, psychological, emotional, spiritual 
and political lasting devastation of residential schools. Yet, the schools and the former 
students remain “comfortably invisible” to settler Canadians (Regan 2010, 5). Regan 
argues that the truth-telling events have uncovered an uncomfortable historical amnesia 
about past and ongoing settler colonialism. She contends that this amnesia reveals the 
“continuing complicity in denying, erasing, and forgetting this part of our own history as 
colonizers while pathologizing the colonized” (2010, 6). A central question of my 
evaluation of the TRC is, thus, how will settler Canadians remember this “sad chapter in 
our history” that we settler Canadians have so selectively forgotten.  
The relationship between historical amnesia and recognition becomes particularly 
                                                        
66 Vowel 2016, 173. 
 
67 Regan 2010, 5. 
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salient when considering the truth-telling events that were central to the TRC. The 
Commission’s events, designed to make settlers remember the country’s colonial past, 
have to contend with a sustained denial of a settler colonial past and present. The denial 
of a settler colonial past and present can be both explicit and implicit. It can be explicit—
for example, in the denial of ongoing settler colonialism in the 2008 Statement of 
Apology—“The treatment of children in Indian Residential Schools is a sad chapter in 
our history [that] has no place in our country”—which positions the ills of colonialism 
strictly in the past and thus denies the realities of an ongoing settler colonial present, or in 
the denial of past settler colonialism in Stephen Harper’s 2009 G20 address in which he 
proudly claimed that “Canada has no history of colonialism,” in Sen. Lynn Beyak’s 
recent remarks on “the good deeds […] and remarkable works” of the residential school 
officials, in the Governor General’s June 2017 comments that Indigenous people are 
immigrants,68 or in a recent article from Montréal paper Le Devoir claiming that Montréal 
is not Mohawk territory.69 The denial of settler colonialism is often more pernicious and 
subtle, however, in forming the settler everyday— for example, in Canadian history 
education curricula that frames the founding peoples of Canada as French and English 
settlers, or in recent discourse about non-European immigration as people who are “not 
from here.”  
The TRC proposes a model of reconciliation based on the sharing of personal 
testimony. According to this view, reconciliation requires recognition of the experiences 
of survivors of residential schools. As such, the TRC’s underlying epistemic claim is that 
                                                        
68 Tasker 2017a. 
 
69 Tellier 2018. 
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a collection of facts and testimonies can, and will, reconcile relationships between 
Indigenous peoples and settler Canadians. It affirms that the problem of historical 
amnesia arises from a lack of recognition and so the remedy is to have more information, 
more recognition. If this were the case, then the sharing of testimonies would transform 
this historical amnesia, but Regan tells us that this has not happened. Indeed, a recent 
informal poll in Winnipeg showed that only 1 in 3 respondents said they were aware of 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Indian residential schools (CBC News 
2018a). While settler Canadians’ knowledge about the existence of residential schools 
has increased—from 51% in 2008 to 66% in 2016—their sense of the impact of these 
schools remains low with only 41% of non-Aboriginal Canadians seeing the residential 
school system as “at least partly responsible for the current challenges Aboriginal people 
face” in 2016 (CBC News 2016).   
Over and above a concern of internalized colonial recognition, the TRC faces a 
set of limitations with respect to how testimonies are, and can be, heard. Settler 
Canadians’ so-called historical amnesia in the face of testimonies of past and ongoing 
settler colonial violence exemplifies this further limitation of the model of recognition in 
a settler colonial context.70 I contend that the TRC’s framing politics of recognition 
mischaracterizes the harm and mechanisms of historical amnesia as a problem of the lack 
of recognition that can be rectified by more testimony. This misdiagnosis of historical 
amnesia exemplifies recognition’s ignorance of land dispossession and political self-
                                                        
70 An example of ongoing colonial legislation is the passing of Bill C-45, which introduces significant 
changes to Canada’s Navigable Water Act, the Indian Act, and the Environmental Assessment Act among 
other pieces of federal legislation, and which unilaterally undermines Aboriginal and treaty rights 
(Coulthard 2014, 127). 
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determination as a cause of settler colonial violence.  
Drawing on Bruyneel’s account of settler memory, I suggest that historical 
amnesia does not signal a lack of memory but rather a particular production of memory 
that upholds structural inequity. He challenges the popular notion that the failure to 
address settler colonial injustices is a result of “collective amnesia, of a forgetting of the 
past” (Bruyneel 2013, 237). He rejects this amnesia diagnosis and affirms that the 
appearance of collective historical amnesia is, in fact, a result of the particular manner in 
which the nation remembers its “past, as facts and myths” (2016, 351).71 Bruyneel names 
the particular kind of memory that is produced and reproduced as “settler memory,” as an 
“excess of memory” (2013, 240).  
Yet, this is the very model the TRC adopts. The epistemic presumption of the 
TRC is that the problem of historical amnesia is simply a lack of information, that we 
simply need more knowledge about the evils of the residential school system, that the 
government and the general public are just conveniently unaware of the violence 
perpetrated against Native peoples in Canada. Bruyneel argues that this apparent lack of 
memory is a “consequence of collective disavowal and as such is a particular production 
and presence of memory” (2013, 237).  
A consideration of settler memory reveals why a model of reconciliation through 
recognition is unable to challenge historical amnesia. The legacy of the residential 
schools does not merely require education in order for settlers to ‘fill the gaps in our 
history education knowledge.’ The TRC promotes reconciliation through the cure of 
remembering, but this model fails to see how discourses of forgetting a violent past and 
                                                        
71 Consider, for example, the settler nation myths of Canada’s 150-year celebrations.  
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present is crucial to the justification and perpetuation of settler violence. To understand 
how historical amnesia as a kind of memory, it is helpful to understand settler ignorance 
as a kind of knowledge.72 
A focus on the cause of historical amnesia reframes the limitations of liberal 
politics of recognition. The motif of recognition cannot provide means for self-
determination because it misidentifies the source of social oppression that Indigenous 
peoples experience by missing the centrality of land. This misidentification leads to a 
mischaracterization of settlers’ lack of knowledge about a settler colonial past and 
present, and the residential school system more specifically. Bruyneel’s account of settler 
memory gives language to show how recognition misdiagnoses historical amnesia. 
Moreover, recognition’s misdiagnosis of historical amnesia shows how recognition is 
predicated upon a denial of settler colonialism.  
 
Conclusion 
Why, then, do we continually seek recognition from Canada  
when we know it never ends well? 
Leanne Betasamosake Simpson73  
 
A liberal politics of recognition misidentifies the source of social oppression as 
culture misrepresentation. This mischaracterization of oppression ignores its own settler 
                                                        
72 To flesh out this account, Charles Mills’ description of white ignorance is helpful (1997; 2007). I give 
this account in chapter 4. 
 
73 Simpson 2017, 181. 
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colonial context, namely in terms of land seizure and the loss of political self-
determination. This disavowal of settler colonialism in liberal politics of recognition 
becomes visible when examining the epistemic assumption that settler Canadians’ 
obliviousness to the residential school system is an innocent lack of information that can 
be rectified by the sharing of testimony. Settlers’ lack of knowledge of the residential 
schools is not, however, a case of misrecognition or a lack of information but a particular 
kind of knowing that tacitly supports ongoing settler colonial violence. The TRC 
misidentifies the harms of the residential school policy by focusing on individual 
experiences at the expense of a consideration of ongoing land dispossession and settler 
colonial violence. Over and above recognition’s inability to attend to power structures, 
the recognition model, as it relates to the TRC, expects testimonies to be heard. Insofar as 
the politics of recognition fails to challenge structures of settler colonial violence and 
enacts an internalization of colonial recognition, it cannot provide the conditions for 
voices of residential school survivors to be heard in a meaningful way. 
The goal of a truth commission is to provide a public platform for victims to tell 
their stories and to give voice to the survivors of human rights violations. For this reason, 
Teresa Godwin Phelps affirms that the truth commissions can provide the opportunity for 
victims to reconstruct their “shattered voices” and regain their dignity and self-respect 
(Phelps 2004, 39).  Coulthard reveals the extent to which being heard requires colonial 
recognition and so, risks assimilation. For this reason, the reconstruction of the “shattered 
voices” of survivors of residential schools cannot occur within the guiding framework of 
recognition, since this process of ‘reconstruction’ is predicated upon a colonial 
recognition that makes voices intelligible only as ‘colonized subjects.’ Following 
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Markell’s critique, recognition makes the social world intelligible by stratifying it and so 
state recognition cannot change settler colonial relationships but merely reaffirm and 
relegitimize them. 
The impulse to establish new relationships through the sharing of testimony 
seems admirable, however. Might the problem with the TRC be solely in its execution, 
rather than in the process of recognizing the experiences of another? Consider, for 
example, Jane Addams’ account of sympathetic knowledge as a model of knowing 
through an openness to disruptive knowledge (Addams 2002). The TRC does not follow, 
however, this model insofar as it is not open to testimonies that transform settler identity. 
While the process of coming to know differently through a recognition of another’s 
experience might often lead to a new understanding and appreciation of social 
oppression, the TRC’s model fails to create conditions for such an exchange of 
experiences.74  
The TRC mischaracterizes the cause of this historical amnesia as primarily a 
problem of a lack of recognition that can be rectified by more testimony. I contend, 
however, that the problem of this historical amnesia is not explainable in terms of a lack 
of access to information that can be remedied through a collection of testimonies. There 
are ways of remembering that complicate the assumption that settler Canadians simply 
need to hear testimonies of residential school survivors in order to challenge our 
historical amnesia. The TRC relies on the expectation that settlers will be emotionally 
                                                        
74 I give an account of settler hearing as a way of explaining how testimonies fail to unsettle settler 
ignorance in my fifth chapter.   
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affected and so will ‘remember’ differently, but Regan tells us that this isn’t happening.75 
As such, the TRC mischaracterizes the harm and mechanisms of historical amnesia. 
Settlers’ lack of knowledge of the residential schools is not a case of misrecognition or a 
lack of information but is a particular kind of knowing. In other words, historical amnesia 
is not a lack of memory, but names a particular kind of memory.  
Bruyneel’s work on settler memory gives us insight into how memory and settler 
colonial violence are intertwined in ways that complicate a model of reconciliation 
through truth-telling. If historical amnesia is not a result of a lack of knowledge but a 
particular kind of knowledge or memory, then we need to investigate what kind of 
knowledge it is and how such knowledge functions. This analysis, however, needs to be 
further developed in order to fully account for how testimonies can fail to be heard by a 
settler audience.  
For this reason, I argue that we need to provide an epistemic evaluation of settler 
colonialism in order to more fully evaluate (i) the limitations of a model of reconciliation 
through recognition and (ii) how the TRC hears the testimonies of residential school 
survivors. This epistemic evaluation involves both an account of the conditions of speech 
that prevent testimonies of the violence inherent in past and present settler colonialism 
from being heard as meaningful, legitimate and self-affirming political expression and a 
conceptual framework to explain the experience of historical amnesia. These will be the 
questions explored in the following two chapters.  
  
                                                        
75 Danielle Lorenz’s study on how well Alberta Teachers’ Association members understand concepts of 
‘reverse racism’ after being exposed to curricula that focuses on Indigenous content is helpful here. She 
concludes that settler colonialism and racism prohibit “reconciliatory thinking for settlers” (Lorenz 2017). 
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CHAPTER III 
SETTLER COLONIAL EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
Colonialism or settler colonialism or dispossession or displacement or capitalism didn’t 
seem complicated anymore. The mess I was wrapped in at birth didn’t seem so inevitable. 
It seemed simple. Colonizers wanted the land. Everything else, whether it is legal or 
policy or economic or social, whether it was the Indian Act or residential schools or 
gender violence, was part of the machinery that was designed to create a perfect crime—
a crime where the victims are unable to see or name the crime as a crime  
Leanne Betasamosake Simpson (Michi Saagiig Nishnaabeg)76 
  
Introduction 
The TRC presents a model of reconciliation through the recognition of the 
experiences of residential school survivors. This model of reconciliation depends on the 
assumption that the testimonies of survivors will be received as credible such that 
settlers’ disavowal of settler colonialism will be transformed by these testimonies. 
However, an ignorance of settler colonialism persists. As such, an explanation of this 
ignorance requires an epistemic evaluation of settler colonialism. An epistemic evaluation 
of settler colonialism first requires examining the underlying structures of settler 
colonialism as a “logic of elimination” (Wolfe 2006, 387).77 The aim of eliminating 
                                                        
76 Simpson 2017, 15. 
 
77 While Wolfe and Veracini use the term ‘logic of elimination’ to name the underlying aims of settler 
colonialism, the use of ‘logic’ here does not bear connections to formal logic. The term here means a more 
general system of ordering that supports a particular aim.  
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Indigenous presence takes the form of statistical elimination, elimination through settler 
nation-building myths, as well as what I call an “epistemic elimination.” The latter 
eliminates Indigenous peoples as a group from the realm of reason. As such, Indigenous 
peoples are eliminated as rational and credible epistemic knowers.  
An epistemic evaluation of settler colonialism explains the assumptions that 
justify the settler colonial project of eliminating Indigenous peoples in order to seize land. 
This comes to form what I call a settler colonial epistemology. Crucially, settler colonial 
epistemology has a specific conception of rationality to justify the seizure of Indigenous 
land. This epistemic framework stems from the dominant model of Western rationality, 
as exemplified in the writings of John Locke. Locke’s political theory epitomizes the 
dominant model of Western rationality in which rational relationships to land are 
relationships of ownership and cultivation. For this reason, I characterize Locke as an 
exemplar settler colonialist. From the settler colonial point of view, Indigenous 
knowledges grounded in the land do not deductively follow and, consequently, 
Indigenous peoples can be dismissed as rational knowers. As such, settler colonial 
epistemology justifies land dispossession by eliminating Indigenous peoples from the 
realm of reason. The epistemic elimination of Indigenous peoples explains how a 
populated North American continent can be characterized as belonging to no one (terra 
nullius) since it is populated by peoples deemed irrational, and it provides the 
justification for the governmental policies of US boarding schools and Canada’s 
residential school policy. 
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Settler Logic of Elimination  
In order to articulate the assumptions of settler colonial epistemology, it is 
important to understand the underlying aims of settler colonialism. Settler colonial 
studies as a distinct field of study emerged with the work of Patrick Wolfe and Lorenzo 
Veracini.78 Their work aimed to theoretically disentangle settler colonialism from 
colonialism and to articulate the underlying aims of settler colonialism. In this respect, 
Veracini affirmed that settler colonial studies aims at articulating heuristic tools, rather 
than transformative ones.79 He traces the genealogy of settler colonialism studies from 
writings on ‘settlers’ in North America as a history of pioneering endeavors, which until 
the 1960s was entirely unrelated to colonialism, to an analytic framework of ‘settler 
colonialism’ in the late 1970s as “an ongoing and uncompromising form of hyper-
colonialism characterized by enhanced aggressiveness and exploitation” (Veracini 2013, 
313). This, then, led to a third phase of scholarship (from the late 1970s to the first half of 
the 1980s) identifying settler colonialism as a practice to ensure economic development 
for colonists. In the mid-1990s, ‘settler colonial studies’ emerged as an autonomous 
scholarly field from this series of developments (2013, 313).  
Veracini and Wolfe aim to articulate the underlying structures of settler 
colonialism. Veracini contends that colonialism and settler colonialism need to be 
“analytically disentangled” in order to consider settler colonialism in its specificity (2011, 
                                                        
78 Veracini gives an outline of the development of the field in the introductory article of the journal Settler 
Colonial Studies (Veracini 2011).  
 
79 This is why settler colonial studies is not a theory of Indigenous resurgence. Veracini contends that an 
analysis of settler colonial studies does not prefer one form of Indigenous agency over another and 
understands radical transformations of Indigenous political structures as both destructive and as constitutive 
processes that are always undermined and positively shaped by Indigenous agency (Veracini 2013, 312). 
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1).80 The difference between settler colonialism and colonialism can be understood 
through the identification of their underlying logics—a logic of elimination and a logic of 
exploitation.81 Settler colonialism is organized around elimination and colonialism is 
organized around exploitation. Colonialism is exogenous domination whereby colonizers 
seek to maintain a permanent colonial relation and to use the labor power of the 
colonized.82 Settler colonialism, on the other hand, aims at the elimination of Native 
populations and the seizure of land.83 For this reason, Veracini argues that colonialism 
and settler colonialism are in some ways “antithetical formations” (2011, 3).  
Wolfe’s description of settler colonialism’s logic of elimination gives us an entry 
point to consider how settler colonialism functions to eliminate Indigenous peoples (both 
physically and discursively). For Wolfe, the logic of elimination manifests in both the 
dissolution of native societies and in the erection of a “new colonial society on the 
expropriated land base” (Wolfe 2006, 388). The elimination of Native populations is “an 
                                                        
80 This distinction arises, in part, in Fanon’s writings on decolonial violence (2005). In Fanon’s analysis, 
colonial and settler colonial phenomena overlap such that it was ‘the settler’ that had “brought the native 
into existence” (Veracini 2013, 318).  
 
81 Veracini draws on the diverse operations of viral and bacterial phenomena to heuristically distinguish the 
distinct functionings of colonial and settler colonial systems. In short, “viruses need living cells to operate, 
while bacteria attach to surfaces and may or may not rely on the organisms they encounter” (Veracini 2014, 
617). While both viruses and bacteria (and so colonialism and settler colonialism) are exogenous 
domination, a colonial system of relationships, unlike a settler colonial one, depends upon the presence and 
subjugation of exploitable ‘Others’ (2014, 617). This heuristic analogy can be useful in drawing out the 
claim that settler colonialism does not require “indigenous ‘Others’ for their reproduction and operation” 
(2014, 623).  
 
82 Settler colonialism, however, aims to “supersede the conditions of its operations” (Veracini 2011, 8). 
 
83 Given the differences in the dependence of Indigenous labor, anticolonial or decolonial struggle will not 
be similar in a colonial and settler colonial context. In a colonial context, anticolonial work will aim to 
withhold the fundamental demand for labor through “direct anticolonial attack, sabotage, self-mutilation, 
insubordination, evasion, non-compliance, ostensible collaboration, mimicry, just to name a few” (Veracini 
2011, 3). Since labor is not required for the maintenance of settler colonialism, anticolonial work in that 
context strives for Indigenous resistance and survival. 
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organizing principal of settler-colonial society” (2006, 388). The motivation for the 
elimination of Native populations is, first and foremost, territory: “Territoriality is settler 
colonialism’s specific, irreducible element” (2006, 388). Whereas colonialism depends 
upon the reproduction of labor power to augment the colonial power’s wealth, settler 
colonialism depends upon access to land.84  
Similarly, Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang articulate the structure of North 
American settler colonialism in terms of “an entangled triad structure of settler-native-
slave” (Tuck and Yang 2012, 1). This triad differentiates settler colonialism from 
“external colonialism” which involves the extraction and transportation of “Indigenous 
worlds, animals, plants and human beings,” and from “internal colonialism” which aims 
at the management of “people, land, flora and fauna within the ‘domestic’ borders of the 
imperial nation” (2012, 4-5). The settler desire for land and resources has the effect of 
both making Indigenous land into the “new home and source of capital” for the settler, 
but also of disrupting and undermining Indigenous relationships to land (2012, 5). 
Crucially, Wolfe explains that the invasion of Native lands in North America and 
Australia, for example, is not an event in the past, but is an ongoing structure that is 
reasserted each day of occupation (Wolfe 2006, 388). Settler colonization is a structure, 
insofar as it is both a “complex social formation and [a] continuity through time” (2006, 
390). This land-centered project of the expansion of the settler-colonial state manifests 
the logic of elimination in the form of “spatial removal, mass killings and biocultural 
assimilation” (2006, 403). This elimination takes the form of both physical and discursive 
                                                        
84 This contrast is exemplified in the difference of defining Blackness in terms of the “one drop rule” that 
exponentially increased populations of labor power for the slave owner, and between the blood quantum 
regulations that radically decreased the Native population (Wolfe 2006, 388).  
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absence. For this reason, Wolfe suggests the term “structural genocide” in order to hold 
on to the specificity of the structure of settler colonialism, while also avoiding the 
hierarchy of qualified or hyphenated genocides (2006, 403).  
Wolfe and Veracini’s structural accounts of settler colonialism encompass both the 
settler will to eliminate Indigenous peoples and Indigenous communities’ capacity for 
survival (Veracini 2015). This project is, however, always incomplete given Indigenous 
peoples’ struggle to survive against a structure aimed at their elimination. As such, settler 
colonial invasion is both ongoing and unresolved.85 
The settler colonial logic of elimination takes many forms. The following section 
examines three practices structured by the logic of elimination—statistical elimination; 
elimination through settler nation-building myths; and what I call epistemic elimination.86 
These three forms of elimination come to justify and normalize the seizure of Indigenous 
land.   
 
Statistical Elimination 
Firstly, the settler colonial logic of elimination manifests in the management of 
Indigenous identity through membership rules that effectively minimize the population of 
Indigenous communities. Wolfe names both the United States’ Dawes Severalty Act of 
1887, which divided tribal land into individual allotments to sell to colonists, and the 
                                                        
85 While Wolfe’s framework of the logic of elimination does not imply that elimination has been 
successfully, Snelgrove, Dhamoon and Corntassel worry that his analysis underplays the role of Indigenous 
resistance (Snelgrove et al. 2014). They worry that the institutionalization of settler colonial studies in the 
academy can “displace, overshadow, or even mask over Indigenous studies” (2014, 9). A limitation of 
Veracini and Wolfe’s respective analyses is that they do not go beyond a theoretical or heuristic analysis of 
the logics of settler colonialism.  
 
86 This list is by no means exhaustive of the manifestations of the settler colonial logic of elimination.  
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1934 New Deal Indian Reform Act as examples of “biocultural assimilation” (Wolfe 
2006, 400). While the authors of the Dawes Act explicitly framed the division of tribal 
land into individual allotments as an attempt to propel “Indians [sic] from the collective 
inertia of tribal membership into the progressive individualism of the American dream,” 
the policy’s concrete effect was to devastate Indigenous communities through 
assimilation in order to access land (2006, 399). Through these measures, the number of 
American Indians “rapidly hit the lowest level they would ever record [and the] 
procedure turned out to yield a faster method of land transference than the US Cavalry 
had previously provided” (2006, 399).87  
For this reason, John Wunder terms the Dawes-era assimilation policy as “the 
New Colonialism” that “attacked every aspect of Native American life—religion, speech, 
political freedoms, economic liberty, and cultural diversity” (Wunder 1994, 39 qtd in 
Wolfe 2006, 400). The drive to eliminate can also be seen in the 1934 Indian Reform Act, 
which included blood quantum requirements to determine tribal membership.88 This 
requirement, yet again, decreased the numbers of tribal members eligible for land 
allotments. For this reason, Juaneño/Jaqi scholar Annette Jaimes has termed the 
procedure of minimizing the statistical populations through blood quantum requirements 
“statistical elimination” (Jaimes 1992, 123-138).89  
                                                        
87 Wolfe writes, “In the half-century from 1881, the total acreage held by Indians in the United States fell 
by two thirds, from just over 155 million acres to just over 52 million” (Wolfe 2006, 399).  
 
88 The 1934 Indian Reorganization Act was John Collier’s most significant initiative during his time as the 
Commission of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The measure abandoned allotment in favor of increasing self-
government. The Act encouraged written constitutions in “structural harmony with its US civic 
environment” (Wolfe 2006, 400).  
 
89 Many Native American tribes continue to use blood quantum requirements to determine tribal 
membership. A person's blood quantum is defined as the percentage of their ancestors, out of their total 
ancestors, who are documented as full-blood Native Americans. 
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Another example of statistical elimination is the Canadian Indian Act of 1876. 
Through the Indian Act, the Canadian government regulates Indigenous identity through 
membership rules and, by using these rules, manages the numbers of “status Indians” 
who can live on reserve land.90 Under the Act, the term ‘Indian’ refers to “1) any male of 
Indian blood reputed to belong to a particular band; 2) any child of such person; and 3) 
any woman who is or who was married to such a person” (National Centre for First 
Nations Governance). On occasion, Canada has forced First Nations to relocate their 
reserves from agriculturally valuable or resource-rich land onto remote and economically 
marginal reserves (Barron 1988). Without legal authority or foundation, in the 1880s, 
Canada instituted a “pass system” that was intended to confine First Nations people to 
their reserves (Honouring the Truth 2015, 11). The method of defining status Indians was 
guided by the goal of assimilating Indigenous people in order to free up lands and 
resources and, consequently, allow the Crown to avoid its fiduciary responsibilities 
(Native Women’s Association of Canada 2007). 
The regulation of Indigenous identity has been central to the colonization process 
by reducing the number of tribal members who can legally access Indigenous land. On 
this account, Métis scholar Bonita Lawrence traces the impact of the Canadian Indian Act 
of 1876 in terms of a settler colonial conceptual framework and meaning-making of race 
and gender in Canada (Lawrence 2003). Lawrence outlines the discriminatory legislation 
under the Indian Act whereby First Nations women who married non-Native men, or 
non-status Indian men, lost their status, and thus access to reservation lands. This sexist 
                                                        
 
90 The Indian Act pertains only to First Nations peoples, not to the Métis or the Inuit.  
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method of defining Indigenous identity rendered First Nations women invisible and so, 
particularly vulnerable.91 In 1985, Bill C-31, or the Bill to Amend the Indian Act, passed 
into law in order to bring the Indian Act in line with gender equity as mandated by the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This Amendment left individual reserves to 
devise membership codes of their own making. Bill C-31 was aimed to redress the 
patrilineal bias of the Indian Act of 1867. With this Amendment, women and children 
who had previously lost status were put back on the federal registration list. The bill 
leaves it up to reserves to admit or deny membership to these women and their children in 
their own local registries (Simpson 2007, 72). While bands can determine their own 
membership, Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development (formerly known as Indian 
and Northern Affairs Canada) only provides funding for status Indians and not for non-
status band members.  
Moreover, government regulatory discourses of who does and who doesn’t come 
to count as an “Indian” in settler colonial North America come to shape self-
identification. This, in turn, comes to form what Megan Bang and Ananda Marin call 
“settler normativity” (Bang and Marin 2015). Settler colonialism imposes a settler 
grammar in which certain identities (consider, for example, twin-spirit gender identity) 
and kin structures are considered unintelligible.92 In this vein, Mark Rifkin highlights the 
                                                        
91 See Quebec Native Women 2008; Amnesty International 2014. The 1996 Report of the Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples relays the situation of Indigenous women in violent family situations: 
“If the marital home is on a reserve, the provincial court is unable to handle the case because it falls within 
federal jurisdiction over “Lands reserved for the Indians,” yet [there is no] federal legislation to deal with 
the matter. Consequently, women often have no alternative but to leave the marital home. Given the 
shortage of housing on most reserves, women in these circumstances usually have to choose between 
moving in with relatives already living in overcrowded homes or leaving the community” (Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples 1996).   
 
92 See Driskill 2010 and Brayboy 2017.  
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heterosexualizing agenda invested in the ongoing management of Indigenous peoples 
(Rifkin 2011). Settler governmental regulation is justified by marking Indigenous kinship 
models as different from the heteronuclear family, and thus as an inappropriate basis for 
governmental structure. According to Rifkin, the settler colonial sexual order of the 
United States has attempted to make Indigenous peoples the mirrored image of the 
Anglo-American heterosexual nuclear family.93 Central to the project of settler 
colonialism is both the erasure of Indigenous presence on land through physical and 
statistical elimination, as well as the imposition of gender and kin structures. For these 
reasons, the shaping of Indigenous identity must be viewed in terms of the project of 
eliminating Indigenous populations in order to seize land. 
 
Elimination through Settler Nation-Building Myths  
A second form of elimination of Indigenous presence is tied to the propagation of 
settler nation-building myths. On this account, Adam Barker provides an analysis of how 
the logic of elimination manifests in present-day Canada through settler myths. He 
affirms that contemporary colonialism need not necessarily involve “the establishment of 
physical colonies, forced military suppression of peoples, [or] slave labor” (Barker 2009, 
326), but rather requires the creation of the narratives of the benevolent settler and the 
                                                        
93 Settler colonial violence occurs in the creation and violent imposition of a Christian heteropatriarchal 
family. This resonates with Scott Morgensen’s work on the relationship between homonationalism and 
settler colonialism. He explains settler homonationalism “as the product of a biopolitical relationship 
between the sexual colonization of Native peoples and the normative settler formation of modern queer 
projects in the United States” (Morgensen 2010, 107). His project is to denaturalize settlement within U.S. 
queer projects in order to reveal “the past and present activity of settler colonialism as a contradictory and 
contested process” (2010, 107). Beth Piatote produces a similar comparison in her investigation of the dual 
meaning of ‘domestic subjects’ as both the legal status of American Indians during the Assimilation Period 
(1879-1934) and the legal destruction of kinship structures in Domestic Subjects: Gender, Citizenship and 
Law in Native American Literature (Piatote 2013). 
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chaotic Native, which “act as both a cover and a motivator for actions of control” (2009, 
347).94 In light of the failure of classical imperialism to control Indigenous populations, 
Canadian imperialism became what Taiaiake Alfred and Jeff Corntassel refer to as 
“shapeshifting colonialism,” which is more reactive and adaptive in its enforcement of 
“an ideology of control than creating specific structures” (Alfred and Corntassel 2005, 
601). In other words, settler colonialism is adaptive and so does not function solely 
through physical elimination or exclusion but through the shaping and management of 
Indigenous and settler identity as well.  
A consideration of settler myths recalls Homi Bhabha’s claim that the nation-state 
creates a homogenous identity by appropriating narratives of the past that mystify 
“discourses of minorities, the heterogeneous histories of contending peoples, antagonistic 
authorities and tense locations of cultural difference” (Bhabha 1990, 212). Alfred names 
“the benevolent peacemaker myth” as formative of Canadian settler identity (Alfred in 
Regan 2010, ix). As he writes: “Canadians grew up believing that the history of their 
country is a story of the cooperative venture between people who came from elsewhere to 
make a better life and those who were already here, who welcomed and embraced them, 
aside from a few bad white men” (Alfred in Regan 2010, ix). This settler myth of 
Canadian benevolence names an example of what Tuck and Yang call “settler moves to 
innocence,” which aim to ensure a settler futurity (Tuck and Yang 2012, 1).95 Settler 
                                                        
94 Barker’s interpretation of Canada’s contemporary colonialism does not fit Hardt and Negri’s definition of 
decentered and deterritorializing Empire (Hardt and Negri 2001) insofar as Canada is a site of “hybrid 
imperialism,” in which the state both participates in the emergence of a decentralized global imperialism, 
and in ongoing colonization in the face of Indigenous resistance (Barker 2009, 344). 
 
95 Against these moves to innocence, Tuck and Yang put forward an ethic of incommensurability, which 
“recognizes what is distinct, what is sovereign for project(s) of decolonization in relation to human and 
civil rights based social justice projects” (Tuck and Yang 2012, 28).  
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myths feign an innocence about the destruction of Indigenous communities by 
maintaining myths of settler benevolence.96 Through this mechanism, settler myths 
exemplify the logic of elimination.  
 
 Epistemic Elimination  
A third manifestation of the settler colonial logic of elimination involves the 
elimination of Indigenous peoples as rational knowers. This characterization comes to 
form an elimination of Indigenous peoples from the realm of reason. Over and above an 
elimination of Indigenous knowledges, an epistemic elimination eliminates Indigenous 
peoples as knowers. This epistemic elimination arises from a settler conception of 
rationality grounded in a belief that land is inert matter to be owned and cultivated, such 
that the rational relationship to land is one of property. The attempt by Western 
philosophers to give an objective account of reality by negating the epistemic role of 
place leads to a particular conception of land. Settler colonial epistemology, which 
describes reality from a ‘view from nowhere,’ is used to justify both the seizure of 
Indigenous lands and the epistemic elimination of Indigenous peoples.97 The settler 
colonial account of the placelessness of epistemology leads to the epistemic elimination 
of Indigenous peoples. 
 
                                                        
96 Scott Pratt shows how the United States’ definition of American Indian nations within its borders as 
“domestic dependent nations” (as a result of the 1831 Supreme Court decision in Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia) as well as organizations such as Friends of the Indian exemplified what he calls “genocide by 
caring” (Pratt 2013, 17).  
 
97 I take Locke as representative insofar as his political writings were explicitly used to justify North 
American settler colonial expansionism.  
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Settler Colonial Epistemology 
Settler colonial epistemology names a way of knowing that legitimates the seizure 
of Indigenous land. This justification arises from a particular conception of land and 
place. According to settler colonial epistemology, the epistemically sound relationship to 
land is as inert matter to be owned. On this account, Locke’s political theory epitomizes 
the dominant model of Western rationality in which rational relationships to land are 
relationships of ownership and cultivation (Locke 1952; Pateman and Mills 2007). The 
following section first presents an account of Indigenous metaphysics that depicts land as 
an agent to then illustrate how such a characterization is deemed irrational according to a 
settler colonial account of rationality. I then describe an example of settler colonial 
epistemology that aims for a placeless account of rationality.  
Vine Deloria Jr (Standing Rock Sioux) and Daniel Wildcat (Yuchi) put forward a 
distinctly Indigenous metaphysics and epistemology that centers on a consideration of 
land, place and power. In Power and Place: Indian Education in America, Deloria and 
Wildcat define Indigenous philosophy as philosophy “of a place” (Deloria and Wildcat 
2001, 31). Deloria claims that in most Native American traditions, land is an active 
participant in the life of the community. The emphasis of being ‘of a place’ puts forward 
an ontology in which place, defined as “the relationship of things to each other,” is an 
agent (2001, 22-23). For this reason, Scott Pratt characterizes Deloria and Wildcat’s 
metaphysics as an agent ontology in which “entities are persons whose particular 
character will be a matter of their interactions and where knowledge will be a matter of 
knowing their personalities” (Pratt 2006, 5). An agent ontology states that all things are, 
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or are parts of, agents, meaning that they are things that act with a purpose. Deloria and 
Wildcat assert that “power and place produce personality” (Deloria and Wildcat 2001, 
23). Agents or persons are the intersection of power and place, where power names a 
kind of motivating force and place names the complex network of relations that make 
agents what they are. A human, for example, is generated by a particular place. In this 
respect, Wildcat affirms that identity—“who one is”— is emergent from place (2001, 
114).  
This ontological starting point leads to an alternative epistemology as well. 
Deloria and Wildcat describe reality as an interweaving of relations. Accordingly, the 
universe is alive and personal, such that “it must be approached in a personal manner” 
(2001, 23).98 If things to be known are themselves agents, then knowing involves not 
only noting their behavior but also learning their purposes and interests. For example, I 
come to know my dear friend Amie by coming to know her interests to the point that I 
can predict (though never with complete certainty) her behavior. Knowing others is not 
simply a process of acquiring objective facts but is a moral activity.99 To know is to be 
familiar and to be familially related.100 Learning is a moral activity insofar as my 
‘subject’ of study is an agent in her own right with her own interests and purposes. 
Moreover, since every action toward a purpose affects the actions of others toward their 
                                                        
98 Deloria affirms that Indigenous epistemology is limited to experiential knowledge of correlation and 
rejects claims of placeless causation as universally true. 
 
99 The natural world is personal and as such, “its perceived relationships are always ethical” (Deloria and 
Wildcat 2001, 27). 
  
100 As Leanne Betasamosake Simpson writes, “intelligence in [a Nishnaabeg] context is not an individual’s 
property to own” (Simpson 2014, 11). 
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purposes, every act is necessarily moral in that it affords or constrains the pursuit of 
goals.  
In dominant Western epistemology, however, place is not epistemically salient. 
Western epistemology seeks to articulate a “view from nowhere.”101 For example, René 
Descartes presents a method to attain a clear and distinct vision of the truth that is 
(ostensibly) not situated in a particular way. He affirms that reason, as a universally 
shared faculty of the mind, leads a knower, through introspection, to universal truths 
about the self and the world. Experience is a mere occasion for the mind to realize 
universal objective rational truths. The specific situations of time and place is irrelevant 
since his method will discern clear and distinct ideas that are not temporally and spatially 
specific. Knowledge is beyond doubt when it is deduced from placeless universals. For 
example, the clear and distinct idea that “I think, I exist” is as true now as it was for 
Descartes in 1637. Located claims of the kind ‘p is true here and now,’ on the other hand, 
are also always and everywhere true since ‘here’ and ‘now’ are indexical to a particular 
place and time. Even though located claims are always and everywhere true, they do not 
imply, however, a universal. For example, “it is raining in Eugene” does not imply a 
universal claim “it is raining everywhere.”102 As such, located claims are less useful in 
the deduction of universal truths.  
Place, unlike in Deloria and Wildcat’s account, is not an agent that creates a sense 
of identity but rather names an epistemically neutral, and so irrelevant, feature. Place is a 
                                                        
101 Most prominently in Thomas Nagel’s The View From Nowhere (1986).  
 
102 In predicate logic, the rule of universal generalization states that ∀xfx can be inferred from any 
proposition fx where ‘x’ stands for an arbitrary, placeless individual that does not appear in the premises. 
From any universal generalization, we may validly infer any instance of it.  
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qualification that is relevant to claims of ownership but not essential to knowledge 
(claims can be made about places, but places are not necessary for all claims). Place, or 
land, does not have an agential role in knowledge-production. For this reason, I assert 
that dominant Western epistemology presents a placeless account of rationality. 
According to a placeless account of rationality, place is not essential to knowing. While 
knowing which is placed is possible according to Western epistemology, it is of limited 
value. For this reason, Deloria and Wildcat’s accounts illustrate an agential relationship 
to land that contradicts and rebuffs settler colonial conceptions of epistemology and 
metaphysics.103 The following section explains how the placelessness of Western 
epistemology is taken to justify land dispossession by eliminating Indigenous peoples 
from the realm of reason.   
In Western dominant epistemology, the placelessness of rationality leads to a 
conception of land as property. An example of this can be found in Locke’s social 
contract theory, which articulates a model of rationality in terms of property ownership. 
In The Second Treatise of Government, Locke begins his argument for monarchy by 
stating that men are naturally free and equal. The law of nature, which is God’s law to 
man that is found out by reason, obliges everyone to not “harm another in his life, health, 
liberty, or possessions” (Locke 1952, 5). The natural liberty of man in the state of nature 
is to be free from the legislative authority of man and to be ruled solely by the law of 
nature.104 In this state of nature, there is no common judge with authority to settle 
                                                        
103 Deloria and Wildcat identify metaphysical assumptions of Western civilization of materialism and 
machine metaphysics as undermining Indigenous knowledge (Deloria and Wildcat 2001, 10-12).  
 
104 Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau all ground their argument for the creation of the state as a necessary 
corrective to their conceptions of the state of nature. Seyla Benhabib argues that the metaphor of the state 
of nature plays an important role in modern moral and political philosophy, in that it serves as a “looking 
glass of these early bourgeois thinkers in which they and their societies are magnified, purified and 
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disputes, and as such, everyone has the right to punish, and even kill, offenders of the law 
of nature (1952, 8). Individuals enter into a state of war whenever someone threatens 
their life or takes their property, which is a threat to their liberty. Locke argues that they 
leave the state of nature by entering into one community and forming a body politic 
under one legislative authority. The creation of the commonwealth removes them from 
states of war since it establishes a common authority that can adjudicate on competing 
claims to property. With the creation of the commonwealth, individuals transfer to the 
governing authority their natural right to be the executioner of the law of nature.  
Locke argues that civil society is primarily concerned with the preservation of 
property. Property that is given to individuals by God and that is held in common in the 
state of nature becomes mine when I mix my labor with the property. Ownership arises 
when the labor of my body is attached to property previously commonly held (the land, 
the fruit, etc.). The accumulation of private possessions is limited however to the 
consumption of perishables. No one can justly own things that she cannot use. The use of 
money to exchange goods thus becomes central to Locke’s account of the limitations to 
property ownership. He affirms that God gave humans dominion over the earth so that 
the industrious can enhance its value through their labor. The commonwealth, through the 
establishment of legislative power, is thus necessary in order to enjoy one’s property in 
“peace and safety” (1952, 75). Locke defines society as nothing but “the consent of a 
number of freeman, capable of majority to unite and incorporate” (1952, 97). Consent to 
                                                        
reflected in their original, naked verity” (Benhabib 1986, 408). Hobbes’ state of constant warfare, Locke’s 
God-given state of natural equality and Rousseau’s utopia free from social intervention reflect, she argues, 
these men’s “flaws, fears and anxieties, as well as dreams” (Ibid.). Hobbes’ state of nature reflects a 
paranoid obsession with the fear of death, Locke’s reveals a fantasy of an efficient self-made property 
owner, and Rousseau’s shows his aspiration for a fictional noble savage. 
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laws becomes the ground of political legitimacy. Consent to the governing laws can be 
either explicitly given or can be given tacitly through the possession or “enjoyment of 
any part of the dominions of any government” (1952, 68). 
I contend that Locke presents a model of settler colonial epistemology that puts 
forward a definition of rationality in terms of a specific relationship to land. Locke writes 
that land is to be owned by the one who works on it. It is not an agent, but an object of an 
agent’s labor. According to Locke, land is “almost worthless,” because “it is labor […] 
which puts the greatest part of the value upon land” (1952, 26—emphasis added). Locke 
offers an account of a specific relationship to land in terms of rationality (i.e., a rational 
relationship to land is one that is predicated upon a logic of capitalism and private 
ownership). Moreover, he explicitly uses his definition of land and labor to justify settler 
colonial expansion and Indigenous land dispossession.105 Since he considers Indigenous 
peoples to not be properly mixing their labor with the land, they do not own it and, as 
such, it is up for grabs. 
Locke’s account of land is epistemological insofar as one can see it as a natural 
consequent of the epistemic assumptions that he develops in his 1689 text, Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding. I emphasize the epistemological dimension of 
Locke’s land-relation to clarify the links between settler colonial epistemology and 
epistemic elimination, which justifies Indigenous land dispossession by relegating their 
ways of knowing and relating to land to the realm of unreason. For this reason, I argue 
that Locke’s political writings that justify Indigenous land dispossession are a 
consequence of his epistemic assumptions. 
                                                        
105 See Tully 1994.  
 
 70 
Unlike Descartes, Locke contends that knowledge is rooted in sense experience. 
His empiricism is greatly informed by the scientific method and the idea that scientific 
progress emerges from observation and experimentation. There are no innate ideas since 
our minds are, for Locke, a tabula rasa prior to sensations (Book II). In Book IV, he 
defines knowledge as a relation (of agreement or disagreement) of ideas.106 For example, 
I know that ‘7 is greater than 3’ insofar as I perceive that there is a size relation of bigger 
and smaller between the two ideas.  
Knowledge does not emerge from place but is a consideration of the relationship 
of ideas. By defining knowledge as the relation of ideas, Locke effectively leaves 
knowledge placeless. While he contends that ideas come from sense-impressions, the 
relations connecting ideas do not emanate from sense-experience but are known through 
the agreement or disagreement that obtains between them. Hence, the relation of ideas 
does not depend on their being grounded in place, but can be known by anyone, 
anywhere, at any time. It is this notion of things been known by anyone, anywhere, and at 
any time that contributes to the placelessness of Locke’s epistemology.107 Indeed, one can 
see this account reaffirmed by other empiricists, like David Hume, who insist that 
relations of ideas (such as mathematical operations) are a priori and universally true, and 
thus do not depend on their being verified in experience (in some place, some time, by 
someone).  
                                                        
106 “Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connexion and agreement, or 
disagreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas. Where this Perception is, there is Knowledge, and where 
it is not, there, though we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short of Knowledge.” (Locke 
1975, 4.2.2).  
 
107 The process of knowing for Locke is to find what is common among diverse experiences, rather than 
what is distinct about one experience. 
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How do claims about place fit such a model? It seems as though ‘X owns Y’ 
(where Y here refers to a plot of land) names not only an abstract relation, but a relation 
of ownership about a particular plot of land. It is, however, an idea of the one place that 
is related to X. The plot of land itself (whatever that is) is secondary to the idea of the 
plot of land. Just as land is only considered valuable if it is worked, plots of land are only 
owned if they are properly ideated by an agent. If people do not properly have an idea of 
a land (with its specific location and dimensions), then there is no claim. Those who 
refuse to have such ideas of ownership cannot properly know it.  
 
Locke as an Exemplar Settler Colonialist 
Locke’s placeless account of knowledge throws into sharp relief his colonial 
desire for place in the form of expansion. Rather than regard his epistemic and political 
writings as contradictory positions, they can be seen as mutually entailing the other.108 
For if knowledge is unbounded by place, then it can go anywhere. Likewise, if there is 
unowned land, the colonist can go anywhere. Locke famously justifies settler colonial 
expansion in North America by characterizing lands as being unused by Native 
populations. In the Second Treatise of Civil Government, Locke affirms that “in the 
beginning all the world was America,” viz., “uncivilized.” As such, settler colonial 
expansion is not, in fact, an infringement of individual rights since the very land that is 
contested is not being cultivated in the appropriate—i.e., rational—way.109 Since land is 
                                                        
108 Max Milam shows the consistency between Locke’s epistemology and political writings through his 
definition of knowledge in terms of property (Milam 1967). Locke’s conception of knowledge as a kind of 
possession or property marks the continuity between how he thinks about knowledge and how he thinks 
about land relations.  
 
109 Tully 2000c, 27. 
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not plotted or assigned, Native Americans are taken to be unable to plot or assign it 
properly. As such, it is up to properly rational knowers to properly assign it (by using 
measures to objectively determine its location to assign its latitude and longitude) to do 
so.110   
Locke’s language of rationality as ownership can be found in the very way North 
American colonists wrote about the Indigenous populations they encountered. The way in 
which settler colonial expansion (and dispossession of Indigenous lands) was framed and 
justified reveals underlying norms of rationality and who counts as a credible knower and 
political agent. With Locke as an exemplar of the “driving moral ethic of the West,” the 
settler rational subject is driven to “appropriate nature, accumulate property, and 
cultivate” (Seawright 2014, 566).111  
Such an account is found in William Robertson’s 1777 History of the Discovery 
and Settlement of North America in which he writes that “Indians [sic] cannot rise out of 
their state of nature because of their inherent moral failings, which are demonstrated in 
their inherent traits that exclude them from the universal human” (qtd in Konkle 2004, 
10).112 Indigenous peoples are destined to remain in their ‘state of nature’—what he calls 
a “state of wild unassisted nature”—because they do not have a relationship to land as 
property (Robertson 1852, 782). Robertson touts the familiar line that a different 
                                                        
110 On the effort to determine longitude in response to Newton’s idea of particles that can have determined 
space and location, see Sobel 2007.  
 
111 For this reason, Tully argues that Locke provides “a set of concepts we standardly use to represent and 
reflect on contemporary politics” (Tully 1994, 137). 
 
112 Robertson was a Scottish historian who was part of the Scottish Enlightenment and a founding member, 
along with David Hume, Adam Smith and Allan Ramsay, of the Edinburgh’s Select Society.  
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relationship to land marks an inherent inferiority. As such, private property is the mark of 
rationality and civilization.  
The conception of Indigenous nations’ state of nature is not presented as an 
original position from which to describe legitimate political authority in the form of a 
social contract but rather as a permanent state of mental immaturity. Insofar as 
Indigenous peoples did not characterize land as something to be owned, they were seen 
as less rational (or even pre-rational) and incapable of escaping their state of nature to 
achieve civilization.113 As such, Robertson characterizes North America as “occupied by 
such people were almost in the same state as if they had been without inhabitants” (1852, 
782). The equation of property and civilization justifies the colonists’ seizure of land, 
since, as the story goes, “Indians [sic] [did] not appreciate the importance of property, 
they [were] morally and intellectually incapable of perceiving the tenets of natural law, 
and therefore incapable of forming governments administered by the rule of law and of 
being civilized, political subjects” (Konkle 2004, 10).114 Insofar as Native Americans 
were purportedly unable to grasp the regularities of natures as placeless laws of nature 
(such as causation as something applicable everywhere), they were taken to be unable to 
follow rules of law. Indigenous peoples remain fixed to a state of nature until they 
                                                        
113 This judgment recalls Charles Eastman’s, a Dakota Ohiyesa, story: “A missionary once undertook to 
instruct a group of Indians in the truths of his holy religion.  He told them of the creation of the earth in six 
days, and of the fall of our first parents by eating an apple. The courteous savages listened attentively, and 
after thanking him, one related in his turn a very ancient tradition concerning the origin of maize.  But the 
missionary plainly showed his disgust and disbelief, indignantly saying: ‘What I delivered to you were 
sacred truths, but this that you tell me is mere fable and falsehood!’ ‘My brother,’ gravely replied the 
offended Indian, ‘it seems that you have not been well grounded in the rules of civility.  You saw that we, 
who practice these rules, believed your stories; why, then, do you refuse to credit ours?’ (Eastman 1980, 
30). 
 
114 “Where the right of separate and exclusive possession is not introduced, the great object of law and 
jurisdiction does not exist” (Robertson 1852, 162-163).  
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changed to a ‘more rational’ conception of land. Unlike Locke’s model of political 
community through social contract whereby each resigns his executive power of law of 
nature to the public, Indigenous communities emerge from their state of nature, on this 
account, through a reconceptualization of land as property (Locke 1952, 50).115 
The settler colonial desire to own property and to improve upon their property 
sets a moral standard in addition to a standard of rationality. According to a settler 
colonial epistemology, an agential relationship to land is not only an epistemic failing, 
but also a moral failing. This moral failing of Indigenous peoples is “a product of their 
incapacity to perceive the tenets of natural law” (Konkle 2004, 11). This so-called 
inferiority was taken to illustrate an inability to grasp abstract ideas, internalize moral 
laws, articulate an understanding of time and space and form real governments. Insofar as 
Indigenous peoples were labelled as unable to grasp abstract ideas and their relations of 
agreement or disagreement (the epistemic standard according to Locke), they were 
deemed to be epistemically inferior. On this account, the (inaccurate) perception that 
Indigenous nations did not seek to improve the land through means of European 
cultivation signaled a mark of rational and moral inferiority. 
Along this line of argumentation, Secretary of War Henry Knox’s report to 
Congress in 1789 articulated the rationale for the United States’ governmental policy 
towards Indigenous nations. He hypothesized that “if Indians could be persuaded to 
change their practices to EuroAmerican ones, fundamentally with regard to the issue of 
                                                        
115 Locke defines society as nothing but “the consent of a number of freeman, capable of majority to unite 
and incorporate” (Locke 1952, 97). Consent to laws becomes the ground of political legitimacy. Consent to 
the governing laws can be either explicitly given or can be given tacitly through the possession or 
“enjoyment of any part of the dominions of any government” (1952, 68). 
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property, they would willingly submit—consent – to EuroAmerican authority” (qtd in 
Konkle 2004, 10). The idea was that a rational conception of land would lead to an 
appreciation of the legitimacy of settler authority. As such, settlers interpreted the 
rejection of settler authority as an expression of moral and rational inferiority. Knox’s 
hypothesis would be repeatedly disproven.116  
The exclusion of Indigenous peoples as knowers is not accidental, but integral, to 
the settler colonial project of eliminating the Indigenous presence. For this reason, 
Gardner Seawright argues that “white supremacy, heteropatriarchy, and colonialism 
coexist with anthropocentrism in the Western body of knowledge to create settler 
traditions of place” (Seawright 2014, 559—emphasis added). According to settler 
colonial epistemology, Indigenous relationships to land premised upon an agent ontology 
fundamentally misunderstands what land is, which is something to be measured and used, 
such that that land is open to proper acquisition.  
Following the settler colonial logic of elimination, land is remade and 
reconceptualized as property and, as such, epistemological, ontological, and cosmological 
relationships to land other than as property are “made pre-modern and backward” (Tuck 
and Yang 2012, 5). In addition to this characterization of land as property, Bang and 
Marin contend that settler colonialism requires the “establishment of settler lifeways as 
the normative benchmark from which to measure development” (Bang and Marin 2015, 
532). More than a mere dismissal, settler conceptions of rationality both justify seizure of 
land and also actively remake land, such that “the way nature was perceived, understood, 
                                                        
116 One counter-example to this line of thinking is the Cherokee Nation, who took up a European 
conception of property and yet continued to be considered irrational Natives. 
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and interacted with was transformed at the most fundamental levels” (Seawright 2014, 
563). An account of knowing through abstract relations sets the standard in the colonial 
world. This is a settler colonial epistemology that leads to an epistemic elimination of 
Indigenous peoples as rational knowers. Indigenous peoples who do not know properly, 
since they do not assign land in determinate space or plot land to be owned, are 
eliminated as knowers. The following section explains two effects of this epistemic 
elimination: the legal category of terra nullius and residential (and boarding) schools 
policy.  
 
Epistemic Elimination: Terra Nullius  
 An understanding of the epistemic elimination of Indigenous peoples explains 
how a populated North American continent could be characterized as belonging to no one 
(terra nullius) since it was populated by peoples deemed irrational. Carole Pateman 
tracks the application of the doctrine of terra nullius to legitimize the interests of white 
settlers in Australia (Pateman and Mills 2007). The doctrine of terra nullius, meaning 
‘land belonging to nobody’ is a legal concept that came to be used in the 17th century to 
allow European colonial powers the right to occupy what belonged to no one. The 
definition of ‘belonging to no one’ is not narrowly defined as uninhabited but includes 
habituated areas that were judged to be uncultivated or without sovereign government. 
Pateman asserts that white settlers characterized populated territories “as mere waste or 
wilderness, and so legitimately open to seizure,” based on the criteria of not having a 
form of government “appropriate to a civil society” (2007, 36). According to a settler 
colonial epistemology, the form of government appropriate to a civil society requires a 
 77 
conception of land as property. Consequently, European colonizers perceived the 
populated continent as belonging to no one, because it was populated by so-called 
uncivilized peoples. For this reason, the doctrine of terra nullius exemplifies how the 
justification of the seizure of Indigenous lands occurs through an elimination of 
Indigenous peoples as knowers.  
 
Epistemic Elimination: Residential School Policy 
 Another example of the effect of the epistemic elimination inherent in settler 
colonial epistemology is the mandate of both the United States’ boarding schools and 
Canada’s residential school policy. Capt. Richard Pratt famously stated that the goal of 
the Carlisle Indian Industrial School, as well as other US boarding schools, was to “kill 
the Indian, and Save the Man.”117 In Canada, the first boarding school opened in New 
France in the early seventeenth century with the goal to both “civilize and Christianize 
young Aboriginal boys” (Honouring the Truth 2015, 28).118 The first residential schools 
failed to take root until the 1880s with the settler expansion of the Northwest. Roman 
Catholic and Protestant missionaries established missions and small boarding schools 
across the Prairies, in the North, and in British Columbia. Most of these schools received 
small, per-student grants from the federal government. While the ostensible goal of the 
                                                        
117 Luther Standing Bear, member of the Sioux Nation, provides account of his experience at the Carlisle 
Indian Industrial School that outlines these violences (Standing Bear 2006). 
 
118 Canada’s first prime minister, Sir John A. Macdonald, told the House of Commons in 1883: “When the 
school is on the reserve the child lives with its parents, who are savages; he is surrounded by savages, and 
though he may learn to read and write his habits, and training and mode of thought are Indian. He is simply 
a savage who can read and write. It has been strongly pressed on myself, as the head of the Department, 
that Indian children should be withdrawn as much as possible from the parental influence, and the only way 
to do that would be to put them in central training industrial schools where they will acquire the habits and 
modes of thought of white men.” (Honouring the Truth 2015, 12).  
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schools was to educate (and ‘civilize’) Indigenous peoples, their primary goal was the 
devastation of Indigenous nations so that the Canadian government could gain control 
over their land and resources. As the TRC final report observes—“If every Aboriginal 
person had been ‘absorbed into the body politic,’ there would be no reserves, no Treaties, 
and no Aboriginal rights. Residential schooling quickly became a central element in the 
federal government’s Aboriginal policy” (Honouring the Truth 2015, 3). If Indigenous 
peoples became rational, then they could become part of the Canadian polity. In addition 
to the cultural, spiritual, and physical elimination of Indigenous communities, these 
schools explicitly aimed to undermine and eliminate Indigenous epistemologies. As such, 
the residential school policy offers another stunning example of the elimination of 
Indigenous peoples (and knowledges) as a manifestation of the settler colonial project of 
land dispossession.  
 
Conclusion 
 The settler colonial aim of elimination leads to different forms of elimination—
statistical elimination, elimination through settler myths, and epistemic elimination. In 
order to describe this third form of elimination, I present Locke as a model of Western 
rationality that justifies settler colonial expansionism by defining a rational relationship 
to land as something to be plotted, used, and owned. According to this settler colonial 
definition of land, agential relationships to land and place, as demonstrated by Indigenous 
peoples, are evaluated as incoherent and as evidence of a moral and rational inferiority. 
This evaluation comes to form an epistemic elimination of Indigenous peoples from the 
realm of reason. This epistemic elimination justifies land dispossession. Moreover, this 
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epistemic evaluation of settler colonialism explains both the doctrine of terra nullius and 
the assimilationist goals of the United States’ boarding schools and Canada’s residential 
schools. These different forms of elimination are ultimately grounded in the settler desire 
for territory. Thus, an epistemic elimination comes to serve as justification for the seizure 
of land and the elimination of Indigenous presence. The elimination of Indigenous 
peoples from the realm of reason affects how their testimony (especially emotional 
testimony) is heard by a settler audience. The following chapter shows how the epistemic 
elimination of Indigenous peoples discredits their testimony in ways that uphold settlers’ 
ignorance of settler colonialism. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SETTLER IGNORANCE119 
 
The treatment of children in Indian Residential Schools is a sad 
chapter in our history […] we recognize that this policy of assimilation 
was wrong, has caused great harm, and has no place in our country. 
Prime Minister Stephen Harper, Statement of Apology 2008 
 
Canada has no history of colonialism. 
Prime Minister Stephen Harper, G20 Address 2009 
 
Introduction 
In 2008, former Prime Minister Harper called the residential school policy an evil 
that has “no place in our country” in his official Statement of Apology for the Indian 
Residential Schools Policy, which precipitated the creation of the Canadian TRC. And 
yet, a year later he proudly proclaimed that “Canada has no history of colonialism” 
during his G20 Address. How can we make sense of this seeming contradiction by a man 
supposedly educated and informed by residential school survivors? What was the evil of 
residential schools if not the evil of (settler) colonialism? This seems, at first glance, to be 
a set of contradictory statements in which one of the two statements must be false. Does 
Prime Minister Harper believe that (i) residential schools were part of a violent settler 
                                                        
119 A version of this chapter will be published in Feminist Philosophy Quarterly Special Issue: Epistemic 
Injustice and Recognition Theory (forthcoming). 
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colonial project, or (ii) Canada has no history of colonialism? It seems like he can hold 
one, but not both.  
Epistemology, as the study of knowledge, and propositional knowledge more 
specifically, uses the schema ‘S knows that p’, where ‘S’ stands for some subject who has 
knowledge and ‘p’ for the proposition that is known from direct observation.120 For 
example, ‘Harper knows that Canada has no history of colonialism’ and ‘Harper knows 
that residential schools were a violent settler colonial endeavor’ are contradictory 
propositions, in which at least one of these statements must be false. Traditional 
epistemology tells us that this conflict must be resolved by determining which individual 
proposition is false by looking for correspondence with the external world. This 
determination will answer which statement is a justified true belief.  
Drawing from feminist social epistemology, I argue, however, that this way of 
proceeding is an impoverished one, especially as it pertains to an explanation of Prime 
Minister Harper’s denial of settler colonialism. Firstly, in the standard model of 
epistemology, it is reason alone, uncontaminated from the unreliability of the body, that 
leads to objective knowledge. In ‘S knows that p’ epistemology, the complexity, 
messiness, and situatedness of life is negated in favor of analytic simplicity and an 
aspiration for infinite replicability. These claims to objectivity and universality have been 
intensely disputed in feminist standpoint theory.121 Sandra Harding, in particular, 
eschews assumptions about “solitary generic knowers on an indifferent landscape 
                                                        
120 The traditional view is epitomized in Thomas Nagel’s A View From Nowhere (1986). 
 
121 The Marxist concept of “standpoint theory” has been further developed in Sandra Harding’s work. See 
Harding’s edited volume The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader (Harding 2004) and Patricia Hill 
Collins’ Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of Empowerment (Collins 
1990). 
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accumulating verifiable ‘bits’ of information” (Code 2014, 153). This feminist 
intervention reveals that the supposed generality is in fact a situated position, namely one 
of a white able-bodied man—“the ‘generic’ S does refer to a ‘standard’ white male 
knower or doer” (2014, 150). Neutrality is not so neutral after all but is rather an 
expression of power and privilege (with its specific interests and values). With this 
intervention, the stark distinction between epistemology and ethics begins to fade as 
knowledge practices can no longer be taken to be ethically and politically neutral. 
Another limitation of this model of knowledge is the individualism of the ‘S 
knows that p’ schema of knowledge that abstracts knowledge-production away from its 
social environment.122 The turn to social epistemology emerges from the recognition of 
the fundamentally relational aspect of knowledge production. This intervention 
investigates the epistemic effects of social interaction and takes testimony to be central to 
knowledge production.123 Testimony does not fall into the ‘S knows that p’ model insofar 
as it is interactive—there are speakers and hearers. Over and above considerations of 
truth and justification, a focus on testimony brings matters of “trust, credibility, 
responsiveness and responsibility, epistemic character and situation” to the fore in 
knowledge-making and knowledge-circulating practices (2014, 152).124 Framed in terms 
                                                        
122 Social epistemology, such as Helen Longino’s The Fate of Knowledge (2002), undoes the dichotomy 
between sociality and knowledge, as she argues that sociality contributes positively to knowledge 
production. 
 
123 Testimony here refers to a “range of practices from simply telling one another the time of day to the 
complex verbal and written reports that are the substance of knowledge-conveying exchanges between and 
among people in the real world” (Code 2014, 152). 
 
124 Linda Martín Alcoff notes that testimony is broadly categorized as either inferential or non-inferential 
(Alcoff 2010, 129). In the former, testimony justifies a belief by inference, whereas in the latter testimony 
justifies a belief directly. 
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of testimony, knowledge production is no longer described impersonally and without 
social location. Kristie Dotson puts it succinctly— “In short, to communicate we all need 
an audience willing and capable of hearing us” (Dotson 2011, 238). 
One outcome of the turn to testimony has been to seriously consider ignorance, 
that is, the failure of knowledge-production and knowledge-circulation, as an epistemic 
practice.125 As a result, Robert Proctor and Londa Schiebinger named and defined the 
field of ‘agnotology’ as “the study of ignorance making, the lost and forgotten” (Proctor 
and Schiebinger 2008, vii 2008).126 Agnotology aims to observe the causes and 
distribution of ignorance in order to question the characterization of ignorance as a 
natural absence and a void to be corrected or filled in. For this reason, the study of 
ignorance (what we do not know) is meant to compliment the study of knowledge (what 
we know).127  
                                                        
125 The development of an epistemology of ignorance as a firmly ethical and political inquiry can be traced 
to the 2003 NEH summer seminar in feminist epistemology and the 2004 Penn State Rock Ethics Institute 
Conference, “Ethics and Epistemologies of Ignorance.” The proceedings of the conference led to a volume 
in Hypatia and to Shannon Sullivan and Nancy Tuana’s edited volume Race and Epistemologies of 
Ignorance (2007). 
 
126 The term agnotology is a neologism that differentiates the study of ignorance (how it is created and 
maintained) from agniology, the “doctrine of things of which we are necessarily ignorant” (Proctor and 
Schiebinger 2008, 27). The former term emphasizes the historicity and artifactuality of not-knowing. 
 
127 As an initial outline of the field of agnotology, Richard Proctor provides a topology of three different 
types of ignorance: “ignorance as native state (or resource), ignorance as lost realm (or selective choice), 
and ignorance as a deliberately engineered and strategic ploy (or active construct)” (Proctor 2008, 3). This 
differentiation of types of ignorance highlights the need for an investigation of the conditions that produce 
or sustain ignorance, the political factors that lead to specific forms of ignorance, and the relationship 
between these forms of ignorance and their corresponding forms of knowledge. The first type portrays 
ignorance as the prompt for inquiry. It is the native state of not knowing that must be overcome, and it is 
what drives scientific inquiry. The second considers inquiry (and thus ignorance) as selectively chosen. It 
characterizes ignorance as having a “political geography” such that we can ask: “Who knows not? And 
why not? Where is there ignorance and why?” (2008, 6). The third considers ignorance as something that is 
“made, maintained, and manipulated by means of certain arts and sciences” (2008, 8). An example of this 
latter kind of ignorance would be research subsidized by the tobacco industry that aims to maintain a 
“studied ignorance” of the fatal effects of tobacco (2008, 17-20). 
 
 84 
The impulse to seriously consider ignorance as a kind of knowledge has emerged 
as a powerful critical intervention to traditional epistemology. The study of ignorance, 
and social ignorance specifically, aims to identify different forms of ignorance and 
examine how they are produced and sustained. It asks which epistemic practices make it 
such that ‘S does not know p.’ In this way, ignorance is not taken to be a “neglectful 
epistemic practice” or simply a lack of knowledge but is rather considered as a 
“substantive epistemic practice” (Sullivan and Tuana 2007, 39). Ignorance is not simply a 
result of failed inquiry or “faulty justification practices,” it is structural and is the result of 
“practices of ignorance” (2007, 40). Analyses of ignorance pose questions at the 
intersection of “cognitive norms, structural privilege, and situated identities” (Alcoff 
2007, 39).  
A study of ignorance reveals cognitive frameworks of ignorance and the “role of 
power in the construction of what is known and [provides] a lens for the political values 
at work in our knowledge practices” (Sullivan and Tuana 2007, 2). The central claim of 
an epistemology of ignorance is that an account of knowledge is incomplete without an 
account of ignorance and an account of ignorance is incomplete without an account of 
who benefits and who is disadvantaged by such ignorance. In particular, investigations of 
racial ignorance examine how a lack of knowledge is “actively produced for purposes of 
domination and exploitation” (2007, 1). 
With these two critical interventions in mind, an investigation of former Prime 
Minister Harper’s statement becomes more complicated. In particular, the positionality of 
S—in this case former Prime Minister Harper—matters to an evaluation of his 
proposition and his attribution of the credibility of residential school survivors emerges as 
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an important factor. In other words, if he does not consider residential school survivors to 
be credible knowers, then their testimonies have little weight.  
I contend that the development of epistemologies of ignorance in social 
epistemology is well suited to better understand the conjunction of Prime Minister 
Harper’s 2008 and 2009 statements. In other words, Harper can hold both these 
statements as true and that something important about these statements is lost if we fail to 
evaluate them in conjunction. What would it mean to take Harper’s statement that Canada 
has no history of colonialism, in the face of testimonies that this is patently false, as a 
belief that is reasonably held? In fact, this seeming lack of knowledge is indicative of a 
kind of knowing that settler colonialism propagates. I propose, then, to evaluate the 
statement “Canada has no history of colonialism” not as presenting a lack of knowledge, 
but as asserting a particular kind of knowledge.  
In the previous chapter, I argued that settler colonial epistemology is one in which 
Indigenous peoples are discounted as rational knowers because of an agential relationship 
to land. The settler colonial logic of elimination implies an epistemic elimination, which 
is the elimination of Indigenous peoples from the realm of reason. In this chapter, I show 
how the epistemic elimination of Indigenous peoples discounts their testimony in a way 
that upholds settlers’ ignorance of settler colonialism. The assumptions of a settler 
colonial epistemology both justify and motivate an ignorance of past and ongoing settler 
colonialism, what I call ‘settler ignorance.’  
In order to explain how settler ignorance functions as a kind of knowledge, I draw 
on Charles Mills’ description of white ignorance and expand it to an account of white 
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settler ignorance.128 My explanation of settler ignorance emerges from an engagement 
with social epistemology, settler colonial studies, and Native feminisms. I begin with an 
overview of developments in social epistemology with an emphasis on white ignorance. 
Secondly, I show how settler ignorance functions by (i) distancing present testimonies to 
the past and (ii) discrediting emotional expressions as signs of individual pathology. 
Thirdly, I explain how, structural settler ignorance comes to form the everyday settler 
common sense such that Indigenous voices are needed in order to identify and make this 
ignorance visible. Finally, I use Kristie Dotson’s characterization of epistemic oppression 
to show how negative prejudicial stereotypes undermine the credibility of Indigenous 
speakers. Epistemic oppression cannot be transformed solely through individual cognitive 
changes or to changes in shared hermeneutical resources. Material changes, and land 
restoration more specifically, must be central to a concerted effort to transform settler 
ignorance. 
 
White Ignorance 
Analyses of ignorance with an emphasis on race were first articulated in Marilyn 
Frye’s 1983 The Politics of Reality and in Charles Mills’ 1997 The Racial Contract. Frye 
defines ignorance not as a simple absence, but as an active force. In particular, she names 
the non-accidental ignorance of white feminists who think of themselves as anti-racist 
while remaining largely oblivious to the worlds of women of color. Additionally, she cites 
“the determined ignorance most white Americans have of American Indian tribes and 
clans, the ostrich-like ignorance most white Americans have of the histories of Asian 
                                                        
128 I use ‘settler ignorance’ and ‘white settler ignorance’ synonymously.  
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peoples in this country, the impoverishing ignorance most white Americans have of Black 
language—ignorance of these sorts is a complex result of many acts and many 
negligences” (Frye 1983, 118).  
Mills gives a structural account of white ignorance such that ignorance is not 
explained in terms of the situatedness of group identities that leads to particular blind 
spots and specific insights (as exemplified in the works of Code and Harding), but in 
terms of structural forms of oppression.129 Ignorance is more than just the individual 
prejudicial blind spots according to one’s group identity. It is a structural feature of white 
supremacy. As such, dominant groups not only “have less interest” in criticizing the 
status quo, but they “have a positive interest in ‘seeing the world wrongly’” (Mills 2007, 
47). In other words, there are concrete benefits to this sustained ignorance. Mills 
illustrates this by looking at the notion of “color blindness” (2007, 25). Color blindness 
fosters a worldview in which racial violence can be easily overlooked. Rather than 
promoting racial equality, color blindness, in the wake of historical inequality and white 
normativity, actively separates present perception from past wrongs thus ignoring the 
ways in which a history of racial domination shapes the present. 
Mills’ articulation of the Racial Contract famously formulates an epistemology of 
ignorance within white supremacy, which prescribes for “its signatories an inverted 
epistemology, an epistemology of ignorance, a particular pattern of localized and global 
cognitive dysfunctions (which are psychologically and socially functional), producing the 
                                                        
129 Lorraine Code analyses the role of subjectivity in knowing. Given her call to “take subjectivity into 
account,” she claims that ignorance follows from our situatedness as knowers (Code 2008). What and how 
we know is dependent on our social location as a knower such that there is no interchangeable subject S of 
the schema ‘S knows that p’. Sandra Harding’s work considers the situatedness of group identities leads to 
particular blind spots (Harding 1993).  
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ironic outcome that whites will in general be unable to understand the world they 
themselves have made” (1997, 18). The Racial Contract is an epistemological contract (in 
additional to a political and moral contract). An epistemology of ignorance (or an 
inverted epistemology) is a requirement for the racial division of the human race into full 
persons and racial subpersons (1997, 118-119). Ignorance is here defined as a substantive 
epistemic practice that differentiates the dominant group. It is more than an effect of the 
knower’s general situatedness but is defined in terms of structures of power. As Linda 
Martín Alcoff writes, “oppressive systems produce ignorance as one of their effects” 
(Alcoff 2007, 40). 
In his 2007 article “White Ignorance,” Mills further elaborates on the “inverted 
epistemology” of the racial contract by describing white ignorance as it is connected to 
white supremacy. Firstly, he affirms that an analysis of ignorance must be historicized 
since whiteness is a political construct that emerges from a particular history of white 
supremacy. Secondly, he acknowledges that an account of white ignorance implies the 
possibility of knowledge that can contrast with such ignorance. Mills’ account of 
knowledge draws on Alvin Goldman’s veritistic epistemology, which is concerned with 
both knowledge, defined in the “weak” sense as true belief, and its contraries error (false 
belief) and ignorance (the absence of true belief) (Goldman 1999, 4).130 It is not an 
                                                        
130 Mills and Alcoff both affirm that a meaningful account of ignorance requires a robust (if reconstructed) 
account of truth and reason. Alcoff expands upon Mills’ analysis of ignorance by drawing on Horkheimer’s 
critique of the ontologies of Western science in order to illustrate that “ignorance is a problem relating not 
just to justificatory practices but also to ontologies of truth” (Alcoff 2007, 40). She argues that an analysis 
of ignorance requires more than an analysis of epistemic situatedness or structural contexts of oppression, 
but that epistemology must be “reflexively aware and critical of its location within an economic system” 
(2007, 57—emphasis added). Drawing on Max Horkheimer’s criticism of instrumental rationality, Alcoff 
defines ignorance as a loss of critical rationality that can only be challenged by a reconstructed and critical 
notion of objective reason (2007, 53). In order to reveal how instrumentalized reason is a dysfunctional 
cognitive norm that obscures the truth, Horkheimer contends that we need to denaturalize the social 
production of the “knowing individual as such” (Horkheimer 1975, 199). A critical description of the world 
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epistemology that is concerned with justification, but rather is one that seeks to discover 
the practices that “have a comparatively favorable impact on knowledge as contrasted 
with error and ignorance” (1999, 5). For his purposes of defining white ignorance, Mills 
uses the term ‘ignorance’ to designate both false belief and the absence of true belief, and 
white ignorance specifically as the false belief and the absence of true belief about 
“people of color, supporting a delusion of white racial superiority that can afflict white 
and nonwhite people alike” (Mills 2007, 17). White ignorance is both individual and 
collective and, as such, impacts both individual and social memory. White ignorance 
supports the social cognition that distorts reality shaped by white supremacy. For 
example, the lens shaped by white supremacy causes people suffering from white 
ignorance to “mis-see whites as civilized superiors and nonwhites as inferior savages” 
(Sullivan and Tuana 2007, 3).131  
White ignorance has the result of cultivating a collective amnesia about the past 
that undermines the testimony and credibility of nonwhite people. Under this analysis, 
white ignorance is naturalized as objective knowledge that rebuffs political analysis.132 In 
this case, the study of ignorance is primarily tasked with unraveling the cognitive 
mechanisms associated with structural racial discrimination.  
                                                        
recognizes knowledge as a reflection or product of “collective human praxis, meaning reflective practical 
activity” (Alcoff 2007, 51). As such, Horkheimer’s critical theory can help us identify the cognitive norms 
that both naturalize and dehistoricize the process and product of knowing.  
 
131 James Baldwin and W.E.B. Du Bois both offer accounts of developing a double vision (or “double 
consciousness”) in order to survive (Mills 2007, 18).  
 
132 Consider, for example, Edward Said’s account of the naturalization of Orientalism (Said 1978), whereby 
the Orient becomes “wholly discrete, stable, and fixed, providing sharp contrast to the Occident” (Alcoff 
2007, 56). Said’s account of the naturalization of the Orient is helpful in beginning to articulate an account 
of how white supremacy and settler colonialism come to naturalize settler knowledge of Indigenous 
peoples. 
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White Settler Ignorance 
An epistemology of ignorance offers both a description and explanation of how 
structures of domination come to inform what can and cannot be known. The task of 
considering the disavowal of settler colonialism as a particular kind of knowledge 
involves looking at how oppressive structures inform the epistemic practices of willfully 
denying past and ongoing settler colonial violence. Work in epistemologies of ignorance 
and epistemic oppression can help give language to explain sustained denial and provide 
tools to further understand how it is maintained and how it can be made visible, and so 
challenged. For this task, Mills’ articulation of white ignorance should be expanded to a 
consideration of white settler ignorance.  
An account of white settler ignorance develops out of an appreciation of the 
intersection of white supremacy and settler colonial violence. Aileen Moreton-
Robinson’s work on the logic of white possession highlights how racism is “inextricably 
tied to the theft and appropriation of Indigenous lands in the first world” (Moreton-
Robinson 2015, xiii). She defines white possession as a set of rationalizing processes that 
are “operationalized within discourses to circulate sets of meaning about ownership of the 
nation, as part of commonsense knowledge, decision making, and socially produced 
conventions” (2015, xii).  
Although Mills speaks to the role of the “state of nature” in the white settler state, 
he does not explicitly thematize white settler ignorance as part of the Racial Contract’s 
epistemological contract (Mills 1997, 12-19). For this reason, my account fills out what is 
only sketched out in Mills’ formulation of white ignorance. Building on Mills’ analysis of 
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white ignorance as a kind of knowing, his description can be expanded to an account of 
white settler ignorance (thus highlighting the intersection of settler colonialism and white 
supremacy). The task of this chapter is to explain what kind of knowledge white settler 
ignorance is and how it functions. Such an account emerges from an examination of 
settler colonialism’s underlying logics. An investigation of the settler colonial “logic of 
elimination” reveals that the elimination of Indigenous presence normalizes and 
sediments an ignorance of settler colonialism. The elimination of Indigenous peoples 
from the realm of reason—the account of epistemic elimination I gave in the previous 
chapter—explains how settlers can remain ignorant of Indigenous peoples’ experiences. 
My description of settler ignorance involves both an account of the conditions of speech 
that prevent emotional testimonies of the violence inherent in past and present settler 
colonialism from being heard as meaningful, legitimate and self-affirming political 
expression, as well as a conceptual framework to explain the experience of historical 
amnesia. In other words, settler ignorance is maintained by hearing testimonies of present 
settler colonial violence as an expression of past wrongs and individual pathology rather 
than as an expression of ongoing settler colonial violence.  
Patrick Wolfe’s description of settler colonialism’s logic of elimination gives us 
an entry point to consider how settler colonialism functions to eliminate Indigenous 
peoples (both physically and discursively). For Wolfe, the logic of elimination manifests 
in both the dissolution of native societies, and in the erection of a “new colonial society 
on the expropriated land base” (Wolfe 2006, 388). In order to assert settler normativity, 
the settler colonial logic of elimination of Indigenous presence also mandates an 
invisibility (and ignorance) of settler colonialism. Importantly, the logic of elimination 
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that underlies settler colonialism aims not only at the elimination of Indigenous peoples 
but also to its very own extinction. Whereas colonialism seeks to reproduce itself, settler 
colonialism seeks to become invisible. Lorenzo Veracini writes: “Settler colonialism 
justifies its operation on the basis of the expectation of its future demise” (Veracini 2011, 
3). In other words, settler colonialism aims to no longer be settler colonial and to become 
either ‘settled’ or ‘postcolonial.’133 For this reason, settler colonialism, when successful, 
“effectively covers its tracks” (2011, 3).  
This ‘covering its tracks’ entails certain ignorance of its own operation. Insofar as 
settler colonialism aims for complete settlement, it demands both the elimination of 
Indigenous peoples and the ignorance of its own operations. Settler colonialism aims to 
make itself invisible, and structural settler ignorance is a way of furthering this 
invisibility. An account of structural settler ignorance exemplifies how a process of 
ongoing structural domination leads to settlers’ obliviousness about settler colonial 
violence.  
Settler colonialism as a structure mandates the ignorance of its own operations. 
This ignorance is structural insofar as it is a necessary outcome of the settler project of 
eliminating Indigenous presence. For this reason, settler Canadians’ obliviousness about 
past and present settler colonial violence is not accidental but is a structural feature of 
settler colonialism. Settler ignorance is maintained by discrediting testimonies of ongoing 
                                                        
133 Veracini cites Ronald Horvath’s classification of six types of colonization, with type 1 being the closest 
to settler colonialism: “Type 1 is colonization in which the dominant relationship between the colonizers 
and the colonized is extermination of the latter. In the extreme sense of the word, to exterminate is to root 
out totally or eradicate. History provides us with relatively few examples where total extermination of the 
inhabitants of geographic entities occurred—among them the European occupation of Tasmania and of 
some of the Caribbean islands—but extermination of the inhabitants of vast areas of America, Australia, 
Canada, and Tsarist and Communist Russia can also be cited here” (Horvath 1972, 47). 
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settler colonial violence by Indigenous speakers. In other words, settlers can remain 
oblivious when testimonies of settler colonial violence are not heard as factually relevant 
or politically meaningful.  
An account of settler ignorance as a necessary outcome of a settler colonial logic 
of elimination can help us better understand former Prime Minister Harper’s two 
statements: “Canada has no history of colonialism” and “Residential school policy […] 
has no place in our history.” What do these two statements made by the same person just 
one year apart signal about how settler colonial power is maintained and re-legitimated? 
Examining these two statements in conjunction allows us to better appreciate how the 
disavowal of colonialism reveals a particular kind of knowledge production and nation 
memory-making.  
 
Settler Ignorance: Present to Past 
In the following section, I give an account of structural ignorance by explaining 
how it functions by discrediting Indigenous speakers through a distancing of present 
testimonies to a fixed past. In this respect, this account builds on the previous chapter and 
demonstrates another way in which testimonies by Indigenous speakers get dismissed. 
Structural settler ignorance functions by discrediting the epistemic agency of Indigenous 
speakers through the negative prejudicial stereotype of being stuck in a settler past. Kevin 
Bruyneel’s account of settler memory is a helpful starting point to explain how settler 
ignorance functions to form settler common sense by relegating testimonies of ongoing 
settler colonial violence to a far-away and fixed past.  
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Bruyneel argues that the explanation for the forgetfulness of settler colonialism as 
a form of “historical amnesia” is not a lack of memory, but a particular production and 
presence of memory that he calls “settler memory” (Bruyneel 2013, 237-240).134 His 
analysis resonates with historian Ernst Renan’s understanding of the nation as constituted 
in moments of violence which must then be perpetually repressed and forgotten in order 
to effect national unity (Renan 1882). The act of forgetting is all the more visible in 
settler nations’ forgetfulness of their own settler colonial projects (as stated in Prime 
Minister Harper’s G20 Address). Settler colonial nation-building requires a certain kind 
of forgetfulness in order to function.135 In this vein, Bruyneel tells us that settler memory 
functions by both seamlessly distancing past injustices from those of the present and 
disavowing the political relevance of this memory by refusing and absenting the presence 
of Indigenous people as contemporary agents (Bruyneel 2013, 236). His work on political 
time is especially useful in better articulating how settler memory shapes “collective and 
individual identities, subjectivities and imaginaries” (2013, 236). 
A feature of structural settler ignorance, then, is its distancing of present 
testimonies of settler colonialism to the past. Settler ignorance is maintained by hearing 
testimonies of present settler colonial violence as an expression of past wrongs, rather 
than as an expression of ongoing settler colonial violence. Consider, for example, the 
2008 Statement of Apology that prompted the creation of the TRC. Former Prime 
Minister Harper considered the legacy of the residential school system to be “a sad 
                                                        
134 This fleshes out the account of settler memory given in chapter 2.  
 
135 This can be seen forcefully with the defunding of the Aboriginal Healing Foundation (AHF), which 
supports Indigenous healing programs in 145 community-based projects (Nagy 2012, 358). 
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chapter in our history [which] has no place in our country,” and thus framed the 
residential school system as both a problem in the past (thus erasing ongoing settler 
colonial violence to Indigenous peoples136), while also diminishing the central role of the 
residential schools in settler-colonial nation-building (“it has no place in our country”). 
Harper’s statements in the Statement of Apology denied a settler colonial present by 
situating the damage of settler colonial violence in the past. His G20 statement continues 
this process of disavowal by denying the settler colonial past.  
This is settler ignorance at work, habitually invoking settler colonialism in a 
manner that blurs the line between past and present and further re-inscribes the practices 
of present day settler violence and dispossession. Specifically, a consideration of these 
two statements in conjunction reveals how settler ignorance is maintained by discrediting 
Indigenous voices through relegating testimonies of ongoing settler colonialism to an 
unchanging past. Nothing can be done now, we should focus on the present rather than on 
the evils of our “history.” As stated in the TRC’s mandate, we should “put the events of 
the past behind us so that we can work towards a stronger and healthier future” 
(Honouring our Truth 2015, 339).  
 The displacement of Indigenous peoples to a fixed past is yet another example of 
the settler colonial logic of elimination. In this case, Indigenous peoples are eliminated by 
being eliminated from the present. This mechanism of elimination relegates Indigenous 
peoples and their expressions to a distant (and irrelevant) past. To be ‘out of time’ erases 
and denies ongoing Indigenous activity and presence. As Bruyneel writes, “these settler 
                                                        
136 Consider, for example, the rates of Indigenous child welfare rates (roughly accounting for 48% of all 
foster children)  creating a “humanitarian crisis” in Canada (Yükselir and Annett 2016 and Barrera 2017). 
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memories are both there and not there at the same time, before our eyes but also 
dispossessed of active political meaning in and by the settler imaginary” (2016, 251—
emphasis added).137 This feature of settler ignorance resonates with Mark Rifkin’s 
description of settler time whereby Indigenous peoples are in a double bind: “either they 
are consigned to the past, or they are inserted into a present defined on non-native terms” 
(Rifkin 2017, vii).138  
Settlers experience the world made by settler colonialism, and so experience its 
temporalities and understandings of space as natural and, therefore, beyond questioning. 
The distancing of present to the past recalls Mills’ “inverted epistemology” of the racial 
contract in which the temporal distancing works to create a denial of present-day settler 
colonial reality (Mills 1997, 19). Settler colonialism demands a temporal displacement of 
Indigenous peoples. This displacement (and subsequent erasure) has the effect of both 
dismissing the political relevance of residential school survivors’ testimony and 
disavowing ethical responsibility for a settler colonial present.  
According to this temporal displacement, the harm has been done and the ‘bad 
guys’ have died.139 The narrative of the benevolent settler informs an ignorance of 
                                                        
137 Bruyneel’s example of the use of “Geronimo” for Osama bin-Laden’s codename that both brings the 
Chiricahua Apache leader to the foreground while reinscribing the settler colonial cultural meaning of his 
rebellion as a threat to US sovereignty that must be destroyed at all costs (Bruyneel 2016).  
 
138 Rifkin rejects the notion of universal time that is “dictated by settler expectations of the future, and 
instead emphasizes Indigenous temporal heterogeneity” (Rifkin 2017, 16). He argues that there is a 
multiplicity of temporalities that coexist and that this multiplicity makes expressions of temporal 
sovereignty possible (2017, 30).  
 
139 “In a global era of apology and reconciliation, Canadians, like their counterparts in other settler nations, 
face a moral and ethical dilemma that stems from an unsavoury colonial past. Canadians grew up believing 
that the history of their country is a story of the cooperative venture between people who came from 
elsewhere to make a better life and those who were already here, who welcomed and embraced them, aside 
from a few bad white men” (Alfred in Regan 2010). 
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ongoing settler colonialism (we’re so benevolent!) and the narrative of the chaotic Native 
justifies a denial of past settler colonialism (they needed to be tamed!) (Barker 2009, 326, 
347). According to this story, as a settler, I am not implicated in or responsible for 
continued land dispossession and the settler colonial myth of Canadian peace-making can 
remain intact.140  
 
Settler Ignorance: Emotional Expression  
A second feature of settler ignorance relates to a negative stereotype that 
Indigenous communities are irrational (or pre-rational). The previous chapter named the 
dismissal of Indigenous peoples from the realm of reason. A settler colonial conception 
of rationality eliminates Indigenous peoples by creating negative prejudices that 
undermine their testimony. In particular, settlers can remain ignorant of settler colonial 
violence when Indigenous testimonies are taken to be expressions of individual 
pathology. As such, settler ignorance functions by discrediting Indigenous voices as 
irrational and a sign of individual pathology. This feature of settler ignorance is most 
forcefully articulated by a feminist Native intervention and Dian Million’s felt theory in 
particular (Million 2009; 2013). Million’s felt theory exposes the way testimonies of 
abuse and the emotional expressions of internalized colonialism are heard as evidence of 
pathological victimhood. For this reason, I argue that settler ignorance is maintained 
through the narrative of Indigenous pathological victimhood, which mishears and 
dismisses emotional expression.  
                                                        
140 Recall that one form of the settler logic of elimination is the elimination through settler nation-building 
myths (see chapter 3).   
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 A Native feminist intervention can more fully identify and destabilize settler ways 
of hearing Native expressions of hurt, pain, and anger insofar as it raises the questions of 
whose voices are heard as politically meaningful in a context of ongoing settler-colonial, 
capitalist and heteropatriarchical violence. Native feminist theory reveals the key aspect 
of settler colonialism to be “the consistency and thus naturalization of heteropatriarchy 
and heteropaternalism” (Arvin et al. 2013, 14). As Maile Arvin, Eve Tuck and Angie 
Morrill put it: “settler colonialism has been and continues to be a gendered process” 
(2013, 9).141 In particular, Native feminists have worked on making visible the epistemic 
assumptions of what counts as academic scholarship.   
Million’s felt theory, with its attention to the affective intersections of 
heteropatriarchy and settler colonialism, makes visible how settler ignorance functions by 
delegitimizing and pathologizing emotional expression. She invites us to recognize the 
way Native women have born “witness to felt colonial experience” (Million 2013, 75). 
These voices—that of Maria Campbell, Lee Maracle, Ruby Slipperjack, in particular—of 
a felt history present a powerful challenge to the social control of internalized colonialism 
and invigorate political discourse of Native self-determination with emotional 
                                                        
141 The silence within mainstream feminist thought about settler colonialism has led to a suspicion within 
Indigenous communities about the use of feminism for decolonial projects (see Shanley 1984; Maracle 
2002; Andersen 2010). Arvin et al. raise five central challenges that Native feminist theories pose to gender 
and women’s studies: The first is the intersection of settler colonialism and heteropatriarchy; the second is 
to challenge the conception of Native feminism’s ‘inclusion’ within mainstream feminism as an articulation 
of hierarchical power; the third is to prioritize questions of land and tribal belonging in building solidarity; 
the fourth is to foreground Indigenous epistemologies of land and sovereignty; and the fifth is to challenge 
“how the discursive and material practices of gender and women’s studies and the academy writ large may 
participate in the dispossession of Indigenous peoples’ lands, livelihoods, and futures, and to then divest 
from these practices” (Arvin et al. 2013, 25). 
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knowledge.142 Their narratives disrupt settler-colonial silencing and defy the logic of state 
recognition that pathologizes Native expression. 
Million tells us, however, that the embodied knowledge of how colonialism is 
felt—what she calls felt scholarship—has been denied as a legitimate form of knowledge 
within academia. Their accounts that describe how colonialism is felt are political acts in 
themselves, insofar as they challenge what counts as ‘proper’ history (2013, 54). First-
person narratives that describe, for example, the felt experience of being raped by a priest 
at ten years old, have been rejected as legitimate historical knowledge (2013, 72). Rather, 
they have been segregated as a “feminine” experience, as a polemic and as evidence of 
pathological distress.  
Moreover, Million affirms that felt descriptions of colonialism have been 
interpreted as evidence of individual pathology (2013, 59). For this reason, she worries 
that the emphasis on historical trauma can situate Native communities as static victims in 
ways that obscure ongoing activities of self-determination—she writes, “the space of 
medicalized diagnosis as victims of trauma is not a site wherein self-determination is 
practiced or defined” (2013, 150). While it is important to recognize and name 
experiences of systemic violence, Million highlights the drawbacks of focusing too 
narrowly on traumatic experiences.143 The characterization of Native communities as 
victims of historical trauma can too easily ignore decolonizing, self-affirming, and 
community-building practices. 
                                                        
142 See Campbell 1973; Maracle 1993; Slipperjack 1987.   
 
143 Another example of settler distortion of emotional expression is in the consumption of damage or deficit 
models of Indigenous life, the appropriation of Indigenous pain and suffering as one’s own while denying 
one’s complicity in it (see Rosaldo 1989).  
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A Native feminist evaluation of the TRC thus highlights its performative 
contradiction of both encouraging emotional expression and dismissing it as apolitical 
non-knowledge. Glen Sean Coulthard echoes this concern with a description of 
reconciliation as a necessary overcoming of reactive negative emotions, which assumes 
the “‘good’ of forgiveness over ‘bad’ reactive emotions, unhealthy, irrational political 
violence” (Coulthard 2014, 108). He affirms that this model of reconciliation draws on 
the Nietzschean characterization of pathological ressentiment as a form of unhealthy 
dwelling in the past, rather than as an expression of “righteous anger” in reaction to a 
settler colonial present. Under this definition of reconciliation, Native testimonies of 
settler colonial violence are heard as “reactive, backward and a passive orientation” 
(2014, 111). Importantly, he is concerned with the way in which the Canadian TRC 
locates the traumas of settler colonialism in the past, such that Native testimonies of the 
impact of the residential schools are heard as a dwelling in the past, rather than as an 
expression of the impact of the ongoing violence of settler colonialism. 
The characterization of testimonies as ressentiment illustrates settler ignorance’s 
temporal displacement (as ressentiment is past-orientated) and pathologization of 
emotional expression. Hearing testimonies of injustices as ressentiment dismisses 
testimony as not factual, meaningful, or about the present, but rather as irrational and 
biased ramblings motivated by past wrongs.144  
 
 
 
                                                        
144 This resonates with Audre Lorde’s work on the uses of anger in black feminism (Lorde 2007). 
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Settler Ignorance as Settler Common Sense 
In the previous chapter, I gave an account of settler colonial epistemology in 
terms of a characterization of land as inert matter to be owned. The settler colonial logic 
of elimination leads to an epistemic elimination in which Indigenous peoples are 
eliminated from the realm of reason. This epistemic elimination affects how a settler 
audience hears testimony by Indigenous speakers. Settler ignorance can appear 
intractable when Indigenous voices are easily dismissed as irrational and out of time. 
Epistemic elimination names the system of domination and exploitation that undermines 
the epistemic agency of Indigenous peoples, whereas settler ignorance names the daily 
lived experience of settler normativity.145 The next section explains how settler ignorance 
comes to form the everyday settler common sense that legitimates and normalizes the 
elimination of Indigenous peoples as credible knowers.  
Settler ignorance comes to form what Rifkin calls “settler common sense,” 
defined as a set of dynamics for granted political and legal structures that both legitimates 
and normalizes the elimination of Indigenous peoples (Rifkin 2013). The everyday non-
Native experiences of space in terms of jurisdiction, occupancy, and ownership and of 
subjectivity as self-identical comprise settler sovereignty on an affective level. This, in 
turn, shapes “an embodied recognition” of settler sovereignty that does not explicitly take 
Native dispossession as its direct object (2013, 323). In this respect, Rifkin describes 
settler colonialism in terms of an affective orientation that forms the background of the 
settler everyday. Settler selfhood does not, Rikfin argues, follow “axiomatically from 
                                                        
145 This resonates with Zeus Leonardo’s account of white privilege as a system of domination (Leonardo 
2004) 
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policy formulations and official legal geography,” but becomes part of the everyday of 
settler experience through affective networks (2013, 322).146  
Rifkin’s account of settler common sense gives language to the affective and 
aesthetic dimensions of settler colonial violence. Settler colonial violence is not limited to 
disproportionately high incarceration and child welfare rates, violations of treaties, and 
acquitted murders of unarmed Indigenous teenagers, but is also present in everyday 
experiences of invisibility.147 Rifkin’s account of settler common sense emphasizes the 
non-cognitive and affective effects of the everyday invisibility of Indigenous peoples in 
the public sphere. The forgetfulness of settler colonialism forms the affective background 
that legitimates both ongoing settler colonial violence and the continued denial or 
forgetting of settler colonialism by settler Canadians. The settler common sense manifests 
in a settler every-day in which Canadian sovereignty and Indigenous land dispossession 
are taken to be both obvious and natural.148  
An account of settler ignorance as a kind of common sense highlights the 
affective investments in knowledge-production. The investment in settler normativity 
impacts how settlers experience a taken-for-granted everyday invisibility of settler 
colonial violence. Settler common sense names the affective orientation that normalizes 
Indigenous absence, which in turn leads to an ignorance of a settler colonial reality. This 
                                                        
146 Andrea Smith notes that since this settler common sense is constantly made and remade, it can, as such, 
potentially be unmade (Smith 2014).  
 
147 Consider, for example, the acquittals of Gerald Stanley for the 2016 murder of Colton Boushie and of 
Raymond Cormier for the 2014 murder of Tina Fontaine. See MacLean 2018 and Draaisma 2018.  
 
148 Rifkin looks to canonical American literature (such as Thoreau’s Walden, Hawthorne’s House of the 
Seven Gables, and Melville’s Pierre) as providing examples of how settlement gives rise to feelings 
through which the terms of law and policy become “imbued with a sensation of everyday certainty” (Rifkin 
2013, 322). 
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affective orientation normalizes and naturalizes a disavowal of settler colonial violence. 
This ignorance is neither individual or innocent but is made possible by a settler colonial 
logic of elimination of Indigenous presence.  
 
Settler Ignorance as Epistemic Oppression 
An account of structural ignorance in terms of (i) distancing present testimonies to 
the past and (ii) discrediting emotional expressions as signs of individual pathology 
shows how Indigenous speakers are discredited in such a way that infringes their 
epistemic agency and reduces their ability to participate in a given epistemic community. 
This dismissal forms the settler everyday experience of settler ignorance. Indigenous 
peoples’ credit-deficit is not accidental but part of the settler logic of elimination. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the settler colonial logic of elimination mandates an 
epistemic elimination, which has the effect of undermining the epistemic agency of 
Indigenous speakers.149 This elimination produces epistemic oppression, which Dotson 
defines as persistent epistemic exclusions in which a knower’s ability to participate in a 
particular epistemic community is hindered (Dotson 2014). By undermining the 
epistemic agency of Indigenous peoples, settler colonialism produces epistemic 
oppression as one of its effects.  
Epistemic oppression can be tracked in the negative identity prejudices (being 
stuck in the past and being irrationally emotional) that undermine Indigenous speakers as 
knowers. The negative prejudicial stereotypes of being stuck in the past and of being 
                                                        
149 Epistemic agency is the ability to use “shared epistemic resources within a given epistemic community 
in order to participate in knowledge production and, if required, the revision of those same resources” 
(Dotson 2012, 24). 
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irrationally emotional harms Indigenous speakers as epistemic agents. Indigenous 
speakers have a credibility-deficit and, as such, experience both testimonial and 
hermeneutical injustice (Fricker 2007). 
Dotson draws on Patricia Williams’ example of being barred entry into an open 
shop as a woman of color in The Alchemy of Race and Rights to illustrate how negative 
prejudicial stereotypes undermines epistemic agency (Williams 1991). Dotson names 
Williams’ experience of repeatedly not being believed that this was an incident of racism 
and being “unwarrantedly stripped of credibility” as an example of testimonial injustice 
(2012, 27). Testimonial injustice, names the injustice that occurs when a knower is 
discredited as a knower by virtue of their social identity as a member of a socially 
powerless group (Fricker 2007, 156). In other words, there is an epistemic injustice when 
a hearer deflates the credibility of a speaker by virtue of their identity. A hearer deflates 
the credibility of a speaker by virtue of negative prejudicial stereotypes about their 
identity and affective investments in negatively stereotyping that group. In Williams’ 
case, testimonial injustice names her experience of being discredited as a credible knower 
and her hearers’ investment in the denial of self-knowledge in the guise of ‘neutrality’ 
that preserves a “willful ignorance of racial discrimination and other social ills” (Dotson 
2012, 27). Similarly, Indigenous women suffer testimonial injustice due to a credibility 
deficit such that their accounts have been dismissed as too “bitter” or “biased.” 
Moreover, their testimonies are met with a negative affective involvement to believe 
them.  
Changes to testimonial injustice call for first-order changes, that is, to changes in 
the attribution of negative prejudicial stereotypes. In order to change testimonial 
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injustice, hearers need to alter their epistemic prejudices. Dotson names this as a first-
order change because it suggests alterations that do not challenge “the underlying 
schemata” (2014, 11). Inefficient credibility distribution is correctable when epistemic 
agents “pursue minimal reforms in their interactions with other epistemic agents” (Bailey 
2014, 64). An implicit bias test to help jury members and police officers would be an 
example of such a reform. 
In the case of Indigenous women, the correction of testimonial injustice would 
call for an inflation of credibility, for example, by making visible the material conditions 
of ongoing settler colonial violence (such as disproportionately high rates of gendered 
violence, incarceration, and suicide, for example150) and by recognizing that Indigenous 
women are well placed to name experiences of heteropatriarchal and settler colonial 
violence.151 Unlike the TRC’s assumption that settler Canadians will attribute credibility 
to Indigenous speakers’ testimonies, these measures of correcting credibility attribution 
aim to challenge stereotypes that distort how these testimonies are heard. 
Insofar as personal accounts of settler colonial violence are unhearable to a settler 
audience, Million’s analysis also points to another kind of epistemic injustice, what 
Miranda Fricker calls hermeneutical injustice. Hermeneutical injustice names the 
                                                        
150 See Bellrichard 2018.  
 
151 According to 2009 report “Violent Victimization of Aboriginal Women in Canadian Provinces,” 
Aboriginal women reported close to 138,000 incidents of violence. Missing and Murdered Indigenous 
women has been described as a Canadian national crisis. The 2014 report by the Commissioner of the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) found that there were 1,181 incidents of homicides and 
unresolved missing Aboriginal women. This report led to the creation of the National Inquiry into Missing 
and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls. The executive director Michèle Moreau announced her 
resignation as a commissioner in July 2017. The Office of the Correctional Investigator reports the 
incarceration rate of Indigenous people is at 26.4 per cent of the federal prison population, while 
comprising only four per cent of the Canadian population. See Brennan 2011 and National Inquiry into 
Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women.  
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injustice of having a significant area of one’s social experience “obscured from collective 
understanding owing to a structural identity prejudice in the collective hermeneutical 
resource” (Fricker 2007, 155). This injustice pertains to the unintelligibility of a knower's 
experience due to a “hermeneutical gap,” and results from a lack of social resources to 
make sense of a social group's experience. For example, the experience of sexual 
harassment was an experience that previously lacked hermeneutical resources, such that 
victims of sexual harassment could not make their experience intelligible and 
interpretable to others and to themselves (2007, 149-151). Alison Bailey uses an apt 
colonization metaphor to explain hermeneutical injustice—“Think of it this way, 
hermeneutical injustice happens when powerful groups colonize the knowing field’s 
schemata. That is, they assign meaning to phenomenon in ways that reflect their 
understandings and their experiences of the world, leaving the rest of us to work 
awkwardly with the conceptual vocabulary they have crafted” (Bailey 2014, 64—
emphasis added). Indigenous peoples suffer hermeneutical injustice insofar as the 
experiences of settler colonial violence are heard as unintelligible in the face of settler 
myths of benevolence and the displacement of settler colonialism to a fixed past. 
Dotson categorizes hermeneutical injustice as a second-order epistemic injustice 
because it demands shifts in structures that generate our shared understandings in order to 
re-organize hermeneutical resources.152 New language, new conceptual resources are 
needed to fill this lacuna in epistemic resources about the felt experience of 
                                                        
152 Dotson is critical, however, of Fricker’s assumption that there is only one set of hermeneutical 
resources.  
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colonization.153 For example, once the term ‘sexual harassment’ entered the lexicon, the 
experience became interpretable and communicable to others (Fricker 2007, 149-151). 
Million’s felt theory amounts to an analogous project of addressing hermeneutical 
injustice by re-storying history curricula to redress the dearth of first-personal accounts of 
settler colonial violence. Accounts of the felt experience of settler colonialism provide 
new hermeneutical resources to communicate ongoing instances of heteropatriarchal and 
settler colonial violence. Importantly, these narratives challenge the historical truths of 
“settler truth,” and as such push the boundaries of what “the Canadian public [is] willing 
to hear” (Million 2013, 58).  
However, epistemic oppression, as an epistemic by-product of social oppression 
often resists transformation. For this reason, Dotson emphasizes the irreducible features 
of epistemic oppression in her description of contributory injustice as a third-order 
epistemic injustice that is particularly resilient to changes in the epistemic field.154 She 
locates contributory injustice “within the gray area between individual and structural 
perpetuation of epistemic injustice” (Dotson 2014, 31). Her account reveals that the 
underlying schemata that give rise to epistemic exclusions often resists the identification 
                                                        
153 Hence, second-order change located at the level of frameworks and structures themselves, is required in 
order to address hermeneutical injustice in the long term (Dotson 2012, 30).  
 
154 Dotson highlights the irreducible features of third-order epistemic oppression that reveals the limits of 
Fricker’s earlier account of epistemic injustice. Alcoff is similarly critical of Fricker’s work on epistemic 
justice insofar as it fails to consider the structural elements of epistemic injustice. She raises concerns about 
the ability of volitional epistemic practices to correct non-volitional prejudices (Alcoff 2010). Alcoff 
worries that Fricker employs a too narrow definition of identity as merely “the source of unearned merit or 
undeserved demerit” that aims at a kind of identity neutrality, and proposes that a structural account, such 
as standpoint theory, better articulates identity as an epistemic resource that can provide epistemic 
resources for specific projects due to the specificity of identity position (2010, 134). Fricker, in response, 
affirms that her individualist approach to the cultivation of epistemic virtues does not preclude the fact that 
“structural mechanisms also have an essential role in combating epistemic injustice” (Fricker 2010, 164). 
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of its exclusions. Bailey puts it succinctly—“our shared epistemic resources are 
themselves inadequate for understanding their inadequacy” (Bailey 2014, 66).  
A structural analysis of settler ignorance exemplifies this third-order epistemic 
injustice. Settler ignorance functions by making settler colonialism invisible and felt as 
normal and obvious. The epistemic oppression of Indigenous peoples is a necessary 
outcome of the structure of settler colonialism. Since settler ignorance is a structural 
outcome of the settler colonial logic of elimination, it is invisible to itself and so, exempts 
itself from critique. As such, Indigenous voices are necessary in order to expose these 
epistemic structures.155 Indigenous peoples are better situated to see the functionings of 
settler ignorance and feel settler common sense as non-sensical and as justification for 
ongoing settler colonial violence. 
Settler ignorance comes to form settler common sense, which is experienced as an 
affective background that normalizes the elimination of Indigenous peoples. Common 
sense normalizes the elimination of Indigenous presence by displacing testimonies to a 
fixed settler past and by dismissing emotional expression as evidence of individual 
pathology. As such, settler common sense needs to be challenged on an affective and 
aesthetic level. In particular, transformations to third-order epistemic oppression cannot 
be limited to cognitive resources since these resources are inadequate in identifying their 
very own inadequacy. Non-cognitive resources, such as aesthetic or affective resources, 
seem more transformative to dismantle third-order epistemic oppression. For this reason, 
                                                        
155 The claim that Indigenous voices are necessary to expose settler colonial violence echoes both work in 
standpoint theory and in José Medina’s definition of the epistemic virtue meta-lucidity among epistemically 
virtuous subjects of oppressed groups, defined as the “capacity to see the limitations of dominant ways of 
seeing” (Medina 2013, 47).  
 
 109 
the transformation of settler ignorance cannot occur solely on a cognitive level. Artistic 
creations, such as Kent Monkman’s recent exhibit Shame and Prejudice: A Story of 
Resilience which includes a painting of Indigenous chiefs Big Bear and Poundmaker in 
chains signing a treaty with founding Canadian Prime Minister John A. Macdonald,156 
Adrian Stimson’s photography parodying photos from his family’s residential school,157 
or Christi Belcourt’s Walking with Our Sisters exhibit with a traveling display of 1,800 
moccasin vamps as a way of honoring and commemorating missing and murdered 
Indigenous women and children in Canada and the United States are better equipped to 
disrupt the invisibility of settler colonialism.158 
On this account, Million’s felt theory names another way to challenge epistemic 
oppression. She argues that Canadian First Nation women’s embodied narratives have 
fueled a discursive shift in the histories of residential schooling (Million 2013, 67). Their 
first person and experiential narratives of past and future pain, grief, and hope create a 
new language for communities to reveal and analyze “the moral affective heart of 
capitalism and colonialism” (2013, 55). In exploring the embodied, gendered and sexual 
nature of their colonization, these Native women’s personal narratives “transformed the 
debilitating force of an old social control, shame, into a social agent in their generation” 
(2013, 55). These voices of a felt history present a powerful challenge to the social 
control of internalized colonialism as well as invigorated political discourse of Native 
self-determination with emotional knowledge. These emerging conversations between 
                                                        
156 Cram 2017. 
 
157 Klein 2018. 
 
158 Qtd in Simpson 2017, 25. See Belcourt.   
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Indigenous women that articulate their felt histories in ways that allow them to speak for 
themselves represent a project of dismantling epistemic oppression. These narratives 
disrupt settler-colonial silencing and defy state recognition that pathologizes Native 
expression.  
Coulthard offers another example of a way to challenge epistemic oppression. 
Against the characterization of Native expression of anger and pain as pathological 
ressentiment, Coulthard argues for the self-affirmative power of righteous anger that 
leads to direct political action—as exemplified in the Oka crisis, the Idle No More 
movement, and the Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women movement, amongst 
others.  
 
Conclusion 
“Yet, collectively we still keep looking and begging, and educating and appealing to the 
morality of benevolent Canada. If only they knew better.” 
Leanne Betasamosake Simpson159  
 
Settler colonialism aims to make itself invisible and, as such, settler ignorance is a 
way of furthering this invisibility. Settler Canadians’ obliviousness about past and present 
settler colonial violence is not accidental but is a structural feature of settler colonialism. 
The legacy of the residential schools does not merely require education in order for 
settlers to ‘fill the gaps in our history education knowledge.’ If it did, then former Prime 
Minister Harper’s statement that Canada has no history of colonialism would be 
                                                        
159 Simpson 2017, 188. 
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nonsensical. His denial of colonialism, however, inadvertently makes the disavowal of 
settler colonialism explicit. An account of settler ignorance shows us that an apparent 
lack of memory results from “a particular production and presence of memory,” which is 
a central and non-accidental feature to the settler colonial logic of elimination (Bruyneel 
2013, 237). Settler ignorance functions by limiting Indigenous peoples’ epistemic agency 
by (i) distancing present testimonies to the past and (ii) discrediting emotional 
expressions as signs of individual pathology. Settler ignorance (as it is bound up with 
negative stereotype prejudices) is both naturalized and normalized to form settler 
common sense, where to be a settler Canadian is to be a Canadian, full stop. The ‘settler’ 
modifier is both unnecessary and overly political.  
The two features of settler ignorance—the relegation of present testimonies to a 
fixed past and the pathologization of emotional expression—are non-accidental features 
of settler colonialism that come to form settler common sense and come to limit 
Indigenous peoples’ ability to contribute to a settler Canadian epistemic community. 
Former Prime Minister Harper’s statement denying Canada’s settler colonial past makes 
sense according to settler common sense, which normalizes a denial of settler colonial 
violence. This description of settler ignorance builds on my account of settler colonial 
epistemology in the previous chapter in order to explain how the dismissal of Indigenous 
peoples as credible knowers upholds an ignorance of settler colonial violence. As such, 
former Prime Minister Harper’s disavowal of Canada’s settler colonial past should be 
seen as a continuation of the settler colonial justification for Indigenous elimination and 
land dispossession. Harper’s disavowal exemplifies a contemporary articulation of a 
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settler colonial epistemology that discredits testimonies by Indigenous peoples in order to 
justify settler colonial expansionism.  
The language of epistemic oppression, in particular, can help identify the 
particular harms of settler colonialism on the epistemic field. In the case of Indigenous 
peoples, there are (at least) two negative prejudicial stereotypes similarly undermining 
their epistemic agency.160 For example, the stereotypes of being irrational (or pre-
rational) and stuck in the past (or out of time) come to inform how Indigenous speakers 
are heard and the epistemic agency that they are afforded by a settler audience. The 
upshot of such an account is that it explains how settlers can remain oblivious to ongoing 
settler colonial violence by hearing testimonies as biased or stuck in a settler past that is 
irrelevant to current policies.  
Moreover, an epistemic evaluation of settler ignorance in terms of settler common 
sense and epistemic oppression highlights the aesthetic and materiality of knowledge 
production and circulation. Crucially, a social investigation into knowledge production 
and circulation reveal how epistemic resources are connected to structural power and 
material conditions. Transformations of settler ignorance cannot be limited to individual 
cognitive changes or to changes in shared hermeneutical resources. Material changes, and 
land restoration more specifically, are required in order to transform settler ignorance.161  
 
 
  
                                                        
160 Following Dotson’s cautionary warning, though, this list is not an exhaustive one (Dotson 2012).  
 
161 I return to the question of reparations in chapter 6.  
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CHAPTER V 
SETTLER HEARING IN THE CANADIAN TRC 
 
There is an emerging and compelling desire to put the events of the past behind us so that 
we can work towards a stronger and healthier future… This is a profound commitment to 
establishing new relationships embedded in mutual recognition and respect that will 
forge a brighter future. The truth of our common experiences will help set our spirits free 
and pave the way to reconciliation162  
 
This Commission presents a unique opportunity to educate all Canadians on the Indian 
Residential Schools system. It will be a positive step in forging a new relationship 
between Aboriginal peoples and other Canadians, a relationship based on the knowledge 
of our shared history, a respect for each other and a desire to move forward together 
with a renewed understanding that strong families, strong communities and vibrant 
cultures and traditions will contribute to a stronger Canada for all of us. 
The Right Honourable Stephen Harper, Prime Minister of Canada163 
 
Introduction 
With an account of structural settler ignorance and an understanding of how 
testimonies are dismissed in order to maintain an ignorance of settler colonialism, I return 
to an examination of the Canadian TRC. In chapter 2, I concluded that the TRC’s framing 
                                                        
162 Honouring the Truth 2015, 339. 
 
163 Statement of Apology 2008.  
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politics of recognition does not identify or challenge a disavowal of settler colonialism. In 
this chapter, I evaluate the TRC in order to show how settler colonial epistemic 
assumptions limit the possibility for meaningful reconciliation.  
While the previous chapter outlined how structural settler ignorance functions as a 
kind of knowing (providing an epistemic evaluation of settler colonialism), this chapter 
investigates the TRC’s ability to properly hear the testimonies of residential school 
system, and so provides an ethical evaluation.164 The willingness and capability of 
hearing is not simply an epistemic concern but is an ethical one as well. The production 
and circulation of knowledge is a profoundly ethical matter. In particular, Jill Stauffer’s 
work on ethical loneliness makes explicit the ethical dimensions of (not) being heard. 
Stauffer defines ethical loneliness as “having been abandoned by humanity compounded 
by the experience of not being heard” (Stauffer 2015, 1).165 This seems to be the very 
condition that the TRC attempts to redress. For this reason, this chapter emphasizes the 
ethical dimensions of knowing and highlights how structural settler ignorance distorts a 
settler audience’s ability to hear the testimonies of residential school survivors in ways 
that can unsettle their settler identity.  
Such an ethical evaluation of the Canadian TRC is firmly grounded in a relational 
conception of the self. The experience of being abandoned and not being heard is 
ethically provocative because of the kinds of being we are and “our intersubjective 
                                                        
164 The need for an ethical evaluation reflects the conclusions of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
Peoples (RCAP)’s final report People to People, Nation to Nation, which sought to establish the 
foundations of a fair and honorable relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples of 
Canada. Its findings, in short, were that past and current governmental policies towards Aboriginal peoples 
were “unethical,” and that there is a need for a complete restructuring of the relationship between 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples in Canada (Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples 1996). 
 
165 She draws on Jean Améry’s account of his experience in Nazi concentration camps (Améry 1980) 
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reliance on one another” (Stauffer 2015, 3). Insofar as we are relational and dependent 
upon others, we are vulnerable to being “refused the human relation necessary for self-
formation” (2015, 26). While Stauffer explicitly draws on Emmanuel Levinas’ emphasis 
on relational intersubjectivity in order to name the injustice of being “abandoned by those 
who have the power to help,” my project is situated in both Western feminist and Native 
American traditions (2015, 5).  
 A number of feminist theorists expound the ethical and political implications of 
an understanding of embodied vulnerability as constitutive of subjectivity.166 They argue 
that the figure of the vulnerable body provides “the ground for, and vital link between, 
ethics and ontology” (Bergoffen and Weiss 2011, 457). This link is most clearly seen in 
Judith Butler’s claim that the recognition of the precariousness of embodied experience 
can ground an ethic of nonviolence (Butler 2003; 2004). The primary ethical provocation 
to ethical response arises, however, from the confrontation with one’s universally shared 
corporeal fragility. It is the recognition of a primary susceptibility that provides the 
ground for an ethical response. The ethical provocation of vulnerability is in no way 
prescriptive, however. An ethics of vulnerability is thus an ethics in a very limited sense. 
It does not provide guidelines for action, but rather reveals that a shared vulnerability 
makes an ethical response both possible and necessary. A feminist ethics of vulnerability, 
more broadly, seeks to revalue vulnerability in both its positive and negative valences in 
order to ultimately challenge the damaging fictions of self-sufficiency and self-mastery.  
                                                        
166 See Debra Bergoffen’s “Toward a Politics of the Vulnerable Body” (2003); Judith Butler’s Precarious 
Life (2004); Gail Weiss’ Body Images: Embodiment as Intercorporeality (1999); Gail Weiss and 
Bergoffen’s “Embodying the Ethical”; Erinn Gilson’s The Ethics of Vulnerability (2014); Catriona 
Mackenzie’s Vulnerability: New Essays in Ethics and Feminist Philosophy (2014); Rosalyn Diprose’s 
Corporeal generosity (2002); and Martha Fineman’s “The Vulnerable Subject” (2010). 
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While providing different frameworks, an emphasis on dependency and 
relationality is also shared in Indigenous epistemology and ethics. Viola Cordova 
(Apache) argues that human beings are fundamentally relational and, as a result, our 
ethical system should be based on the notion of community or a collective “We” rather 
than on an autonomous “I” (Cordova 2003). Similarly, Vine Deloria outlines his 
epistemic methodology that is grounded in the assertion that “we are all relatives” 
(Deloria 1999, 34). The phrase “we are all relations” is both an affirmation of a relational 
ontology and an announcement of the implications for an ethically responsible 
epistemology. Drawing on both Western feminist ethics of vulnerability and Indigenous 
epistemology, I evaluate how successfully settlers can enter into ethical relationships with 
Indigenous communities. The TRC can be taken to be successful insofar as it creates the 
conditions for such an ethical relationship. 
In this chapter, I provide an ethical evaluation of the Canadian TRC in light of 
structural settler ignorance. I begin by describing the TRC’s confessional-model of 
testimony and show how this model reaffirms the state’s authority to legitimate 
Indigenous identity. The confessional-model of the TRC comes to form what I call 
‘settler hearing,’ which is a kind of paranoid hearing that confirms settler authority, in 
which the hearer is not open to surprising or unsettling communication. Settler hearing is 
a concrete manifestation of structural settler ignorance. I characterize settler hearing in 
the TRC in terms of three features: (i) its mandate’s presumption that the sharing of 
testimony can and will reconcile relationships; (ii) the creation of a template for 
acceptable testimonies; and (iii) its isolation from structural settler colonial violence.  
Insofar as the TRC performs a settler hearing, it fails both in terms of its own 
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mandate of “establishing and maintaining respectful relationships” between settler 
Canadians and Indigenous communities, as well as its ability to assuage the ethical 
loneliness of residential school survivors. In order to address the ethical loneliness of 
residential school survivors, settlers must develop a kind of ‘reparative hearing’ whereby 
the voices of residential school survivors are heard as an expression of ongoing 
Indigenous self-determination that testify to the ongoing failure of the settler colonial 
project of elimination. Without an affirmation of Indigenous self-determination, the TRC 
does not disrupt settler ignorance because it maintains the fiction of settler benevolence. 
 
TRC’s Confessional-Model  
The TRC aims to signal the seriousness with which the Canadian government 
considers the violations of the residential school system. It seeks to make amends for the 
past wrongs of governmental policies in the hope of establishing a new relationship 
between the state and Indigenous communities and “forg[ing] a brighter future” 
(Honouring the Truth 2015, 339). It offers the promise of communicating previously 
unknown information to many settler Canadians. While truth commissions differ, they 
share the basic commitment to investigate and publicly disseminate information about 
past human rights abuses and to provide a public platform for victims to tell their stories. 
As such, one of the goals of truth commissions is to give voice to the survivors of human 
rights violations.167 For this reason, Teresa Godwin Phelps emphasizes the potential of 
                                                        
167 Moreover, Phelps acknowledges that not all ways of sharing personal testimony will be effective. In 
particular, she notes the limitations of both the Argentinian and Salvadoran truth commissions in their 
general framework that perpetuated an us/them distinction between innocent civilians and guilty soldiers 
(Phelps 2004, 97-104). She contends that the South African truth commission’s “carnival-like” approach, 
whereby victims shared their stories in their own ways was more effective (2004, 105-110). 
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storytelling as a non-violent means of achieving retribution that avoids cycles of revenge. 
She argues that victims of human rights abuses lose language, such that truth 
commissions can provide the opportunity for victims to reconstruct their “shattered 
voices” and regain their dignity and self-respect (Phelps 2004, 39).   
Phelps affirms that the kind of compensation that victims want and need is the 
acknowledgment of their suffering. Consequently, truth-telling seems particularly well 
suited as both a reparative activity and a condition of other kinds of reparations. For 
Phelps, the “sacramental storytelling” of truth commissions can offer restorative justice 
that might “actualize a radically new kind of constitutive history for an emerging 
democracy” (2004, 55-56).168 Similarly, Margaret Urban Walker characterizes truth-
telling as a reparations measure. She argues that politically implemented modes of truth 
telling can satisfy the four features of suitable reparations vehicles—(i) interaction 
between responsible parties and victims which (ii) is useful for victims in light of their 
experience of suffering and loss, (iii) fitting for the wrong and loss, and (iv) effective for 
the victim’s concrete experience of repair (Walker 2010, 533-534).169  
While a truth commission purports to foreground the experience of the survivors 
of human rights abuses, its relationship to reconciliation, however, is unclear. The TRC’s 
final report notes that the very definition of reconciliation was up for debate throughout 
                                                        
168 Phelps is critical, though, to characterize truth commissions as a panacea that marks a closure or a 
burying of the past (Phelps 2004, 120). 
 
169 Walker cautions that truth telling will not in and of itself be reparations for serious wrongs, without a 
sensitivity to the larger reparative activity. Truth telling does not guarantee “to produce and maintain the 
moral conditions of confidence, trust, and hope and their political embodiment in voice, recognition, civic 
respect, and guarantees of equal standing and protection” (Walker 2010, 540). While she acknowledges the 
limitations of truth telling, as well as any reparations vehicle in “righting” past wrongs, she holds hope for 
truth telling to “effect quite real and profound changes in our intertwined epistemic and moral worlds” 
(2010, 540). 
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the truth-telling events. While the final report remarks on this ambiguity, it officially 
defines reconciliation as “an ongoing process of establishing and maintaining respectful 
relationships.” The TRC suggests that the experience of “truth-telling” is a necessary step 
in (re)establishing respectful relationships.170 The truth will lead, as it were, to 
reconciliation—“The truth of our common experiences will help set our spirits free and 
pave the way to reconciliation” (Honouring the Truth 2015, 339). As such, the TRC 
proposes a confessional model of reconciliation whereby residential school survivors 
confess their experiences (and the state confesses its shame) in order to establish new 
relationships. Given this definition of reconciliation, an evaluation of the TRC will, 
therefore, have to discern its ability to establish and maintain respectful relationships. The 
Canadian TRC can be taken to be successful in its mandate so long as the sharing and 
dissemination of the truth about Indian Residential Schools leads to the establishment of 
respectful relationships between settler Canadians and Indigenous peoples.  
In order to evaluate the TRC on the terms of its own primary goals of establishing 
and maintaining respectful relationships, first we need to understand what reconciliation 
can mean in the context of ongoing settler colonial violence. What, exactly, can 
“establishing and maintaining respectful relationships” mean in the context of the TRC’s 
final report? What would it take to re-establish respectful relationships if these so-called 
respectful relationships have never existed? The TRC, then, could be said to seek to 
                                                        
170 Both Teresa Godwin Phelps and Ronald Niezen are wary of the equation of truth with reconciliation: “It 
seemed to me that truth was one thing, reconciliation another, and that truth alone did not necessarily result 
in reconciliation: the rote connection—truth-and-reconciliation—was wrongheaded” (Phelps 2014, 665).  
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establish respectful relationships between settler Canadians and Indigenous peoples for 
the first time.171  
To be even more specific, what would a respectful relationship look like in the 
context of ongoing land dispossession and systemic settler colonial violence (including 
disproportionately high rates of female homicides, practices of ‘scooping up’ Indigenous 
children from their families for placement in foster homes,172 and poor living conditions 
in many Aboriginal communities)?173 Given the context of an ongoing settler colonial 
present, an evaluation of the TRC (and an interrogation of the relationship between truth 
and reconciliation more broadly) must ask: Which interests are best served by the TRC? 
In what ways is the settler colonial nation-state challenged (or re-legitimated) by the 
publication of the TRC’s final report? If the Canadian government sponsors such a 
commission, what are the Commission’s limitations in scrutinizing and calling into 
question the very legitimacy of the Canadian settler nation-state? 
The terms of the TRC must be understood with respect to the restrictions of the 
Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement (IRSSA). The TRC invites survivors of 
the residential school system to a settler audience in order to fulfill the government’s 
                                                        
171 Recall that the RCAP’s report called for a new Royal Proclamation to require the government to commit 
to a new set of ethical principles that would acknowledge and respect the inherent right to Aboriginal self-
determination (Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples 1996).  
 
172 Patrick Johnston coined the term “Sixties Scoop” in his 1983 report “Native Children and the Child 
Welfare System” to name the practice from the late 1950s to the 1980s of removing Indigenous children 
from their families (Johnston 1983). The Canadian government announced a $800 million settlement with 
survivors of Sixties Scoop, with $750 million for individual compensation and $50 million for a foundation 
dedicated to reconciliation initiatives. (Tasker 2017b). 
 
173 James Anaya, a United Nations human rights investigator called the living conditions of the 
Attawapiskat First Nation a national crisis. He stated, “The social and economic situation of the 
Attawapiskat seems to represent the condition of many First Nation communities living on reserves 
throughout Canada, which is allegedly akin to Third World conditions” (Anaya 2011).  
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legal obligation.174 While the Indian Residential Schools system is emblematic of 
structural settler colonial violence and its desire to take Indigenous land and exterminate 
Indigenous presence, the TRC does not frame reconciliation in terms of legal or structural 
changes to Canadian nationhood and to governmental policies toward Indigenous nations.  
As noted in chapter 1, the TRC does not have any legal power to name names but 
is limited to collecting testimonies in order to educate a settler audience. The TRC’s role 
is to create a ‘counter-narrative’ of Canadian history. While the TRC’s framing of the 
residential school system is limited in challenging underlying structures of settler colonial 
power, we can evaluate the TRC’s symbolic power of “reconciling” relationships between 
the Canadian state and Indigenous peoples. On this account, Joseph Weiss argues that, by 
its existence, the TRC symbolically constitutes ‘truth and reconciliation’ “without 
necessitating any further action on the part of the state or church” (Weiss 2015, 33).  
The success of the mandate depends on the circulation of knowledge, which, in 
turn, requires “an audience willing and capable of hearing us” (Dotson 2011, 238). In 
order for the circulation of knowledge to be successful, hearers and speakers must be 
both vulnerable and open hearing the other. The establishment of new respectful 
relationships requires, at the very least, an ability to hear one another on each’s own 
terms. The imbalance of vulnerability is most visible when considering how the TRC 
proposes a confessional model of truth-telling. The following section argues that the way 
the TRC frames the residential school policy leads to settler hearing. Settler hearing does 
not challenge settler identity and fails to establish an ethical relationship between speaker 
                                                        
174 As explained in chapter 1, the IRSSA is an agreement between the government of Canada and the 
approximately 86,000 Native Canadians who were enrolled in residential schools. 
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and hearer. Insofar as the TRC does not create the conditions for successful circulation of 
knowledge, it does not establish such a relationship and, consequently, fails on its own 
terms.  
 
Settler Hearing 
 “And they opened up all our wounds, for what? To turn us all down? And some people 
are dying…. My sister’s doing drugs, like, ’cause she’s tired of waiting. 
 She’s living on the streets. So, so, why did they do this to us, again?  
They hurt us again. They shouldn’t go back on their word to us.  
They already hurt us. Stop hurting us.” 
Amelia Galligos-Thomas, a former student at Sechelt residential school175  
 
Over and above the epistemic elimination of Indigenous speakers that dismisses 
their testimony by hearing it as an expression of a past wrong and an evidence of 
individual pathology (as discussed in the previous chapter), the TRC performs a 
particular kind of hearing that prevents the testimonies of being heard by a settler 
audience in such a way to change the terms of the relationship between Indigenous 
communities and settler Canadians. This kind of hearing enacts, drawing on Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick’s work on paranoid reading, a paranoid hearing in which the hearer 
is not open to surprising or unsettling communication (Sedgwick 2003).  
A paranoid reading, or paranoid hearing in this case, is closed off to possibility in 
a way that overdetermines the result of inquiry. This kind of hearing negates the very 
                                                        
175 Honouring the Truth 2015, 169. 
 
 123 
fragility and inherent risk of communication. A paranoid hearing closes itself from the 
vulnerability of communication. Stauffer writes, “paranoid reading is a kind of insurance 
policy against the disappointment that comes with wanting the world to be one way and 
finding that it is not that way” (Stauffer 2015, 69).  
Settler hearing is a kind of paranoid hearing that overdetermines the content of 
testimonies of settler colonial violence such that they conform to negative prejudicial 
stereotypes and reaffirm settler colonial power.176 The TRC’s confessional model of 
reconciliation based on the sharing of testimony performs this settler hearing insofar as it 
decides ahead of time that the sharing of testimony can (and will) lead to reconciled 
relationships between Indigenous peoples and settler Canadians. It offers a false promise 
that the process will work. In this way, the very mandate of the TRC presupposes the 
results of the truth-telling events.  
Paradoxically, then, the truth-telling events, which were meant to foreground the 
experience of survivors and to share their testimony with the general public, can lead to a 
kind of hearing that prevents the voices of survivors from being heard as expressions of 
Indigenous refusal of settler authority.177 An Indigenous refusal of settler authority would 
constitute a surprise to settler hearers, which their model of truth-telling extinguishes as a 
possibility (i.e., as a possible mode of truth-telling). Settler hearing thus prevents an 
acknowledgment that settlers are responsible for the historical and ongoing violence 
inflicted upon Indigenous peoples insofar as it hears the testimonies as always already 
                                                        
176 I describe these negative stereotypes in chapter 4.  
 
177 Stauffer asserts that a kind of irony is always present in Levinas’ account of human communication, 
when institutions aimed “to adjudicate loss may impose loss of a different kind” (Stauffer 2015, 70). 
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reconciled. The TRC performs a settler hearing insofar as (i) its mandate presumes that 
the sharing of testimony can and will reconcile relationships; (ii) it creates a certain 
template of the kinds of acceptable testimonies; and (iii) it isolates testimonies from 
structural settler colonial violence.  
 
Settler Hearing: TRC’s Mandate 
A first feature of settler hearing can be found in the very framing of the TRC’s 
mandate as victim-centered. The goal of the truth-telling events is for survivors to share 
their experiences and for these experiences to be collected in the TRC’s final report in 
order to inform changes in curriculum and policy.178 The confessional model of the TRC 
leads, however, to a settler hearing since it inadvertently positions the settler audience as 
arbiter of both truth and reconciliation. 
Both the mandate for the TRC and the Statement of Apology make references to a 
“compelling desire to put the events of the past behind us” and to the treatment of 
children in Indian Residential Schools as “a sad chapter in our history” (Statement of 
Apology 2008). This framing in the Apology and TRC Mandate marks a sharp division 
between settler Canadians as “us” and Indigenous peoples as “them.” The TRC’s 
confessional model proposes a way for “‘them’ to let go of this admittedly ‘sad chapter’ 
in ‘Canadian history’ so that settlers can ‘have all of ‘us’ move on with our lives” 
(Koggel 2014, 503). The government’s expression of a desire to put the events in the past 
illustrates how it defines reconciliation as serving settlers.  
                                                        
178 While everyone was invited to share their experiences (including former staff), the vast majority of 
participants were survivors or family members of survivors of the residential schools.  
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The settler hearing appears with the very definitions of truth and reconciliation 
within the TRC’s final report. For example, the TRC proposes a definition of 
reconciliation amidst a lack of consensus as to whether or not it is even possible.179 As for 
its definition of truth, Christine Koggel argues that the TRC’s mandate places settlers as 
the ‘us’ that are “judges or evaluators of the ‘truth’ of ‘their’ stories” (Koggel 2014, 503). 
While the TRC invites survivors to share their experiences, Sue Campbell worries that 
the settler public will hear these testimonies as if they were in “the adversarial setting of 
the courtroom” (Campbell 2008, 4).180 As such, the confessional model of the TRC 
makes settlers the arbiter of the truth of the residential school system.181 For this reason, 
Campbell affirms that we need to distinguish forensic from narrative forms of truth-
telling within the legal and political testimony of the truth-telling events in the TRC.  
The Apology and TRC’s mandate focus on what has happened, rather than on the 
active role of the government in devastating Indigenous nations. The emphasis on the 
harms of residential schools eclipses a conversation about the government’s continuing 
actions. For this reason, Matt James argues that the TRC’s victim-centered focus 
performs “a ‘quasi-apology’ in which wrongdoer agency is obscured by an emphasis on 
victim experiences, with ‘sorry for what happened to you’ standing in for ‘sorry for what 
                                                        
179 “During the course of the Commission’s work, it has become clear that the concept of reconciliation 
means different things to different people, communities, institutions, and organizations” (Honouring the 
Truth 2015, 17). 
 
180 The TRC explicitly affirms that the truth-telling process will not lead to legal action against churches 
and the government. The TRC “shall not hold formal hearings, nor act as a public inquiry, nor conduct a 
formal legal process” (Stanton 2011, 5).  
 
181 This account thus rejects Matt James’ claim that the victim-centered TRC, in foregrounding the truths of 
the victims of the residential school survivors, “embodies the prefigurative, role-reversing spirit of the 
carnivalesque,” and this overturning of settler knowledge performs a form of “symbolic reparation” (James 
2012, 21). 
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I did’” (James 2012, 22). Settler hearing thus allows settlers to evade their responsibility 
as agents who commit and continue to commit wrongdoings against others. This follows 
from Sedgwick’s account of paranoid reading insofar as paranoia allows subjects to shirk 
from holding themselves accountable for their actions, but rather places this 
responsibility on others or on surprising events.  
 
Settler Hearing: (Un)acceptable Testimonies 
A second feature of the TRC’s settler hearing is the way in which it creates a 
certain template of the kinds of acceptable testimonies, and so closes itself to testimonies 
that complicate the narrative of the residential school system. Complexities and diversity 
of experience get simplified and streamlined to create a unified testimony of the 
residential school policy. On this account, social and legal anthropologist Ronald Niezen 
provides an ethnology of the TRC and shows how the truth-telling events shape 
testimonies shared to highlight the particular “kind of justice a truth commission 
delivers” (Niezen 2013). Niezen argues that the TRC’s educational goal took precedence 
over its goal to disseminate truth or to provide the means for reconciliation. He affirms 
that the truth-telling events framed the testimonies in such a way as to limit certain kinds 
of testimony in order to create an oversimplified narrative of the experience at the 
residential schools.  
The Canadian TRC is oriented around the experience of survivors. As such, the 
TRC creates an audience that has specific expectations for the truth-telling events. This 
orientation comes from the specifics of the TRC’s origins and context. The TRC emerges 
from the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)’s out of court settlements. Crucially, 
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though, the TRC responds to a legal situation that was invisible and unknown to most 
Canadian citizens. Unlike the South African TRC or the Argentinian TRC, there was no 
public consensus that motivated the creation of the Canadian TRC on the Indian 
Residential Schools.182 Before the TRC, only one in two Canadians were even aware of 
the existence of the Indian Residential Schools system.183 A general lack of awareness of 
the schools, and of the experience of Indigenous peoples in Canada more broadly, shaped 
the Canadian TRC in specific ways. For this reason, the Canadian TRC has both an 
educational and publicity-oriented goal of raising awareness about the residential school 
system and the experience of victims of the schools more specifically. The TRC does not 
have legal powers and it is primarily aimed at educating settler Canadians by creating a 
unified counter-history of the residential school legacy.184  
The TRC presents a model of reconciliation through the creation of a counter-
history that provides venues for the formerly silenced survivors to tell their stories.185 
Niezen affirms, however, that the goal for reconciliation and the collection of truth are at 
odds. Crucially, he focuses on which testimonies got told and which were omitted in the 
truth-telling events. Not all stories get told as witnesses shape their stories to fit the 
“acceptable” template. The process of creating a unified counter-history necessarily 
involves shaping testimonies to fit a certain narrative with clear victims and perpetrators. 
                                                        
182 Nagy provides a comparison with the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (see Nagy 
2012). 
 
183 Niezen 2016, 923.  
 
184 The National Centre for Truth and Reconciliation opened at the University of Manitoba in 2015.  
 
185 The TRC Commissioner Justice Murray Sinclair announced—“Once these truths are known, they will 
form a part of our country’s historical record” and “provide opportunities for healing and greater 
awareness” (CBC News 2010). 
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As such, Niezen concludes that the history of the residential school policy is far more 
complex than the “history” that is being promulgated by the TRC.  
The TRC truth-telling events produced an unspoken template for acceptable 
narratives in a few ways. The events began with a ‘highlight reel’ of previous events as a 
way to connect disparate experiences in residential schools across the country. Niezen 
argues that this reel had the effect of creating a template of sorts for the kinds of 
testimonies that could and could not be shared at the truth-telling events. In addition to 
the highlight reel, the events began with testimony of a survivor of the residential schools 
who travelled with the Commission to the different truth-telling events. This ‘template 
testimony’ set the tone of each truth-telling event. In particular, the testimonies privileged 
the sharing of extreme abuse in a way that inadvertently silenced, Niezen argues, less 
visible (or graphic) experiences of abuse at the schools.  
Moreover, Niezen contends that the TRC’s events both created and performed the 
category of ‘residential school survivor’ in a way that overdetermines the kinds of 
testimony that could be shared at the truth-telling events.186 The category of the 
‘residential school survivor’ was enacted through the narration of traumatic experience, 
for example, through a sunrise ceremony and lighting of a sacred fire in which tears were 
collected to be burned at the end of the truth-telling events. The ceremony also marked a 
finality to the process.  
The sacred fire ceremony is symbolically illuminating, especially as it reveals 
what the TRC means by “reconciliation” and their attempt to create a “counter-history.” 
                                                        
186 Niezen relays how the affirmation of survivor experience pervaded the events and activities of the 
Commission “with phrases like ‘for survivors only’ (with reference to gift bags or refreshments), 
‘Survivors registration,’ or ‘Survivors rest area,’ and so on” (Niezen 2016, 927).  
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By marking this finality, it assumes that trauma can disappear (be burned away) simply 
by sharing the experience of it. It also entails an over-determination of trauma as that of 
extreme violence, rather than countenancing the other, subtle forms that trauma can take. 
The counter-history is one that attempts to vanish the colonial history that made the 
trauma possible in the first place. These two erasures—the erasure of trauma and the 
erasure of history—are mutually imbricated in one another. The picture of reconciliation 
is one that aims to overcome a traumatic history and in aiming to overcome it, this history 
is denied.  
Another way the testimonies were framed to create a unified narrative can be seen 
in the handling of testimonies from former teachers and church officials. While the truth-
telling events were open to former teachers and church officials, their testimonies were 
implicitly unwelcome.187 Niezen reports how churches attempted to provide a counter-
narrative to the testimonies. In addition to churches’ statements of apology, there were 
attempts to show a broader account of the residential school experience.188 Niezen relays 
meeting a woman who showed a multi-lingual dictionary (with Indigenous languages) as 
evidence that not all church officials sought to eliminate Indigenous languages and 
culture. These testimonies were not, however, welcome since they challenged a unified 
counter-history. Niezen worries that these measures had the effect of patrolling the 
boundaries of the kinds of experiences shared in the truth-telling events.  
For these reasons, Niezen argues that the TRC failed to gather a complete 
                                                        
187 Niezen notes that the governmental officials were mostly absent from the events. While the 
governmental role at the truth-telling events was limited, its presence was felt in the restrictions to 
accessing archives.  
 
188 Pope Francis has, however, refused to issue an apology for the Catholic Church’s role in the abuses in 
residential schools (CBC News 2018b).  
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historical record, since it shaped the testimonies to form a more unified experience. The 
requirement of a universalized experience is a symptom of a paranoid settler hearing.189 
The result is predetermined, such that any surprise or unexpected testimony must be 
omitted or stifled. Accounts like those from Tomson Highway about his positive 
experience at residential schools are seen as dangerous threats to the TRC’s goal of 
creating a unified narrative.190 The importance of the unification (and oversimplification) 
of the residential school experience points to the TRC’s goal of showcasing a unified 
traumatic experience instead of presenting a full and messy picture of the schools. In a 
sense, the desire for a unified experience reflects the need to legitimate the TRC’s very 
existence and the thousands of survivors’ lawsuits.191 According to this line of thinking, 
the experience was either (universally) traumatic or it was not that bad.  
 
Settler Hearing: No Land and No Politics 
Finally, a third feature of settler hearing is how it hears testimonies as apolitical 
and isolated from talk of land and political self-determination. As such, the TRC fails to 
meaningfully hear the testimonies of survivors insofar as it focuses on cultural 
recognition at the expense of talk of Indigenous land restitution and politics of self-
determination.  
                                                        
189 Sedgwick 2003, 134.  
 
190 Tomson Highway has said—“You may have heard stories from 7,000 witnesses in the process that were 
negative [but] what you haven't heard are the 7,000 reports that were positive stories” (Ostroff 2015). 
191 Defending the legitimacy of the TRC is all the more pressing given that 67% of non-Aboriginal 
Canadians “believe Indigenous people have a sense of entitlement to government support and services” 
(CBC News 2016). 
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The shift away from political self-determination was prominent in the TRC’s 
truth-telling events, which included exhibits showcasing Indigenous survival in the face 
of cultural genocide. These exhibits did not frame survival as acts of resurgence and self-
determination but framed them as expressions of individual survivors.192 While the events 
celebrated cultural resilience, the TRC did not explicitly celebrate political self-
determination, defined as the restoration and regeneration of Indigenous nationhood, and 
the “repatriation of Indigenous land and life” (Tuck and Yang 2012, 1). While the 
emphasis on the cultural harm of the residential schools is important, it should not 
overshadow the harms of the schools in terms of seizure of land and the undermining of 
political self-determination.  
The emphasis on cultural harm can be seen in the TRC’s declaration in their final 
report that the establishment and operation of the Indian Residential Schools system was 
a policy of cultural genocide (under Article 2(e) of the UN’s Convention on 
Genocide).193 It is cultural genocide, rather than physical genocide, because it sought to 
                                                        
192 Niezen writes, “The most prominent display that toured with the major TRC events was that of the 
Legacy of Hope, self-described as ‘a national Aboriginal charitable organization dedicated to raising 
awareness and understanding about the legacy of residential schools’. This display took great care to 
present a range of material, supported with photographic and documentary evidence, assembled into 
timelines, and presented with brief, plain-language summaries presented under clear captions. Prominent in 
the Legacy of Hope display were photographs and transcribed testimony from survivors illustrating the 
connections between residential schools and territorial removal as well as the traumas associated with the 
school experience. In one section of the display, headings taken from survivor statements like ‘I learned to 
feel shame’, ‘I wanted to go home’, ‘I died in this place’, and ‘They cut my hair and burned my clothes’ 
stood out prominently above explanations of the dislocations brought about by the schools. The messages 
conveyed by the Legacy of Hope in this touring exhibit paralleled those that it presented on-line, including 
the general finding that ‘[g]enerations of Aboriginal people today have memories of trauma, neglect, 
shame, and poverty. Those traumatized by their experiences in the residential school have suffered 
pervasive loss: loss of identity, loss of family, loss of language, loss of culture’” (Legacy of Hope 
Foundation 2015 in Niezen 2016, 929). 
 
193 This recalls the limitations of politics of recognition’s narrow focus on cultural representation that was 
given in chapter 2. 
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destroy structures and practices that allow the group to continue as a group.194 For this 
reason, the truth-telling events also sought to affirm cultural survival in the face of this 
attempted cultural genocide.195 The characterization of cultural genocide was even used 
by former Prime Minister Paul Martin.196 The truth-telling events invoked the language 
of genocide by inviting survivors of the Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide.197 The 
characterization of cultural genocide plays into a cultural recognition model of 
reconciliation that limits questions of recognition of political self-determination to the 
recognition of cultural identity.  
The TRC presents a model of cultural resilience in the face of individual trauma. 
Dian Million warns that the emphasis on trauma is profoundly troubling. In particular, 
she notes that this shift away from talk of political self-determination to talk of emotional 
self-care limits political discourse (Million 2013). The trauma discourse individualizes 
systemic power imbalances—completely leaving out talk of land dispossession—and has 
the potential to frame Indigenous agents as static victims. Under this model, the only 
                                                        
194 Joseph P. Gone raises concerns, however, about the political efficacy of characterizing North American 
settler colonialism as ‘genocide’ (Gone 2014). 
 
195 “Physical genocide is the mass killing of the members of a targeted group, and biological genocide is the 
destruction of the group’s reproductive capacity. Cultural genocide is the destruction of those structures and 
practices that allow the group to continue as a group. States that engage in cultural genocide set out to 
destroy the political and social institutions of the targeted group. Land is seized, and populations are 
forcibly transferred and their movement is restricted. Languages are banned. Spiritual leaders are 
persecuted, spiritual practices are forbidden, and objects of spiritual value are confiscated and destroyed. 
And, most significantly to the issue at hand, families are disrupted to prevent the transmission of cultural 
values and identity from one generation to the next” (Honouring the Truth 2015, 1).  
 
196 “Let us understand that what happened at the residential schools was the use of education for 
cultural genocide, and that the fact of the matter is, yes it was. Call a spade a spade” (Right Honourable 
Paul Martin qtd in Honouring the Truth 2015, 276). 
 
197 The report is accompanied by Calls to Action to redress the legacy of residential schools and advance 
the process of reconciliation with respect to child welfare, education, language and culture, health, and 
justice (Calls to Action 2012).  
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legitimate expression of Indigeneity is traumatization in the face of cultural genocide. 
This description reaffirms an emphasis on cultural recognition at the expense of political 
self-determination and land restitution. Moreover, this characterization is paranoid 
insofar as it presumes at the outset the nature of the oppression that Indigenous peoples 
face. 
The TRC’s emphasis on cultural resilience in the face of cultural genocide does 
not, in and of itself, lead to more respectful relationships between Indigenous peoples and 
the Canadian state. Such a transformation would require changes to the material 
conditions of Indigenous communities, such as ensuring access to clean water (David 
Suzuki Foundation 2018).198 It would, to put it simply, require changes to how the 
Canadian state positions itself with respect to its authority over Indigenous land. Such 
structural changes are not, however, within the TRC’s mandate. At the very least, a vision 
of reconciling relationships between the state and Indigenous communities must support 
Indigenous self-determination and describe settler colonial violence in terms of ongoing 
land dispossession. In order to evaluate the TRC’s ability to fulfill its own mandate, we 
must consider the extent to which it satisfies these two conditions.   
 
TRC: Establishing Respectful Relationships? 
Without foregrounding political self-determination and land restitution, the TRC 
fails on its own terms of “establishing new respectful relationships” between Indigenous 
                                                        
198 The David Suzuki Foundation’s 2018 report “Reconciling Promises and Reality: Clean Drinking Water 
for First Nations” notes that the federal government’s actions to address the First Nations drinking water 
crisis in Canada falls short of its promises to ensure the right to clean water. The report said that the federal 
government should adopt First Nation-led models for fixing water problems and ensure appropriate 
financial resources to the problem (David Suzuki Foundation 2018).  
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communities and the Canadian settlers. Two notable absences in the final report 
exemplify the TRC’s limitations to changing existing relationships: political self-
determination and land restitution. Instead of leading towards meaningful reconciliation, 
the TRC reaffirms the settler fiction of benevolence and recreates the power of the 
colonizer’s shame in defining Indigenous identity. 
Firstly, a more ‘respectful’ relationship requires recognizing Indigenous self-
determination in forming nation-to-nation relationships.199 This is, however, clearly not 
part of the TRC’s mandate. As noted in chapter 1, the Canadian TRC is unusual in that it 
does not have a post-conflict structure that announces “a new democratic order” (Weiss 
2015, 32).200 The TRC does not emerge at a transitional period of political systems —“In 
Canada, by contrast, the basic political system that was established when Canada first 
became a nation remains in place. In other words, the nation-state that was responsible 
for the residential school system is now sponsoring a commission aimed at making 
amends for its harms and injustices” (Weiss 2015, 32). 
Secondly, a change towards more respectful relationships requires talk of land 
dispossession. Concerns of land dispossession are not central, however, in the TRC final 
report. While Elders’ and survivors’ testimonies often spoke about the importance of land 
in sustaining culture and the people, the final report does not focus on the question of 
land restitution. As Anishinaabe elder Fred Kelly recounted, to take the lands away was 
                                                        
199 The treaties between Indigenous nations and the Crown form the legal and constitutional foundation of 
Canada as a nation (Honouring the Truth 2015, 195). Dale Turner and James Tully both provide accounts 
of what nation-to-nation relationship and respect of treaties would consist in (Tully 2000c).  
 
200 The Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement (IRSSA) came in the shadow of the dissolution of 
the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in 2005 that unsuccessfully settled thousands of residential 
school survivor lawsuits. The Settlement Agreement provided approximately $5 billion in compensation, 
commemoration, and the establishment of the TRC. 
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to dispossess the people of their being and to destroy Indigenous nations. He spoke about 
the role of land at the truth-telling events—“To take the territorial lands away from a 
people whose very spirit is so intrinsically connected to Mother Earth was to 
actually…destroy whole Indigenous nations. Weakened by disease and separated from 
their traditional foods and medicines, First Nations peoples had no defence against 
further government encroachments on their lives” (Honouring the Truth 2015, 224-
225).  In its 94 Calls to Action, talk of land is noticeably absent, only making an 
appearance in relation to corporate responsibility and sustainability (Call to Action #92). 
Talk of land is limited to a call to ‘meaningful consultation’ for land development by 
corporations. As Eric Ritskes notes, though, the language of ‘meaningful consultation’ 
has already been “the hallmark of the Canadian government’s approach to development 
on and extraction from Indigenous land, and what is considered ‘meaningful’ to 
Indigenous peoples varies wildly from what is considered ‘meaningful’ by the Canadian 
government” (Ritskes 2015).  
While the residential school system follows from the settler colonial logic of 
elimination, the significance of these schools must be grounded in the taking of land. As 
Aboriginal Healing Foundation (AHF) board member Viola Robinson puts it: “truth has 
to go deeper than residential schools or it will be superficial” (qtd in Weiss 2015, 44). 
The broader systemic problems that plague relationships between settler Canadians and 
Indigenous peoples is rooted in the seizure of land. Recall Leanne Betasamosake 
Simpson’s quote above—“It seemed simple. Colonizers wanted the land” (Simpson 2017, 
15). It is this history that must be foregrounded by the TRC in order to begin a process of 
true reconciliation, otherwise reconciliation is simply superficial rhetoric. In other words, 
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testimony from survivors cannot on its own address the devastating legacy of the 
residential school system. The residential school system must be viewed as a product of 
an ongoing history of settler colonialism encompassing government policies, settler 
myths of benevolence and broken treaties. Insofar as the TRC isolates testimonies from 
ongoing land dispossession, it fails to address this broader history and, therefore, does not 
challenge settler common sense whereby land dispossession is experienced as normal for 
settlers.   
Without explicit framing of the residential school system as an inevitable feature 
of the settler project of land seizure and extermination, the TRC’s model of reconciliation 
fails because it characterizes the residential school system as merely “a historical 
injustice to be ‘resolved’” (Weiss 2015, 46). This model of reconciliation would be what 
Dale Turner calls restoring two contradictory realities—settler colonial violence and the 
myth of Canadian benevolence (Turner 2011). The TRC aims to resolve these two 
contradictory realities, rather than dismantle the myth of Canadian benevolence that 
undergirds ongoing settler colonial violence.201  
While the truth-telling events seem to express a commitment to foregrounding the 
experiences of residential school survivors in order to face the legacy of Canada’s 
colonial past, this vision of reconciliation is not one that supports Indigenous self-
determination. The TRC’s symbolic power has the function of relegitimating the 
Canadian state’s authority of creating its nation-narrative. In other words, the school 
                                                        
201 Chief Lee Crowchild of the Tsuut’ina Nation proposes “making wolf” as an alternative to term 
‘reconciliation.’ The term refers to practices of his ancestors whereby leaders of tribes with whom they had 
fought meet in order to validate experiences of both sides (Dippel 2018).  
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policy is framed in such a way that testimonies of school survivors are not heard as 
challenges to structures of ongoing settler colonial power and violence.  
While the TRC provides a national platform for residential school survivors to 
share their lived experiences, it does so within a context that does not validate these 
experiences as expressions of ongoing colonial violence and land dispossession. The 
TRC provides the opportunity for individuals to express their individual grievances 
without attending to ongoing settler colonial structures (both economic and 
psychological). These testimonies are shared in a way that is politically palatable to the 
settler colonial state, yet politically ineffective. It is politically palatable in that it 
reaffirms narratives of Indigenous pathology in such a way as to frame the Indian 
Residential Schools policy as an ongoing Indigenous problem, rather than as an ongoing 
settler colonial problem. It is politically ineffectual in that it individualizes these 
experiences without the possibility of legal action against the government and churches 
responsible for systemic assault. Consequently, the TRC acts as a panacea that has the 
goal of moving past what former Prime Minister Harper called “a sad chapter in our 
history… that has no place in our country” (Statement of Apology 2008). The 
reconciliatory potential of the TRC in provoking a social accountability of past and 
present colonial violence is thus heavily mitigated.202  
Moreover, in this respect, the TRC’s confessional model amounts to the request of 
residential school survivors to perform a form of ‘colonial-exorcism’ for a settler 
audience, in order to maintain the fiction of Canada as a peacekeeping and non-colonial 
                                                        
202 This is not to suggest, however, that the sharing of experiences of violence cannot be empowering for 
residential school survivors. But rather that the focus on individual experiences fails to address the 
structural violence of the residential school system. 
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country. As such, the TRC does not shatter this nation-fiction but rather performs the 
narrative of Canadian respect of human rights. This functions as a form of colonial-
exorcism insofar as it acknowledges the need for reconciliation but in ways that limit the 
possibility of inciting meaningful conversations about ongoing settler-colonial violence. 
It thus assuages settler guilt, while perpetuating the legitimacy of settler authority.  
The TRC seeks a colonial-exorcism through a form of therapy for the settler 
colonial state. The state foregrounds the “experiences of its ‘victims’ and so publicly 
admits its ‘shame’” (Weiss 2015, 38). The TRC’s commitment to move forward indicates 
a desire to move beyond an “ashamed” past in order to create new relationships. 
Following Elizabeth Povinelli’s analysis of a politics of recognition based on suspicion, 
we can understand this in terms of a desire to create a new ‘purified’ state.203 The 
admission of past wrongs ‘purifies’ the state so that it can continue on with a new 
legitimacy (Povinelli 2011, 162). The TRC’s confessional model relegitimates and 
justifies the Canadian state’s power, while simultaneously reaffirming shame as a 
mechanism of settler colonial control. 
The TRC inadvertently reproduces the colonizer’s shame by emphasizing pain 
without explicitly situating it within settler colonial land dispossession. As discussed in 
previous chapter, the political relevance of Indigenous testimonies can be denied when 
                                                        
203 Povinelli aims to articulate the paradoxes of liberal multiculturalism which aims to, on the one hand, 
recognize otherness and, on the other, to subject that otherness to critical scrutiny. She affirms that the 
aboriginal subaltern must be “inspected, examined, and investigated,” but in ways that force Indigenous 
persons to account for themselves in a manner that suits the national imaginary of liberal multiculturalism 
(Povinelli 2002, 39). As such, the inspection of Indigenous Australians always already constitutes them as 
“failures of indigeneity as such” (2002, 39). She argues that this paradox leads to a “politics of recognition 
based on suspicion” in which Aboriginal Australians must serve the function of providing evidence that 
Australia is a tolerant multicultural nation, and at the same time they must “protect the liberal subject from 
suspecting the (ir)rationality of their intolerance” (2002, 109). 
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they are heard as evidence of individual pathology. Leanne Betasamosake Simpson 
writes, “We are made to feel ashamed—dysfunctional, wrong, ‘damaged goods’—
because of how we cope with the pain of shame and violence, which in turn amplifies and 
perpetuates shame. Not knowing languages, not protecting our lands well enough, not 
organizing effectively enough, for always being on the losing end of colonial violence. 
Shame cages resurgence in a very basic way because it prevents us from acting. Radical 
resurgent organizing, then, must generate the escape routes out of shame and into 
grounded normativity” (Simpson 2017, 188).204 
Settler hearing means that the hearer only hears what she expects. Settler hearing 
names a kind of hearing that reaffirms the legitimacy of settler authority. As such, it 
marks a failure of communication.205 The TRC’s mandate does not extend to a critique or 
reconsideration of the legitimacy of the settler colonial nation and the settler colonial 
government. As such, the truth-telling events are situated within a framework that 
presumes a shared (settler colonial) world. The truth-telling events do not put this shared 
world into question. If settler Canadians and Indigenous peoples do not agree on the 
(supposedly shared) world, then how can we expect testimony to lead to a reconciliation? 
If there is no consensus on the way in which the world is broken, how can solutions 
possibly be heard? In settler hearing, colonial recognition is heard such that it reaffirms 
settler colonial power.206 As such, the settler public can rest assured that the TRC does 
not the challenge settler colonial foundations of this supposedly shared world.  
                                                        
204 I return to the question of resurgence and grounded normativity in the final chapter. 
 
205 Stauffer, drawing on Levinas, affirms that communication is not about transferring knowledge, but it 
about co-creating the world (Stauffer 2015, 91).  
 
206 Leanne Betasamosake Simpson reminds us that “the colonizer’s mirror [will always] reflect back to us 
what the state wants to see” (Simpson 2017, 188). 
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These three features of settler hearing— its presumption that the sharing of 
testimony can and will reconcile relationships; its creation of a template for acceptable 
testimonies; and its isolation from structural settler colonial violence—prevent, in effect, 
testimonies from establishing new respectful relationships between Indigenous people 
and Canadian settlers. Insofar as the TRC performs a settler hearing, it fails to create an 
ethical relationship between speaker and hearer, and so does not provide the means to 
establish respectful relationship since it does not shatter the settler myth of benevolence 
or reject colonizer’s shame.   
 
Ethical Loneliness and Reparative Hearing 
A second criterion by which we can evaluate the TRC in light of structural 
ignorance is in terms of its ability to hear testimonies of residential school survivors in a 
way that attends to their ethical loneliness. The TRC’s limited capacity of hearing 
testimonies means that it is not likely to assuage the loneliness caused by social 
abandonment. In order for the TRC to address the survivors’ ethical loneliness, a settler 
audience must be able to hear their testimonies in a particularly unsettling way.  
The TRC’s politics of suspicion exemplifies its settler hearing.207 As such, the 
TRC’s model of reconciliation is based on paranoia and suspicion. I say this also because 
for Sedgwick (who gets the idea from Melanie Klein), it is only with the reparative 
position that agents experience themselves as ethically responsible agents—as agents 
who recognize the fact that their actions inflict harms, damages and unintended 
                                                        
 
207 Sedgwick explicitly links paranoid reading to suspicion (Sedgwick 2003, 125). 
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consequences on others.208 Hence, it is only with the reparative position that agents 
experience things like regret, mourning, guilt, remorse and the like (Klein 1975, 316 and 
Sedgwick 2007, 637).209 As such, a settler hearing does not create the conditions to 
assuage the ethical loneliness of the residential school survivors and, as such, fails to 
establish new respectful relationships between settler Canadians and Indigenous 
communities.  
Meaningful communication, for Stauffer, is one that begins from an appreciation 
of our dependence on others “to confirm the reality of the shared world [...] without that 
there is no world” (Stauffer 2015, 92). Communication begins from an understanding of 
our dependence on each other to make sense of (and to create) the world.210 This means 
that the act of speaking and hearing is a co-authoring in which the end-result is a surprise 
to all parties. With this understanding of communication, she argues that reconciliation 
“rests on a fragile consensus—a new definition of past, present, and future—that can be 
won only slowly, painfully, and cooperatively and will never succeed in erasing or 
redefining every resistant narrative” (2015, 93). Reconciliation puts into question a 
supposed shared world. It seeks to show that what was previously experienced as 
consensus was never stable. Reconciliation based on testimony requires that testimony 
shape the very framework of reconciliation. Reconciliation cannot be a fixed and stable 
end-result of truth-telling events but must be a process that must be shaped and reshaped 
                                                        
208 I borrow the term ‘reparative’ from Sedgwick’s account of reparative reading as an alternative 
interpretative practice to that of paranoid reading (Sedgwick 2003).  
 
209 Bonnie Sheehey expands Sedgwick’s account of reparative reading to reparative agency in “Meliorism 
and Reparative Agency in Jamesian Pragmatism” (forthcoming).  
 
210 Following Levinas, Stauffer calls a world “a cooperatively authored thing” (2015, 80). 
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by (often contradictory) testimonies in the continued co-creating of a world with a new 
past, present and future.  
The confessional model of the TRC prevents meaningful communication in that it 
overdetermines what can be heard.211 The overdetermination of the kinds of testimonies 
that can be shared within the truth-telling events inadvertently closes itself to the surprise 
and risk inherent in communication. Insofar as the TRC can present a final report of 
having done its job in providing the truth of the residential schools and having 
uncovering injustice—cultural genocide—it performs a settler hearing that forecloses the 
possibility for meaningful communication. An example of this is in how the Apology has 
been read as the recognition of an historical wrong that marks the resolution of 
reconciliation, rather than as the beginning of a meaningful process. On my account, 
then, the TRC does not succeed in assuaging ethical loneliness of residential school 
survivors insofar as it does not engage a practice of reparative hearing. 
Stauffer interestingly notes that meaningful communication requires hearers to be 
“open to being unsettled” (2015, 70—emphasis added). Unlike settler hearing, a more 
meaningful kind of hearing is one that begins from an “openness where what is said 
might be heard even if it threatens to break the order of the known world for those who 
listen” (2015, 80). This is a type of reparative hearing that must unsettle entrenched 
relationships of inequality and upset norms and structures of power that have shaped and 
continue to shape how injustices are spoken, but not heard (Koggel 2016, 3).  
                                                        
211 Leanne Betasamosake Simpson, for one, worries that ‘reconciliation’ has been taken as a stable state, 
rather than as an ongoing process. 
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Unlike settler hearing, reparative hearing begins from an avowal of the inherent 
vulnerability and risk of communicating without knowing in advance what may be said 
or heard. That is, reparative hearing requires an openness on the part of hearers to being 
caught off-guard, and hence, to the possibility of being unsettled by what is said. This 
hearing requires an openness to what is not said, as much as it does to what is said. This 
openness is required in order to assume ethical responsibility. By being open to 
testimonies that challenge or disrupt what appears to settlers as natural and normal—
namely, settler ignorance—reparative hearing is a kind of hearing that begins the work of 
challenging the assumptions of settler colonial epistemology that eliminate Indigenous 
speakers as credible knowers.212 This is a type of hearing that the TRC effectively gives 
up by relying on a model of reconciliation that overdetermines what is heard through 
tropes of victimization, survival and a confessional form of truth-telling. Whereas truth 
commissions aim to sanitize a devastating past, Stauffer considers the use of “revisionary 
practices,” which make “the past more livable in the present moment” (2015, 7).213 
Revisionary practices do not attempt to simply do away with the past or to “get over” 
feelings of resentment, but rather aim to grapple with a reconciliation with time, which is 
“the desire to live with what the past has been” (2015, 7).214  
                                                        
212 An account of reconciliation as reparation will be given in the final chapter.  
 
213 Stauffer draws on Nietzsche’s term “willing backwards” in her account of revisionary practices as ways 
of learning to live with the past. These practices, such as those of transitional justice, are ones which does 
not keep a strict boundary between victim and perpetrator. These practices highlight how we “are 
implicated in the destruction of worlds and in a responsibility to rebuild those worlds” (Stauffer 2015, 138). 
 
214 With this concern in mind, Campbell argues that the TRC will have to challenge myths that have 
rationalized Canadian settler colonialism in order to foster relational memory-sharing. Her model of 
relational remembering emphasizes the role of relationships of power and oppression in shaping what is 
remembered and considered to be true. In this respect, it refuses the act of abstracting the “us” and “them” 
in the remembering relation by “focusing on memory as the shared activity of remembering together—as 
always in relationships through time and shaped by the how of remembering and who remembers” (Koggel 
2014, 503). Campbell’s model of relational remembering raises concerns about the inability of a non-
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Conclusion  
The TRC’s settler hearing provides a concrete illustration of the ethical impact of 
structural settler ignorance. The TRC proposes a definition of reconciliation as “an 
ongoing process of establishing and maintaining respectful relationships.” The promise 
that the experience of “truth-telling” is a necessary step in (re)establishing respectful 
relationships fails when we consider how the testimonies have been framed in such a way 
as to limit being heard as expressions that challenge settler authority. These testimonies 
must be heard as examples of Indigenous resurgence, rather than as expressions of 
shameful victimhood. The emphasis must be on acknowledging the government’s actions 
to destroy Indigenous nations, rather than on the sharing of testimonies which signal 
individual survival in the face of cultural genocide.  
Without an account of Indigenous self-determination, the TRC cannot 
meaningfully hear testimonies but enacts a settler hearing. Given the settler hearing of the 
TRC’s truth-telling events and the reception of its final report, I argue that the TRC fails 
on two accounts. It does not provide the means to establish respectful relationships 
between settler Canadians and Indigenous peoples, and so fails on the terms of its own 
mandate. It is also unsuccessful in its ability to address the ethical loneliness of 
residential school survivors. Since the TRC mischaracterizes the harm of the residential 
schools solely in terms of cultural identity, it does not hear testimonies as expressions of 
Indigenous refusal of settler authority. The ability to assuage ethical loneliness calls for a 
                                                        
Indigenous public to hear, and remember with, Indigenous residential school survivors (Campbell 2003; 
2014). 
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reparative hearing which is open to being unsettled by testimonies that challenge settler 
common sense, which normalizes settler authority and Indigenous absence. An account 
of reparative hearing suggests what is required of setters to enter into ethical relationships 
with Indigenous communities. An account requires work to disrupt structural settler 
ignorance by rejecting the epistemic assumptions that lead to the elimination of 
Indigenous peoples as credible knowers. This is the account I give in my final chapter.  
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CHAPTER VI 
UNSETTLING SETTLER IGNORANCE 
 
Linked by sweetgrass, there is reciprocity between you, 
 linked by sweetgrass, the holder as vital as the braider.  
The braid becomes finer and thinner as you near the end,  
until you’re braiding individual blades of grass, and then you tie it off. 
Robin Wall Kimmerer (Potawatomi)215 
 
Introduction 
The problem of settler ignorance complicates an evaluation of reconciliation 
within the confines of the TRC and other governmental attempts to ‘move forward’ from 
past wrongs. An account of settler ignorance demonstrates that reconciliation cannot 
occur by simply sharing testimonies of residential school survivors since epistemic 
assumptions undermine the very credibility of these testimonies. The TRC’s underlying 
epistemological framework is one in which subjective felt experiences of residential 
school survivors can be easily dismissed as being stuck in the past, or as overly 
‘emotional’ and a sign of individual pathology. These dismissals are not accidental but a 
necessary part of the settler colonial epistemic elimination of Indigenous peoples. For this 
reason, the TRC cannot properly hear the testimonies of residential school survivors as 
challenges to settler authority. Consequently, the truth-telling events of the TRC do not, 
                                                        
215 Kimmerer 2013, ix 
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on their own, challenge settlers’ structural ignorance of past and ongoing settler colonial 
violence. 
Without challenging these structural epistemic assumptions that limit Indigenous 
epistemic agency, governmental apologies and truth commissions simply replicate 
epistemic exclusions that leave settler ignorance unaltered. Furthermore, an analysis of 
settler ignorance shows us that an apparent lack of knowledge about residential schools is 
not a case of misrecognition or a lack of information but a particular kind of knowing that 
undermines Indigenous peoples’ epistemic agency. 
The previous chapter concluded that the TRC performs a kind of settler hearing in 
the ways in which it structures its mandate, defines acceptable testimonies at the truth-
telling events, and fails to frame the residential school policy in terms of land seizure and 
destruction of Indigenous nations. These features come to form a settler hearing by 
foreclosing the possibility of settlers being surprised—of being ‘unsettled’—by the truth-
telling events. The failure of being vulnerable leads to a settler hearing that evades ethical 
responsibility and, therefore, fails to provide the conditions for “establishing and 
maintaining respectful relationships” between settlers and Indigenous communities, as 
well as for assuaging the ethical loneliness of residential school survivors. As such, the 
inability to be vulnerable further cements settler common sense and settler ignorance. 
This settler hearing does not challenge what appears, to settlers, as normal, natural and 
common-sensical. In this chapter, I propose practices to challenge structural settler 
ignorance. These are practices of reparative knowing that show what meaningful 
reconciliation requires on the part of settlers.216  
                                                        
216 Reparative knowing is a broader account than reparative hearing. Whereas ‘reparative hearing’ names 
how testimonies can be heard, ‘reparative knowing’ names a way of knowing. 
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Against the TRC’s framing of reconciliation as something that has a single fixed 
meaning, I contend that reconciliation comes to require different practices for Indigenous 
communities than for settlers. The very meaning of reconciliation cannot be presented as 
a foregone conclusion with a predetermined assurance of its success. With this in mind, I 
present two possible definitions of reconciliation that go beyond the TRC—reconciliation 
as refusal and resurgence, and reconciliation as reparation. The account of reconciliation 
as refusal and resurgence showcases practices of cultivating Indigenous self-
determination within Indigenous communities and outside the confine of recognition 
from the settler Canadian government. These practices call for reciprocal recognition and 
come to refuse the state’s role in bringing about meaningful reconciliation. The account 
of reconciliation as reparation proposes practices aimed at settlers to recognize their very 
own settler identity and its implications in order to bear ethical witness to past and 
ongoing settler colonial violence. This form of reconciliation requires that settlers take up 
a practice of reparative knowing whereby they cultivate an epistemic responsibility 
characterized by humility, curiosity, and open-mindedness.217 
In the context of ongoing settler colonial violence, reparative knowing involves a 
troubling of settler common sense and a disruption of structural settler ignorance. On this 
account, a critical transformation of settler ignorance must be predicated upon a rejection 
of the “placelessness” of Western epistemology, which justifies land dispossession 
through the epistemic elimination of Indigenous peoples as credible knowers. For this 
reason, I contend that work in Indigenous land-based education, which highlights land’s 
                                                        
 
217 Lorraine Code develops an account of epistemic responsibility that highlights the role of social forces on 
our identities as epistemic authorities (Code 1987; 1991; 2006).  
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role in knowing, makes visible the epistemic assumptions of the settler colonial logic of 
elimination. Meaningful reconciliation requires of settlers a reparative transformation of 
the epistemic assumptions that work to maintain a structural ignorance of past and 
ongoing settler colonial violence.  
 
Reconciliation and Recognition (again) 
The ethical evaluation of the TRC in the previous chapter highlighted the fact that 
the voices of residential school survivors cannot be properly heard outside of an account 
of Indigenous resurgence and self-determination. Anishinaabe Elder Fred Kelly puts it 
succinctly—“Real and meaningful [reconciliation] in Canada…must embrace the 
inherent right of self-determination through self-government envisioned in the treaties” 
(Kelly 2008, 22 qtd in Weiss 2015, 45). Meaningful reconciliation requires “a revision of 
contemporary Canadian-Aboriginal policy entirely” and it needs to be more than merely 
symbolic but require change in material conditions (2015, 46). Taiaiake Alfred is clear on 
this point—“Without massive restitution, including land, financial transfers and other 
forms of assistance to compensate for past harms and continuing injustices committed 
against our peoples, reconciliation would permanently enshrine colonial injustices and is 
itself a further injustice” (Alfred 2005, 152).  
For these reasons, Jeff Corntassel and Cindy Holder argue that the Canadian 
government’s reconciliation mechanisms ultimately fail to transform inter-group colonial 
relationships and go beyond “hollow, symbolic gestures” (Corntassel and Holder 2008, 
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467).218 State apologies fail to address larger policy implications for Indigenous nations 
and contemporary power imbalances between settler and Indigenous communities. In this 
respect, state apologies and truth commissions fail Matt James’ criteria for an authentic 
political apology, which includes the acceptance of responsibility, a statement of regret, 
and does not demand forgiveness (James 2007).219  
Corntassel and Holder affirm that the Canadian government’s 1998 apology in 
response to the Final Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) co-
opts the language of reconciliation without first “establishing meaningful forms of 
restitution and group compensation” (Corntassel and Holder 2008, 486).220 The short 
‘Statement of Reconciliation’ to Indigenous leaders sought to close the book on the 
historical legacy of residential schools and “to find ways to deal with the negative 
impacts that certain historical decisions continue to have in our society today” (Statement 
of Reconciliation 1998 qtd in 2008, 473). The Statement clearly situates the violences of 
the residential school policy in the past, such that the task of reconciliation is to “deal 
with [past] negative impacts.” The 2008 Statement of Apology for the Indian Residential 
Schools similarly places the ills of settler colonialism in a fixed past.  
Without land restitution and support of self-determination, apologies and truth 
                                                        
218 Jeff Corntassel and Cindy Holder critically evaluate the use of official apologies and truth commissions 
in addressing human rights abuse. They consider the use of state-sponsored commissions in Canada, 
Australia, Peru, and Guatemala (Corntassel and Holder 2008). 
 
219 These conditions include: (i) recorded officially in writing; (ii) names the wrongs in question; (iii) 
accepts responsibility; (iv) states regret; (v) promise non-repetition; (vi) does not demand forgiveness; (vii) 
is not hypocritical or arbitrary; (viii) undertakes—through measures of publicity, ceremony, and concrete 
reparation—to engage morally those in whose name the apology is made and to assure the wronged group 
that the apology is sincere (James 2007, 5).  
 
220 The RCAP was formed in response to the 1990 “Oka Crisis.” It was mandated to cover the relationship 
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples in Canada. The 1996 report’s sections on the residential 
school system aroused such outrage and shame that it called for a separate public inquiry (Nagy 2014, 204).  
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commissions engage in a “politics of distraction” that diverts energy and attention away 
from community resurgence and frames community relationships in “state-centric terms” 
(Alfred and Corntassel, 2005, 600). The politics of distraction names the tools of shape-
shifting colonial entities to separate Indigenous peoples from their homelands, cultures 
and communities. Corntassel contends that the focus on rights, reconciliation, and 
resources are central to the distraction from “deep decolonizing movements and push us 
towards a state agenda of co-optation and assimilation” (Corntassel 2012, 91). Corntassel 
and Holder characterize state apologies and truth commissions as engaging in this 
distraction insofar as they shift the discourse away “from restitution of Indigenous 
homelands and resources and ground it instead in a political/legal rights-based process 
that plays into the affirmative repair policies of states and ultimately rewards colonial 
injustices” (Corntassel and Holder 2008, 471).  
Reconciliation, in other words, would require recognition of the damage of past 
and ongoing structural settler colonial violence. Is this not, however, the model the TRC 
adopts? Although the TRC presents a model of reconciliation based on the recognition of 
testimonies, I explained in my second chapter that the TRC’s framing politics of 
recognition cannot challenge structures of settler colonialism. A meaningful account of 
reconciliation requires reciprocal recognition, which includes a recognition of structural 
settler colonial violence and material support of Indigenous self-determination. Insofar as 
the TRC’s confessional model does not challenge these underlying structures, it ends up 
being a distraction from the work of political self-determination.  
Leanne Betasamosake Simpson defines reciprocal recognition as “the act of 
making it a practice to see another’s light and to reflect that light back to them, forms the 
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basis of positive identity, self-worth, and dignity in the other being” (Simpson 2017, 
184). Simpson’s model of reciprocal recognition within Nishnaabeg intelligence is one 
that is grounded to land and is an expression of love in the continuance of Indigenous 
life.221 Simpson writes—“Recognition within Nishnaabeg intelligence is a process of 
seeing another being’s core essence; it is a series of relationships. It is reciprocal, 
continual, and a way of generating society. It amplifies Nishnaabewin—all of the 
practices and intelligence that make us Nishnaabeg” (2017, 185). 
Simpson’s Nishnaabeg model of reciprocal recognition rejects “the colonizer’s 
mirror” which will always “reflect back to us what the state wants to see” (2017, 188). 
For this reason, Kahnawà:ke Mohawk anthropologist Audra Simpson’s politics of refusal, 
which situates the refusal to share testimony is a model of self-determination that firmly 
rejects state recognition that can address the ethical loneliness of residential school 
survivors (A. Simpson 2014). The model of refusal provides a more viable alternative 
that prioritizes self-determination and Indigenous resurgence over the empty rhetoric of 
reconciliation. Whereas the TRC asks Indigenous peoples to engage with a state-
sanctioned truth commission in order for the Canadian government to recognize the 
damage of the residential school system, Nishnaabeg reciprocal recognition rejects the 
colonizer’s mirror, and asks “when you look in the mirror, what do you see?”222  
 
                                                        
221 In Leanne Betasamosake Simpson’s model recognition, it is about “profound listening, and about 
recognizing and affirming the light in each other as a mechanism for nurturing and strengthening in each 
other as a mechanism for nurturing and strengthening internal relationships to our Nishnaabeg worlds” 
(2017, 182). 
 
222 Audra Simpson asks a Mohawk national, “What is the ideal form of membership for us? What do you 
think makes someone a member of the community?” He looks her squarely in the eye and doesn’t answer. 
Instead he says, “When you look in the mirror, what do you see?” (qtd in Simpson 2017, 179).  
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Reconciliation as Refusal and Resurgence 
A powerful example of a model of self-determination that turns away from the 
colonizer’s mirror is Audra Simpson’s politics of refusal. Simpson’s work in 
anthropology explores the avenue of refusal as a politics of resurgence (Simpson 2007; 
2014). Refusal here serves the purpose of ‘turning away’ from the legitimizing gaze of 
settler authority and from the “presumed ‘good’ of multicultural politics” towards 
revitalized, self-generated, transformative models of self-determination (2014, 11). 
Refusal is both a political and methodological stance to refuse the legitimacy of the 
settler state’s jurisdiction and power of recognizing. Refusal is a failure to consent to the 
politics of cultural recognition, that is to the “desire to have one’s distinctiveness as a 
culture, as a people, recognized” (2014, 11).223   
In Mohawk Interruptus, Simpson outlines how refusal can be a political and 
ethical stance of disengagement that enacts sovereignty.224 Refusal is at once a refusal of 
settler authority and a declaration of political sovereignty—she writes, “[turning away] 
negates the authority of the other’s gaze” (2014, 24). Kahnawà:ke Mohawks’ refusal to 
claim Canadian and American passports or to become objects of anthropological study, 
are methods of claiming political sovereignty amidst settler colonialism. Simpson writes, 
“Refusal comes with the requirement of having one’s political sovereignty acknowledged 
and upheld and raises the question of legitimacy for those who are usually in the position 
                                                        
223 Audra Simpson writes: “If a refusal to recognize also involves using one’s territory in a manner that is 
historically and philosophically consistent with what one knows, then it is an incident of failed consent: 
Mohawks, in this case, refused to consent to colonial mappings and occupations of their territory” 
(Simpson 2007, 195).  
 
224 Audra Simpson defines sovereignty as “a construct which is always a bestowal and as such is deeply 
imperfect but critical for these moments in Indigenous/Settler-State relations” (Simpson 2007, 72).  
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of recognizing” (2014, 11). The importance of ethnographical refusal emerges, in part, 
from Simpson’s own experience of “complete disjuncture between what was written 
about [her] own people and the things that mattered the most to [them]” (2007, 72). The 
refusal of state recognition is thus not simply an individual act but names collective 
action whereby membership is collectively defined. For this reason, she frames the 
question of Mohawk nationhood in terms of “living, feeling citizenships” that are 
narratively and communally constructed and form the basis of everyday life of the 
community (2014, 175).225 Refusal rejects recognition and prioritizes questions of land, 
Indigenous resurgence, and language revitalization.226 
In the context of the TRC, refusal would be exactly that—refusing to participate 
in the process and refusing the state’s authority to recognize and hear these testimonies. 
Refusal means refusing state-sanctioned truth-telling events as a way to reconstruct 
“shattered voices,”227 since this process of ‘reconstruction’ is predicated upon a colonial 
recognition that makes voices intelligible only by creating ‘colonized subjects.’228 Rather, 
refusal negates the authority of the state’s gaze (or the settler’s hearing in this case). The 
TRC’s framework of recognition does not challenge colonial structures that prevent 
testimonies from being heard. For this reason, the exposing of voices to settlers who 
                                                        
225 Audra Simpson’s work centers Kahnawà:ke Membership Law of who can and cannot live and access 
resources on the Kahnawà:ke reserve. She considers the “problem of membership” within the context of the 
amendment to the Indian Act.  
  
226 An example of this can be found in Michelle M. Jacob’s Yakama Rising: Indigenous Cultural 
Revitalization, Activism, and Healing (2013).  
 
227 Phelps 2004, 39.   
 
228 Coulthard argues that settler colonial recognition involves the creation of “colonized subjects” through a 
process of internalization whereby the colonized come to accept and even identify with the limited 
misrecognition granted through state structures (Coulthard 2014).  
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cannot hear is further damaging and harmful. Consequently, refusal has the potential to 
assuage ethical loneliness and avoid the dangers of further abandoning residential school 
survivors in the process by sharing their personal testimonies in an environment in which 
they cannot be heard.  
Indigenous resurgence is another example that cultivates self-determination 
outside of a relationship with the state. Within Indigenous communities, Taiaiake Alfred, 
Glen Sean Coulthard and Leanne Betasamosake Simpson all point to the role of 
resurgence as a means of cultivating self-determination outside of the confines of 
recognition from the settler Canadian government. Cultural and spiritual restoration or 
revitalization does not prescribe a return to pre-contact Indigenous lifeways, but rather 
fosters “‘self-conscious traditionalism’ anchored in customary relations of family, place, 
and politics modeled in traditional knowledge and cultural practices” (Alfred 2009a, 16). 
Kirby Brown (Cherokee Nation) identifies Indigenous resurgence theory as committed to 
“collective critique of and resistance to settler-state structures of politics, power, and 
representation, coupled with—if not motivated by—the revitalization of community-
specific indigenous traditions” (Brown 2015, 293). Resurgence emphasizes ways to 
restore and regenerate Indigenous nationhood and the “repatriation of Indigenous land 
and life” (Tuck and Yang 2012).  
The return to Indigenous traditions is forcefully articulated by Alfred 
(Kahnawà:ke Mohawk). He proposes an Indigenism that is not an assimilative pan-
Indianism, but rather a view that “brings together words, ideas, and symbols from 
different Indigenous cultures to serve as tools for those involved in asserting nationhood” 
(Alfred 2009a, 112). His work weaves together oral traditions and interviews with 
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community leaders, activists, Elders and youth. In Wasáse, Alfred speaks of the Wasáse, 
the Rotnishonni Thunder Dance or war ceremony, as a “ceremony of unity, strength, and 
commitment to action” in order to map out meaningful, revolutionary change that 
reclaims dignity and strength for Onkwehowe (Original People) (2005). The call for 
radical change stems from, and necessarily involves, the resurgence of tribal traditions. 
Alfred’s call to return to warrior tradition is at once grounded in a call for peace and in 
the resurgence of traditional spirituality. The warrior dance “must be formulated as a 
spiritual revolution, a culturally rooted social movement that transforms the whole of 
society and a political action that seeks to remake the entire landscape of power and 
relationship to reflect truly a liberated post-imperial vision” (2005, 27). His call to 
revitalize traditional and spiritual roots echoes his reasoning in Peace, Power, 
Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto, in which he argues for the return to traditional 
Indigenous governing models in order to challenge the capitalist model of power, “My 
guiding vision is of a retraditionalized politics, and the re-establishment of our nations 
and relationships on the basis of the sacred teachings given to us by our ancestors” (2009, 
27). As Alfred notes, traditionally rooted self-determination requires “a set of values that 
challenge the homogenizing force of Western liberalism and free-market capitalism” 
(2009a, 60).  
Jeff Corntassel (Cherokee Nation) similarly considers everyday examples of 
resurgence within Indigenous communities, such as from Cherokees in Kituwah, the 
Lekwungen protection of camas, the Nishnaabekwewag “Water Walkers” movement, and 
Kanaka Maoli (Native Hawaiian) revitalization of kalo (Corntassel 2012).229 He argues 
                                                        
229 Corntassel describes the Cherokee Nation and United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians’ opposition 
to the Duke Energy project and creation of the “Citizens to Protect Kituwah Valley” (Corntassel 2012, 91); 
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that Indigeneity means struggling to “reclaim and regenerate one’s relational, place-based 
existence by challenging the ongoing, destructive forces of colonization” (2012, 88). 
Practices of Indigenous resurgence reflect “the spiritual, cultural, economic, social and 
political scope of the struggle” (2012, 88). Unlike the state’s measures that form a politics 
of distraction, Corntassel suggests that decolonizing resurgence emphasizes 
responsibilities over rights, localized and community-centered actions “premised on 
reconnecting with land, culture and community” over processes of reconciliation that 
reinscribe the status quo, and an understanding of Indigenous homelands as “a complex 
web of relationships” over the commodification of resource (2012, 91).  
Corntassel, Cha-Win-Is, and T’lakwadzi call for an Indigenous “restorying” as an 
alternative to the Canadian TRC and as a “first step toward remembering and revitalizing 
our collective and individual consciousness” (Corntassel et al. 2009, 155). Without an 
explicit attention to storytelling, they affirm that the 2008 Statement of Apology and the 
TRC reinforce colonial relationships, and so maintain a colonial status quo. They name 
the Nuu-chah-nulth Stop the Violence March (May 2006)230 as an example of community 
                                                        
Cheryl Bryce and her family’s efforts of managing their traditional Lekwungen territories for centuries and 
harvesting kwetlal (camas) on park lands and private properties (2012, 93); the “Water Walkers” movement 
in Wikiwemikong Unceded First Nation in Ontario, Canada in response to increasing threats of 
environmental pollution to their community lakes and traditional waters; and finally, the Hàlau Kû Mäna 
(HKM) public charter school to rebuild Indigenous Hawaiian agricultural and educational systems (2012, 
96).  
 
230 The 10-day March raised awareness and act as a catalyst for community-based change. Gloria Larocque 
(Cree) writes, “The Indigenous women of this land will continue to march to attain what has been 
suppressed, what has been denied, what has been taken with their lives and liberty. The Indigenous women 
of this land will again stand where once they have fallen; to feel inside our souls the heartbeat of our 
ancestors. It is they who fell yesterday, that we base our collective value today. That together, the ancestors 
will walk alongside future generations, guiding the fight for all Indigenous people of this land. Empowering 
the Indigenous women empowers the Indigenous family. This walk will be a tangible means that those 
participating can offer towards the collective end. That all Indigenous women may have the power to 
provide a sustainable future for the Indigenous family” (Stop the Violence 2012). 
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mobilization that results from inter-community relationship building between the Nuu-
chah-nulth communities rather than from state intervention—“In fact, Nuu-chah-nulth 
people view state-centered processes as further dividing communities—or trapping us in 
a cycle of ongoing oppression. In the march, Nuu-chah-nulth people engaged a haa-huu-
pah that breathed hope and possibility for the future grounded in our own world-view” 
(2009, 156).  
Leanne Betasamosake Simpson advocates land-based education and the embodied 
resurgence within language and spiritual traditions (Simpson 2008; 2014). Simpson turns 
to traditions of governance and resurgence within the Nishnaabeg language, Creation 
Stories, and personal encounters with both Elders and children. She uses Nishnaabeg 
stories to reclaim land as pedagogy, in which “stories direct, inspire and affirm ancient 
code of ethics” (Simpson 2014, 8). She proposes that a return to land, as opposed to 
efforts to “Indigenize the academy,” can nurture a generation of people that can think 
“within the land and have tremendous knowledge and connection to aki [the land]” 
(2014, 23). Resurgence involves a turn to Indigenous experiential knowing.231 Moreover, 
she puts forward a four-part strategy designed to transcend the politics of distraction and 
keep the focus on the revitalization of Indigenous communities (2009, 75). Resurgence 
requires confronting and rejecting a “funding” mentality; confronting linguistic genocide; 
visioning resurgence of Indigenous traditions; and renewing “precolonial treaty 
relationships with contemporary neighbouring Indigenous Nations” (2009, 77-84).  
                                                        
231 Leanne Simpson writes, “Shortly after the creation of the world and the birth of Nanabush, Nanabush 
took a trip around the world as a way of learning about the world. That’s the first lesson. If you want to 
learn about something, you need to take your body onto the land and do it. Get a practice. If you want to 
learn about movement building, get yourself outside involved with people that are building movements. 
That doesn’t mean don’t read books, or don’t talk to people with all kinds of intelligences. It doesn’t mean 
don’t find mentors. It does mean, get out, get involved and get invested” (Simpson 2014, 17-18).  
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Alfred, Coulthard, Corntassel and Simpson all offer visions of everyday practices 
that reject the settler colonial logic of recognition and the assumptions of a settler 
colonial epistemology in order to enact self-determination on their own terms. In this 
respect, they present practices of reconciliation as refusal and resurgence that reject both 
the authority of the settler colonial state and turn to an Indigenous epistemology and 
ontology.  
 
Reconciliation as Reparation 
The project of reconciliation should not, however, be framed solely as a task for 
Indigenous scholars. It is not the ‘job’ of Indigenous communities to ‘inform’ settler 
communities about the realities of settler colonialism. Rather, it is the ethical 
responsibility of settlers to bear witness to the testimonies of past and ongoing settler 
colonial violence in meaningful and unsettling ways. I argue, though, that the very ability 
to bear ethical witness depends, however, upon a reparative hearing. The very possibility 
of ethical responsibility depends upon the vulnerability of reparative hearing. It requires 
an openness on the part of settlers to hear refusals of settler authority as legitimate 
expressions of political self-determination. A settler hearing, on the other hand, dismisses 
the possibility of refusal insofar as it remains closed off from the unexpected or 
unanticipated. Against this settler hearing, reconciliation as reparation demands a 
rejection of assumptions of a settler colonial epistemology. For this, I expand on Paulette 
Regan’s recommendations for critical interventions to begin the work of deconstructing 
the Canadian peacemaker myth that informs both collective settler ignorance and empty 
colonial empathy.  
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Regan affirms that a focus on settler identity and on the benefits and privileges 
that settlers have reaped from Indigenous lands and resources is crucial in order to move 
the prevailing framing of the residential school system as a “Native problem” to a more 
accurate conception of the residential schools as a “settler problem” (Regan 2010, 36).232 
She seeks to replace colonial forms of denial, guilt and empathy with acts of “insurgent 
remembrance” to borrow Roger Simon’s term (Simon 2005). These acts, including her 
own autoethnographical account of feelings of “unsettlement” at the Apology Feast in 
Hazelton held on Gitxsan territory, center around the violation of treaties and the 
dispossession of Indigenous people from their ancestral lands in order to resist the state’s 
tendency to reduce settler colonialism to residential schools in order to foreclose the past.   
 Regan asks, “How can we, as non-Indigenous people, unsettle ourselves to name 
and then transform the settler—the colonizer who lurks within, not just in words but by 
our actions, as we confront the history of colonization, violence, racism, and injustice that 
remains part of the [residential school] legacy today?” (Regan 2010, 11). I offer 
reparative knowing as a way of responding to this question. This response builds on 
Regan’s project of dismantling the settler myth of benevolence and transforming 
misguided attempts to assuage settler guilt. Reparative knowing is a coming to know that 
                                                        
 
232 To this end, she seeks to answer the question posed by historian Roger Epp regarding reconciliation in 
Canada: “How do we solve the settler problem?” (Epp 2003, 228).   
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displays an openness to being surprised and unsettled.233 This reconstructed epistemology 
draws on an Indigenous relational ontology.234  
The settler national myth of Canada as peacemaker works to uphold settler 
ignorance, such that “colonial forms of denial, guilt, and empathy act as barriers to 
transformative socio-political change” (2010, 11). On this account, Regan articulates an 
account of settler responsibility that requires settlers to “enter willingly into a more 
vulnerable, unsettling space of not knowing” (2010, 41). The productive space of not 
knowing—what I am calling reparative knowing—is necessary to transform the ability of 
settlers to hear the experiential accounts of residential school survivors.235 A 
transformation of settler guilt, and other moves to settler innocence, requires not only an 
active listening, but also an implementation of Indigenous epistemologies and 
methodologies in Canadian education. In this vein, Regan calls for the need to “restory” 
the dominant version of history by making decolonizing space for Indigenous history—
“counter-narratives of diplomacy, law, and peacemaking practices—as told by 
Indigenous peoples themselves” (2010, 6).236   
                                                        
233 Bonnie Sheehey notes that reparative knowing “requires a kind of transformative work on the part of the 
subject” (forthcoming). Klein understands the work of reparation to be tied to creativity. In “Love, Guilt, 
and Reparation,” Klein argues that feelings arising with the achievement of the depressive position, 
feelings like guilt, mourning, and love, are a “fundamental incentive towards creativeness” (Klein 1975, 
335). 
 
234 For example, in Deloria 1999. 
 
235 Matt James contends that Canada’s victim-centered TRC performs a carnivalesque “symbolic 
reparation” that reverses the dominance-submission logic by foregrounding the voices of survivors in ways 
that trouble settler truths (James 2012, 189). This, however, can only happen within a context in which 
these voices are meaningfully heard. 
 
236 An example of this is Oregon Senate Bill 13, which directs the Department of Education to develop 
curriculum relating to Native American experience in Oregon (Oregon 2017).  
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I contend, though, that Regan’s recommendations for critical pedagogical 
interventions can only function by dismantling the epistemic assumptions of settler 
colonialism. As I have shown in previous chapters, epistemic assumptions of Indigenous 
peoples being stuck in a fixed past and being irrational undergird the settler colonial drive 
for elimination. For this reason, Regan’s recommendations should be expanded to 
practices that challenge underlying epistemic norms of who counts as a knower. 
Consequently, the transformation of settler ignorance requires work in making dominant 
epistemic assumptions visible. This is the work of taking settler epistemic responsibility.  
 
Settler Epistemic Responsibility  
An account of settler epistemic responsibility draws from José Medina’s 
epistemology of resistance, which emphasizes the importance of locating one’s epistemic 
positionality (Medina 2013). Settler responsibility first requires settlers to experience 
settler ignorance as an example of profound epistemic arrogance. For this reason, the 
transformation of the settler common sense requires what Medina calls “epistemic 
friction” to disrupt our taken-for-granted assumptions (2013, 29). Settler ignorance 
becomes fixed when an invisibility of settler colonialism is felt as both natural and 
normal. Settler common sense becomes visible to settlers only when it comes to be 
experienced as strange. As such, cognitive and emotional turmoil is necessary for critical 
epistemic introspection. 
The epistemic virtue that Medina attributes to epistemically virtuous subjects 
among oppressed groups is their meta-lucidity—“their capacity to see the limitations of 
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dominant ways of seeing” (2013, 47).237 This meta-lucidity involves the epistemic virtues 
of humility, curiosity, and open-mindedness, and it has the critical potential to provide 
perspectives that make it possible to “redraw our cognitive maps, to redescribe our 
experiences, and to reconceptualize our ways of relating to others” (2013, 47).238 
Reparative knowing includes this virtue of meta-lucidity insofar as it is open to being 
surprised by something that initially appears non-sensical. This openness to the non-
sensical can challenge the fixity of settler common sense. The transformation of active 
ignorance requires both an individual retraining of epistemic attitudes and habits as well 
as social and material changes.  
Drawing on the epistemic virtue of meta-lucidity, Medina proposes two guiding 
principles for an epistemology of resistance: the principle of acknowledgment and 
engagement, and the principle of epistemic equilibrium. The former demands that all the 
cognitive forces be acknowledged and engaged (2013, 50). The latter principle dictates 
that agents search for equilibrium in the “interplay of cognitive forces” (2013, 50). Such 
an equilibrium requires epistemic meta-lucidity as well as an epistemic responsibility to 
others. On this latter point, Medina draws on Miranda Fricker’s account of testimonial 
responsibility to highlight the need for agents to understand “how identity power 
functions in their society, and how epistemic appraisals (such as credibility assessments) 
                                                        
237 Medina describes epistemic vices (arrogance, laziness, and closed-mindedness) that cultivate an active 
ignorance (Medina 2013, 39). These epistemic vices are structural and systematic, and manifest as a 
cognitive superiority complex and a lack of curiosity in the perspectives of others. Medina defines active 
ignorance as “an ignorance that occurs with the active participation of the subject and with a battery of 
defense mechanisms” (2013, 39). 
 
238 Medina’s approach to epistemic resistance stresses the importance of cultivating an openness to a 
multiplicitous set of perspectives developed by both individuals and collectives in solidarity networks, 
which are formed “by weaving together problems, values, and goals, that though often irreducibly different 
[…] can be addressed simultaneously and enjoy mutual support” (Medina 2013, 308). 
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and testimonial exchanges are mediated and colored by social perceptions and 
stereotypes” (2013, 54). 
Crucially, the disruption of epistemic assumptions cannot occur solely through 
cognitive means but requires material and social change. As Kristie Dotson tells us, there 
are irreducible features of epistemic oppression. Epistemic oppression, of which settler 
ignorance is one example, is an epistemic by-product of larger social and political 
systems that often resists transformation (Dotson 2014). Her account of contributory 
injustice reveals that the underlying schemata that give rise to epistemic exclusions resists 
the very identification of its exclusions. This is why Medina’s description of the 
emotional turmoil of epistemic friction is so helpful here. While epistemic exclusions are 
hard to see and name, they can be felt. For this reason, Alison Bailey offers that 
“performance art, spoken word, mystical insights, mindfulness about affective resources, 
or by applying non-Western cosmologies and epistemologies critically to the unlevel 
knowing field” can better identify and change third-order epistemic oppression (Bailey 
2014, 67).  
An account of reconciliation as reparation is helpful in naming both material 
reparations (e.g. monetary reparations and land restitutions) and relational reparations in 
the form of reparative knowing. In this respect, the language of reparation highlights the 
connection between epistemology and social change. A change in epistemology does not 
solely occur on the cognitive level and, as such, a change to settler ignorance requires 
affective and material changes. In particular, I contend that a rejection of settler colonial 
epistemology can occur through a turn to land-based education.  
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Reparative Knowing and Land-based Education 
Reconciliation must be placed within a spiritual context,  
as an intervention in settled understandings of identity and place  
Chief Robert Joseph, head of the Indian Residential Schools Survivors’ Society239 
 
In chapter 3, I argued that the settler colonial logic of elimination leads to an 
epistemic elimination, which in turn comes to be used as justification for the seizure of 
Indigenous land. This epistemic elimination arises from a settler colonial epistemology 
which defines rationality in terms of a property-relation to land. The settler colonial 
project of seizing Indigenous land and eliminating Indigenous communities destroys 
relationships in place, and then dismisses the epistemic and ethical import of this 
destruction. Accordingly, agential relations to land are taken to be a sign of rational and 
moral inferiority. This presumed inferiority comes to justify settler colonial expansionism 
and assimilationist policies, such as the Indian Residential Schools system. Epistemic 
elimination, which discredits Indigenous peoples as rational knowers, works to uphold an 
invisibility and ignorance of past and present settler colonialism. For these reasons, I 
contend that a transformation of settler ignorance must begin by challenging the 
epistemic assumptions that prevent Indigenous speakers from contributing to public 
knowledge-production and knowledge-circulation. 
I identify Western epistemology’s aim for placelessness as a lynchpin to the 
epistemic elimination of Indigenous peoples. For this reason, the project of working 
towards unsettling settler ignorance through reparative knowing must begin from a 
                                                        
239 Qtd in Nagy 2013, 69. 
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critical re-valuation of the placelessness of epistemology. Land-based education has the 
potential to create the “epistemic friction” needed to spark a change out of the inertia of 
settler ignorance insofar as it rejects the assumption of placelessness (Medina 2013, 29). 
This is not to suggest, however, that a change in epistemology in itself will bring about 
political change. Rather, my account of settler ignorance shows the extent to which 
epistemic assumptions come to justify settler colonial violence. As such, transformation 
would require, as a necessary (but not sufficient) condition, the reworking of these 
assumptions. A consideration of alternative epistemologies serves to identify both the 
epistemological limitations of state-sanctioned truth commissions and highlights the 
violences of such epistemic assumptions.   
Land-based education explicitly rejects the placelessness of Western 
epistemology by considering land as a source of knowledge and understanding (Wildcat 
et al, 2014). An exploration of land as a “system of reciprocal social relations and ethical 
practices” provides an epistemic and ontological framework for reparation (2014, ii). 
Land-based education prioritizes Indigenous resurgence and the sustenance of Indigenous 
life in ways that contest the settler colonial drive for elimination.240 Land-based education 
does not aim for reconciliation through the tokenized inclusion of Indigenous 
epistemologies within settler education but seeks to revitalize Indigenous communities in 
order to work towards decolonization.241  
                                                        
240 See McCoy et al. 2016.  
 
241 Indigenous resurgence has become one of the most robust scholarly paradigms to study Indigenous 
politics for theorizing how a shift in the consciousness of Indigenous peoples, away from reconciliation and 
towards decolonization, would provide the foundation of an Indigenous social movement capable of 
transforming Canadian society (Wildcat et al. 2014, iii).  
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Land-based education gives an account of ethical relationships in terms of 
grounded normativity. Grounded normativity is the ethical framework that emerges from 
“place-based practices and associated forms of knowledge” (Coulthard 2014, 60). Leanne 
Betasamosake Simpson affirms that it is an ethical framework that does not have a pre-
determined structure or conclusion but is generated and “maintained from deep 
engagement with Indigenous processes that are inherently physical, emotional, 
intellectual, and spiritual” (Simpson 2017, 23). Since land is a connection of 
relationships, a land-based ethics is one that emerges from the particular obligations to 
the particular relationships in place.242  
Grounded normativity is an ethical model that both rejects the placelessness of 
settler colonial epistemology and resists the moral authority of the settler nation.243 It 
presents an alternative model of reconciliation in the refusal to see the legitimacy of the 
settler nation. According to grounded normativity, reconciliation must itself be place-
specific.  
 
Conclusion  
So, what does this mean in the context of settler ignorance and the Canadian 
TRC? What does a model of grounded normativity suggest as a way forward? According 
to grounded normativity, the ways forward emerge from relationships in place, and so 
cannot be unilateral. The emphasis on land as a source of knowledge, however, is 
                                                        
242 Deloria and Wildcat 2001. 
 
243 “Having undergone cultural regeneration, an Indigenous resurgence would engage in an outward, 
disciplined confrontation with settler society” (Wildcat et al. 2014, iv).  
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suggestive for both an account of reconciliation as refusal and resurgence, and 
reconciliation of reparation. The model of grounded normativity points to the need for 
land-based responses that emerge from relationships with the land. These responses are 
unlike attempts to ‘reconcile’ a difficult past through state mandate, which are not 
responsive to relationships to land. Reconciliation as refusal and resurgence, however, 
points to actions that are responsive to communities.244 Settlers have an ethical 
responsibility to listen and to be open to hearing refusal of settler authority and to disrupt 
settler ignorance. On this account, reconciliation as reparation highlights the need for 
material reparations as well as a model of reparative knowing that is open to hearing such 
refusals.  
Land-based education has the promise of creating the epistemic friction needed to 
begin the work of disrupting the felt normalcy of settler common sense and making 
visible the epistemic assumptions of settler ignorance. A focus on the ethical import of 
sustaining relationships in place disrupts Western philosophy’s ambitions to a placeless 
account of the world and reveals that this ambition only serves to justify, and thus evade 
ethical responsibility for, the destruction and genocide of Indigenous communities. For 
this reason, reconciliation requires a rejection of epistemologies and ontologies that have 
justified (and continue to justify) settler colonial violence.  
Throughout my dissertation, I have shown that a transformation of settler identity 
requires a critical investigation into the epistemic assumptions that normalizes and 
                                                        
244 Leanne Simpson names examples of Indigenous land-based responses that are response to relations in 
place—the community of Hollow Water First Nation’s Community Holistic Circle of Healing as a 
Nishnaabeg restorative justice model to address sexual violence in their community; Grassy Narrows First 
Nation’s fight against mercury poisoning in their river system; and the Akwesasne Freedom School that 
provides Mohawk education for Mohawk children (Simpson 2016, 24-25).  
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naturalizes settler colonialism. Without such a critical investigation into settler ignorance, 
we settlers can believe the myth of our own benevolence, which masks and justifies 
ongoing violence. Whereas the TRC inadvertently perpetuates settler colonial authority in 
its epistemic assumptions, the model of land-based education presents a radically 
different picture of reconciliation. For one, reconciliation is not one that can occur within 
the confines of state recognition but is rather an on-going process that emerges from 
relationships to, and with, the land. For this reason, reconciliation requires a central focus 
on land restitution and a nation-to-nation relationship with the Canadian government. A 
change in settler colonial epistemology entails, for settlers, a new relationship with land. 
Reconciliation requires settlers to critically transform our epistemology and ontology in 
order to attend to our relationships to, and in, place for the first time. Reconciliation for 
settlers, in this respect, must be thoroughly grassroots and profoundly unsettling.  
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APPENDIX 
THE 2008 STATEMENT OF APOLOGY  
The treatment of children in Indian Residential Schools is a sad chapter in our history. 
For more than a century, Indian Residential Schools separated over 150,000 Aboriginal 
children from their families and communities. In the 1870's, the federal government, 
partly in order to meet its obligation to educate Aboriginal children, began to play a role 
in the development and administration of these schools.  Two primary objectives of the 
Residential Schools system were to remove and isolate children from the influence of 
their homes, families, traditions and cultures, and to assimilate them into the dominant 
culture.  These objectives were based on the assumption Aboriginal cultures and spiritual 
beliefs were inferior and unequal. Indeed, some sought, as it was infamously said, “to kill 
the Indian in the child”.  Today, we recognize that this policy of assimilation was wrong, 
has caused great harm, and has no place in our country. 
One hundred and thirty-two federally-supported schools were located in every province 
and territory, except Newfoundland, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island.  Most 
schools were operated as "joint ventures" with Anglican, Catholic, Presbyterian or United 
Churches.  The Government of Canada built an educational system in which very young 
children were often forcibly removed from their homes, often taken far from their 
communities.  Many were inadequately fed, clothed and housed.  All were deprived of 
the care and nurturing of their parents, grandparents and communities.  First Nations, 
Inuit and Métis languages and cultural practices were prohibited in these 
schools.  Tragically, some of these children died while attending residential schools and 
others never returned home. 
The government now recognizes that the consequences of the Indian Residential Schools 
policy were profoundly negative and that this policy has had a lasting and damaging 
impact on Aboriginal culture, heritage and language.  While some former students have 
spoken positively about their experiences at residential schools, these stories are far 
overshadowed by tragic accounts of the emotional, physical and sexual abuse and neglect 
of helpless children, and their separation from powerless families and communities. 
The legacy of Indian Residential Schools has contributed to social problems that continue 
to exist in many communities today.  
It has taken extraordinary courage for the thousands of survivors that have come forward 
to speak publicly about the abuse they suffered.  It is a testament to their resilience as 
individuals and to the strength of their cultures.  Regrettably, many former students are 
not with us today and died never having received a full apology from the Government of 
Canada. 
The government recognizes that the absence of an apology has been an impediment to 
healing and reconciliation.  Therefore, on behalf of the Government of Canada and all 
Canadians, I stand before you, in this Chamber so central to our life as a country, to 
apologize to Aboriginal peoples for Canada's role in the Indian Residential Schools 
system. 
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To the approximately 80,000 living former students, and all family members and 
communities, the Government of Canada now recognizes that it was wrong to forcibly 
remove children from their homes and we apologize for having done this.  We now 
recognize that it was wrong to separate children from rich and vibrant cultures and 
traditions that it created a void in many lives and communities, and we apologize for 
having done this.  We now recognize that, in separating children from their families, we 
undermined the ability of many to adequately parent their own children and sowed the 
seeds for generations to follow, and we apologize for having done this.  We now 
recognize that, far too often, these institutions gave rise to abuse or neglect and were 
inadequately controlled, and we apologize for failing to protect you.  Not only did you 
suffer these abuses as children, but as you became parents, you were powerless to protect 
your own children from suffering the same experience, and for this we are sorry. 
The burden of this experience has been on your shoulders for far too long.  The burden is 
properly ours as a Government, and as a country.  There is no place in Canada for the 
attitudes that inspired the Indian Residential Schools system to ever prevail again. You 
have been working on recovering from this experience for a long time and in a very real 
sense, we are now joining you on this journey. The Government of Canada sincerely 
apologizes and asks the forgiveness of the Aboriginal peoples of this country for failing 
them so profoundly. 
Nous le regrettons 
We are sorry 
Nimitataynan 
Niminchinowesamin 
Mamiattugut 
In moving towards healing, reconciliation and resolution of the sad legacy of Indian 
Residential Schools, implementation of the Indian Residential Schools Settlement 
Agreement began on September 19, 2007. Years of work by survivors, communities, and 
Aboriginal organizations culminated in an agreement that gives us a new beginning and 
an opportunity to move forward together in partnership. 
A cornerstone of the Settlement Agreement is the Indian Residential Schools Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission.  This Commission presents a unique opportunity to educate 
all Canadians on the Indian Residential Schools system.  It will be a positive step in 
forging a new relationship between Aboriginal peoples and other Canadians, a 
relationship based on the knowledge of our shared history, a respect for each other and a 
desire to move forward together with a renewed understanding that strong families, 
strong communities and vibrant cultures and traditions will contribute to a stronger 
Canada for all of us. 
On behalf of the Government of Canada 
The Right Honourable Stephen Harper, 
Prime Minister of Canada245  
                                                        
245 June 11, 2008 
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